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ABSTRACT 
The dissertation examines the origins of textile engineering 
in Yorkshire, particularly in the context of its 
relationship with the textile industry and with a wider 
industrializing community. Because machine-making occupied a 
unique and crucial role in industrialization, an 
appreciation of how the industry developed offers a means of 
better understanding the dynamics of industrialization, and 
particularly the part played by technological change in the 
process. Whether the industry worked competitively, or 
preferred a form of productive association, provides a 
central theme. 
The study considers the technical and social origins of 
mechanical engineering, examining the change from machine- 
making as an non-specialist pursuit to its emergence as a 
specialist industry in its own right. Through case studies 
concentrating upon Keighley and Leeds, the two major centres 
of textile engineering in Yorkshire, attention is directed 
at questions of entrepreneurial origins, the level of skill 
required as the industry evolved, how the process of 
technological innovation and diffusion operated, and changes 
in the organization of machine-making and expansion of 
markets over the period. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The marvellous body of machinery ... is one of the most 
surprising and interesting spectacles that the eye of man 
can survey, and presents a forcible example of the 
subjugation of brute matter to the mind anI dominion of 
man, as effected by science and mechanism. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the scale and 
diversity of the British textile industry had become a 
2 
source of wonder to contemporary commentators. The numbers 
of factories and of employees, the quantity of raw materials 
consumed, the size of the export market, and above all the 
range of mechanical innovations, all excited the admiration 
of such writers. Yet there is little in these accounts to 
explain the origins of this machinery which had made 
possible a revolution in textile production. Beyond the 
customary references to inventors of certain machines, 
nothing was said about the means by which machinery was 
improved, produced and brought into service. 
Although textile engineering in Yorkshire had grown from 
virtually nothing in the closing decades of the eighteenth 
century to become a major industry in its own right by 1850, 
its main claim to interest lies beyond its own rapid 
expansion. To study only the progress of a local industryt 
however vigorous its growth might have been, still amounts 
to micro-history, and that can make only a limited 
contribution to a more general historical understanding*3 
Rather the interest of the burgeoning machine-making 
industry lies in its relationship with textiles and the 
wider industrializing community. The machine-making industry 
supplied the means by which textiles, whose central role in 
industrialization is indisputable, was able to achieve its 
astonishing expansion. To understand the origins and the 
nature of the industry which occupied this special role is 
therefore-a way to better appreciate the dynamics of 
industrialization, and particularly the role of 
- 
technological change in that process. That above all is the 
justification for this work. 
Previous histories of the engineering industry have been 
more concerned with the period of consolidation after 1850 
than with its foundations. The emphasis upon this later 
period, and generally upon large and successful firms, has 
accentuated an impression of an industry highly organized, 
concentrated and competitive. For example Kirk follows the 
fortunes of five of the seven largest firms in the 
Lancashire machine-making industry between 1870 and 1939.4 
Saul, while identifying certain important features of 
factory-floor organization in the industry, considers only 
the period after 1860 in a chapter which covers the whole of 
mechanical engineering. 5 Floud, though strenuously 
attempting to account for the entire machine-tool industry, 
deals with that sector's growth after 1850 and inevitably 
6 focuses upon the largest firms. 
In contrast with Kirk, Saul and Floud, whose work was not 
intended to examine earlier engineeringl Musson and 
Robinson's Science and Technology in the Industrial 
Revolution promises much, with chapters entitled 'Science 
before the Industrial Revolution' 9 'The diffusion of 
technology during the Industrial Revolution', and 'The 
7 origins of engineering in Lancashire'. Musson and Robinson 
assembled an impressive range of evidence, and because early 
engineering has been so little studied, their work has been 
8 influential and is widely quoted. It has also been strongly 
criticized for failing to meet its extravagant claim to 
offer 'a major re-interpretation of the Industrial 
Revolution'. 9 The book has other faults, for despite its 
title it does not grasp the relationship between science and 
technology, and fails to explain adequately the technical 
background of the mechanical engineering industry, 
specifically the strand of artisan craft from which 
- 
engineering grew. Although Musson and Robinson make a 
promising start to their chapter on the origins of 
Lancashire engineering - 'It is extraordinary how little is 
known about the engineers who produced the water-wheels, 
steam engines, textile and other machinery of the early 
Industrial Revolution. ' - the chapter ends lamely 'no doubt 
the roots of this technical development lie deeper in 
history ... 1. Their broad brush approach, by neglecting 
subtle distinctions between various groups engaged in early 
machine-making, both fails to pinpoint links between 
machine-making and science, and also, despite the cast of 
thousands, misses any real sense of the industry's 
dynamism. 10 
It is natural that a history of engineering will be raked 
over to provide ammunition for those who favour a 
technological explanation of industrialization. Although 
engineering, being atypical of the general run of 
industries, has limited potential as an industrial case 
study, it can inform a wider debate on the nature of 
industrialization. On the other hand, any misreading of the 
character of early engineering can produce a distorted view 
of technological development. Landes, for example, by 
accepting Musson and Robinson's impression of the Lancashire 
industry, overstates-the theoretical knowledge of early 
machine-makers and overlooks changes over decades and 
distinctions between trades. As a result his conclusions 
about why the 'harvest of inventions' and their rapid 
diffusion should have occurred in Britain rather than 
elsewhere are not fully convincing. 
" 
Landes defined the 'heart of the industrial revolution' in 
terms of technological change. 12 It is possible to see that 
Landes's stress upon the role of technology in the process 
is extreme, as many have, yet agree with Rosenberg that 'a 
responsive machinery-producing industry has been the key to 
- 10 - 
successful industrialization'. 13 Whether Landes or Rosenberg 
has the emphasis right, the history of machine-making is 
relevant to the debate about the causes and speed of 
industrialization. That, then, stands as the main purpose of 
this work, to provide a clearer view of the origins and 
development of a trade which played a central role in 
industrialization. By considering textile engineering in the 
context of local communities and in the light of its 
relationship with the textile industry, it is also intended 
to offer some explanation of both the process of 
technological change and the nature of competition. A 
supplementary issue is that of continuity or discontinuity, 
whether gradual change rooted in long-established tradition 
could be a distinguishing feature of a new and 'high-tech' 
industry. There is also a question to be considered of how 
far the industry's development was planned and directed, or 
whether it evolved through intuitive responses to a series 
of problems. 
II 
Berg has criticized the teleological approach to industrial 
history, a concentration upon large and successful firms 
encouraged by the uneven survival of business records and 
other sources, an approach which produces an 'historical 
chasm between the known - the factory system and large-scale 
production - and the unknown - the artisan and the small- 
and medium-scale producer'. 
14 Specifically on the subject of 
the engineering industry, Floud emphasises that the 
? aggregated business history' of large firms can hardly add 
up to a complete account of an industry when a 'submerged 
section' of small workshops was responsible for so much of 
the production. 15 
Previous efforts to identify Floud's 'submerged section' of 
engineering have not amounted to a great deal, other than in 
Floud's own work sifting through late-nineteenth century 
-11 - 
directories. 'It has also to be remembered', says Floud, 
'that securing the necessary information becomes 
progressively more difficult as the enquiry is pushed back 
into the nineteenth century'. 16 But the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries are not the Dark Ages, and both Berg 
and Hudson17 have shown how a community-wide approach can 
illuminate aspects of industry when business records alone 
are inadequate. Even where relevant company records do 
survive, information from a wider community may offer 
supporting evidence, and also place industry in its proper 
context. This makes possible a more accurate assessment ofs 
for example, some of the more exaggerated accounts of 
success or failure advanced by Victorian commentators. As 
far as the early engineering industry in Yorkshire is 
concerned, an emphasis upon community evidence may be the 
only possible approach, for Floud's 'submerged section' 
describes more or less the whole industry. Even those who 
prefer to investigate the large and successful would have to 
dip underwater in search of the humble origins of what would 
later become famous firms. But in order that the development 
of an industry is properly appreciated, it is just as 
important to uncover failure, to identify those who moved 
into other trades through choice or necessity, and to know 
about those modest successes whose businesses did not 
survive in the long term, yet who managed at least for a 
time to make an adequate living. 
Using sources which fall outside the standard definition of 
business records has the advantage of showing up small or 
temporary industrial formations, and perhaps identifying the 
origins or subsequent careers of lesser participants in a 
trade. There is another positive benefit in focussing upon a 
wider community, for where work and social life overlap as 
they did in early engineering communities, then industrial 
history should not confine itself to the workplace but ought 
to take into account social issues. A community-orientated 
- 12 - 
approach to industrial history may be more likely to stress 
continuities, though that does not mean such a viewpoint is 
flawed. By setting discontinuities in a context of those 
things which did not alter, there may be a better means of 
evaluating the significance of change. 
It is., though, a business archive, the records of Richard 
Hattersley of Keighley and his successors, 18 which has been 
the mainstay of this research. The Hattersley archive 
provides a considerable and continuous, though not fully 
complete, record of the firm's activities from 1793 into the 
twentieth century. It is fortuitous that it was Hattersley's 
records which were the ones to survive in such quantity and 
quality, as-his firm occupied a dominant and central 
position in the Keighley engineering industry during the 
whole period, and through Hattersley can be traced links 
with Leeds, the other major engineering centre of West 
Yorkshire. 
Information from Hattersley's records has been amplified or 
confirmed by using other local evidence so that the 
Hattersley family, their workers, subcontractors and 
customers can be drawn into a community context. These other 
sources are mainly standard ones such as parish registers 
and census returns, though Keighley records include a muster 
roll of 1803 which lists almost the whole male population, 
" 
and also a remarkable secondary work, John Hodgson's much 
quoted Textile Manufacture and Other Industries in 
Keighley. 20 Hodgson's information, though not always the 
dates he quotes, has proved exceptionally accurate where it 
can be verified. He had lived in Keighley from the age of 
eight in 1815, and as first a textile manufacturer, and 
later a rate and tax collector, possessed detailed personal 
knowledge of the early industries and industrialists of the 
town. 21 
- 13 - 
The main body, of information for this study has been drawn 
from the two main engineering centres, Leeds and Keighley, 
though incorporating any available evidence of other 
engineers in the region (which will be referred to 
conveniently, though anachronistically, as West Yorkshire). 
Keighley, being a well-defined, self-contained and 
reasonably static community blessed with good source 
material, has been able to provide a very full account of 
early machine-making. The study of Leeds-engineering, while 
not in total quite so satisfactory, is comprehensive in its 
coverage of the more important engineers. 
III 
The method adopted in this dissertation is to consider in 
turn some of the component elements of the new machine- 
making industry, and attempt to relate each of these topics 
to wider historical debates, for example on the origins of 
entrepreneurs, or about the nature of skill. Engineering is 
set in its community context and defined in relation to its 
customer industry, textiles. The main themes which recur 
include the dynamics of technological change and the role of 
competition, issues of continuity and discontinuity, and 
whether the industry's development was the result of any 
conscious planning. 
To understand the character and standing of textile 
engineering, it is necessary to know its precedents, 
whether, for example, it'grew as a sideline of longer 
established trades, whether it resulted from the self-help 
efforts of machine-users who had no other means of acquiring 
machinery, or whether it had connections with the middle- 
class profession of engineering. The opening chapter 
considers evidence of the ancestry of machine-making, and 
also defines phases in the development of the industry 
between 1780 and 1850. 
- 14 - 
Crucial to the success of any new industry is the quality of 
business leadership. In this case the backgrounds of early 
entrepreneurs, their trade and hence their social origin, 
can define the character of the early industry. By linking 
information about entrepreneurial origins with what is known 
of the fortunes of their firms, it may be possible to 
conclude that particular skills or capital, or connection, 
were especially important in olr to succeed. The question 
of skill is explored further in the second chapter, which 
examines how a skilled workforce was recruited and trained 
to make machinery. The skill and knowledge required, though 
its actual level may have changed over time, could also have 
been influenced by social conventions. In other words, the 
trade may have become progressively de-skilled, though still 
claiming to be skilled in order to protect the vested 
interests of existing participants. Such a process may also 
have affected opportunities for mobility, either into 
entrepreneurship or through advancement as a journeyman. 
Relationships within the industry, between entrepreneurs and 
with the wider workforce, are central to an explanation of 
the dynamics of technological change. If innovation were 
taking place on the engineering shop-floor, is it possible 
to identify what informed it, how it was stimulated, and by 
what means the resulting technology spread? If innovation 
were the product of social processes within an innovating 
community, could it also have been considered the property 
of that whole community? If that were the case, then 
previously held beliefs about secrecy and protection of 
technology require reappraisal. The way in which technology, 
which was after all the raison dletre of machine-making, was 
developed and regarded may provide the best clue to 
understanding the new industry. 
Relationships are explored further in the chapter on the 
industry's organization, which considers in particular 
-15 - 
whether textile engineering could really have functioned as 
a community of producers. Besides describing how work was 
arranged, this sets out to demonstrate any connections 
between individual machine-makers and assess the extent of 
any network of engineers. 
Finally there is an examination of the market, looking not 
merely at its extent, value and location but considering 
whether it might have played a more inter-active role, 
influencing the growth, concentration, organization, and the 
technical development, of the industry. 
-16- 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PRECEDENTS AND PHASES 
It is the Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward 
sense of that word; the age which, with its whole 
undivided might, forwards, teaches and practises the 
great art of adapting means to ends. 
Thomas Carlyle, SiRns of the Times (1829) 
The origins of mechanical engineering are commonly 
misunderstood. It has often been assumed, wrongly, that 
textile machine-making grew as an offshoot from established 
trades such as that of the millwright. Another 
misapprehension is to see the industry as static, though 
growing, rather in the way that pre-Renaissance artists drew 
children as miniature adults, ignoring those changes which 
come with development. In this view, textile engineering grew 
much bigger but essentially it stayed the same. Within such a 
frozen framework the dynamism which was a distinctive feature 
of machine-making can easily be understated. The industry 
thrived because of an ability to respond to its customers' 
rapidly changing needs, and changed markedly itself as a 
result. Textile engineering in its infant periodt before 
1800, was not the same as, nor did it much resemblet the 
maturing industry of the mid-nineteenth century. Generalized 
accounts which ignore those distinctive changes during the 
industry's formative period have failed to properly 
understand the industry. 1 
This opening chapter has two purposes. First9 it will examine 
possibilities regarding the origins of textile engineering, 
to determine whether this really was a new industry of the 
late eighteenth century which developed separately from 
textiles. Alternative explanations are that it grew out of 
domestic machine-making, that it was established by 
millwrights, or that it remained largely a sideline of 
textile manufacture, splintering off to form a separate 
-18- 
industry only much later. Secondly, the chapter aims to 
distinguish phases in the early textile engineering industry, 
with some definition of parts, processes and location. 
MAKING TRADITIONAL MACHINES 
When textiles were produced in domestic workshops, during the 
first stages of the industrial revolution and earlier, a 
variety of machinery was already in use. Much of this 
equipment was of simple, even crude, construction, and it was 
made mainly from wood. The heaviest machinery used in textile 
manufacture at that time, the stocks, water wheels and 
transmission gear in fulling mills, had long been the 
2 preserve of the millwright. Less has been recorded about the 
production of handlooms, spinning wheels and other items for 
domestic use. 
Drawing together evidence from textile districts in southern 
England and the Midlands during the early modern period, 
Kerridge shows that looms had been 
fashioned from oak, beech or ash .* fitted with elm or iron screws, nuts and bolts, cane sleys and metal plates 
and gears. Shuttles and spools were carved out of solid 
wood. The turnerli lathe and the graver's knife were 
much in evidence. 
Specialist tradesmen involved in making this early machinery 
included turners and wheelwrights (for spinning wheels)p 
carpenters, joiners and locksmiths and framesmiths (who may 
sometimes have styled themselves blacksmiths). Kerridge found 
references to a sixteenth century Iturnour or maker of 
loomes' in London, and to Canterbury weavers using a 'turner 
for framyng of ther lomes'. The making of knitting frames was 
sufficiently organized to have generated a small but 
significant export market during the seventeenth century. 
4 
Kerridge locates the specialist machine-making industry of 
the early modern period in Exeter, Colchester, Canterbury, 
London and Norwich for looms, and Wymondham, Great Bardfield, 
-19 
- 
Tewkesbury, Norwich and Leicester for spinning wheels and 
5 spindles. Similarly handloom weavers on the Scottish borders 
bought many of their looms from specialist producers in 
Glasgow or sometimes Edinburgh. 6 
Sometimes machinery was produced, in whole or in part, by 
machine-users themselves. In Canterbury, Flemish drapers had 
their own turners' shops, with lathes for making spindles and 
7 bobbin blanks. In Norfolk, weavers made loom-frames which 
they fitted with parts bought ready made from specialists, a 
practice also adopted by expatriate framework knitters in 
Avignon in 1658, who fitted metal parts made to order by 
local clockmakers and locksmiths into frames which they had 
built themselves. 8 Though no evidence has been found of such 
" specialist machine-making industry in the north of England, 
" similar system could have operated, with machine-users 
building frames and buying parts - spindles, metalwork or 
wheels - from local smiths or joiners. But as even domestic 
machine-making demanded a certain level of skill, it is more 
likely that wood- and metal-workers in textile districts 
accepted the construction of looms and spinning wheels as an 
occasional part of their work. 
According to directories of 1772-3 and later, some Manchester 
woodworkers were then making looms in a more systematic and 
professional fashion. 9 These carpenters grasped an 
opportunity presented by the huge increase in demand for 
handlooms after the mechanization of cotton spinning. 
10 Early 
directories for Yorkshire are less helpful in identifying 
loom-makers, but the domestic machine industry east of the 
Pennines probably followed a similar path to that in 
Lancashire. In 1781 a foreigner evidently on a spying mission 
was able to 'procure a machine to be made' and 'bespoke 
another lately invented machine' in Leeds. The first of these 
was 'a compleat spinning jenny', the second a scribbling 
mill. Who was responsible for their manufacture is not made 
-20- 
clear,, though the business was still the province of 
traditional makers, probably woodworkers. The report refers 
to 'the Makers of these kinds of machines' as though a 
recognised trade then existed. 11 
The Leeds millwright John Jubb, who had been producing 
improved machines for scribbling and carding wool and 
'Engines &c both for cotton and fleece wool' for several 
years before 1784, sold four handlooms to John Marshall in 
1788, presumably for experiments in weaving linen. 12 It was 
unusual for such domestic machines to be supplied by a 
millwright. Benjamin Gott bought handlooms for Bean Ing Mill 
from small makers in neighbouring villages. Gott's notes of 
mill practice (c. 1810-6) record the purchase of five 
handlooms at 99 each from Nathan Carlton of Armley, four at 
98 from Bentley of Birstall and two at seven guineas from 
Thomas Taylor of Armley. 13 A directory identified similar 
small local businesses in 1822, when loom- and shuttle-makers 
were listed in Barnsley, Dewsbury and Batley, 14 though more 
were concealed in the listings of general machine-makers. 
That there remained an industry separate from mainstream 
textile engineering to cater for the needs of domestic 
textile-making is shown by an 1838 directory which marked out 
several joiners as 'Jenny and Loom makers' in Pudsey though 
not in neighbouring places where they certainly existed. 
15 As 
these domestic machine manufacturers served a purely local 
market, directories did not usually bother to specify this 
aspect of their work. 
If it is true that handloom weavers experienced a golden ageg 
then handloom-makers must also have found increased business 
after spinning was mechanized. It was estimated that there 
were a quarter of a million handlooms at work in the U. K. 
cotton industry in 1836 16 and thousands more working in the 
woollen and worsted branches. 17 But the boom was short-lived, 
for although handlooms were still in widespread use in the 
-21 - 
woollen industry as late as 1850, in some cases persisting 
into the twentieth century, orders for new handlooms would 
have become increasingly infrequent. Some of those 
specializing in pre-industrial machinery continued to refine 
their products. John Antis (or Antes) of Fulneck won a prize 
from the Society of Arts in 1793 for his improved mechanism 
for the Saxony wheel. 18 More exoticallyg John Planta, active 
in the same trade at Fulneck between 1798 and 1824, developed 
cabinet-making skills to produce spinning wheels of 
superlative quality, inlaid with woods and ivory, to be sold 
as drawing room-pieces and lamp-holders. 
19 But hand-powered 
machinery, however improved, was becoming obsolete, most 
makers did not have the option of a luxury market, and their 
natural route was back into wood-working trades. 
Handlooms have persisted in some sectors of the textile 
industry. As recently as 1993 a new broadloom was launched to 
transform the cottage industry in Harris tweed, but by 
changing the product to suit modern markets rather than 
trying to alter technology which, though old-fashioned, 
ideally suits local needs. 20 In Yorkshire, handlooms 
continued to be widely used for samples and speciality weaves 
in the Huddersfield industry into the twentieth century. 
21 An 
old handloom, now in the Colne Valley Museum, was rebuilt by 
J. Stansfield and Son of Almondbury for Josiah France of 
Honley, perhaps as late as the 1930s. Stansfield was a 
joiner22, and the superiority of his work over that of the 
original loom-maker is clear. Early domestic machines were of 
simple design and relatively easy for a wood-worker to 
produce. Colne Valley Museum's replica jenny was made by 
someone possessing basic handicraft skills, adapting second- 
hand parts from other types of textile machine. 
23 
Those wood-workers who converted to the new machine-making 
industry, where they continue to be employed on the fringesq 
acquired a higher degree of skill than had been necessary in 
-22- 
domestic machine production. For example, great precision was 
required of carding machine builders during the opening years 
of the nineteenth century in the United States, where wood, 
being more plentiful than iron, was the preferred material. 24 
A Gomersal textile engineer interviewed in 1992 still 
employed a full-time joiner/ coach-builder whose work 
included making wooden covers for carding machines, and 
timber carriages for mules. 25 Those carpenters who took up 
manufacture of the new textile machinery after about 1800 had 
moved into a different industry, leaving behind them that 
which made domestic machines. The domestic machinery industry 
was not a forerunner of modern machine-making and continued 
to function quite separately from it, for as long as hand 
machines were required. 
MAKING MACHINERY: BEFORE THE MACHINE-MAKERS 
Before 1800 a number of machine-makers set up in business in 
the textile towns of Yorkshire, building new kinds of textile 
machinery in response to the local demand. They were not 
established in time to satisfy the earliest needs for such 
machines, for when the first factories appeared in Yorkshire, 
from 1780, a local textile engineering industry hardly 
existed. During this period of transition factory owners 
adopted various expedients to acquire machinery. Such 
measures may have been purely short-term and pragmatic, 
though it is possible that a more enduring machine-making 
industry grew from these beginnings. 
Master millwrights are often credited with a pivotal role in 
erecting and equipping early factories, planning and 
organizing the building itself, and recruiting members of 
various trades, including journeymen millwrightsv joinerst 
clockmakers and smiths, to build the machinery in situ. 
26 
Individual millwrights in Yorkshire have left few traces of 
their activities at this time, with little known even of 
major figures like John Jubb of Leeds and John Sutcliffe of 
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Halifax. The number of millwrights in West Yorkshire was low, 
and they served a range of industries in addition to 
textiles. It is not likely that, in general, they would want 
or need to accept commissions to make textile machines. 
Millwrights mainly continued their traditional work, building 
and installing power sources, transmission systems and 
heavier machines like fulling stocks, and sometimes acting as 
consultants*27 Many textile manufacturers were able to 
organize factory building and oversee machine-making 
themselves, buying in certain specialist advice. Neither 
master nor journeymen millwrights were an obvious choice to 
employ as machine-makers, as their knowledge of textile 
machines was not necessarily any better than that possessed 
by other trades, like smiths, who were available at lower 
rates of pay. 
The central role of owners in building and equipping 
factories is clear from a number of local examples. One of 
the better documented is the worsted manufacturer Robert 
Heaton, who built a cotton mill at Ponden, or Roydhouse, six 
miles from Keighley. He was competent to supervise machinery 
construction, although it was in a branch of textiles with 
which he was unfamiliar. 28 Heaton's journal, running from 
about 1789 until the mill's completion in 1791, shows that he 
took advice from wherever he could find it when planning his 
venture. He used a series of agents and advisers, but did not 
consult a millwright until the project was well under way. 
Nor did he directly employ an engineer until the mill was 
complete. 
John Weatherhead of Keighley, a joiner who made spinning 
frames, advised Heaton on sources of metal components in 
Bradford and in Lancashire, and though he did not supply 
parts, labour or machiness was paid expenses for a visit to 
29 Haworth in 1791, presumably to comment on work at Ponden. 
Technical advice, as well as machinery, was offered to Heaton 
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by a Lancashire machine-maker: 
Richard Sagar, Burnley, and his brother at Blackburn, makes 
mules and jennys. He says a room six yards square will hold 
two mules of about 144 or 150 spindles. A room five yards 
square will hold two Jenneys, a jenny with 100 spindles 
will cost 0 
79 and will spin llb an Hour from 24 to 30 hanks 
in a lb. ' 
Although Heaton collected names of several other machine- 
31 makers in Bolton and Manchester , in the event the 
machinery for Ponden Mill was built on site, with parts 
brought in by tradesmen or agents. Heaton covered several 
pages of his journal with detailed specifications for wood to 
construct two cotton frames, each nine feet long, three pairs 
of, cards, binders for two spinning frames, and a roving 
frame. 32 His suppliers included James Greenwood, for brass 
work, 'two pairs of cards Iron Wheels' and oak planks. 33 
Joshua Smith built at least four spinning frames, Peter 
Milner dealt with the Bradford ironfounder John Sturges on 
behalf of Heaton, and John Brigg was employed to cut brass 
for a roving frame. 34 Brigg was subsequently engaged by 
Heaton and his partner, John Murgatroyd, for one year from 
September 1791 for forty pounds plus his meat, drink and 
lodging: 
to come and work for them at Roydhouseq Brassq Iron and 
Wood Turning and t 35 Act as Engineer for the cotton mill 
erected there ... 
Although Heaton showed an interest in books on mechanics and 
mathematics, 36 detailed blueprints for machinery could not 
be gleaned from any written source at this time. Machine 
specifications which he noted must have come from a personal 
contact, whose identity is not known. It was possibly the 
millwright Joseph Tempest, who was first consulted by Heaton 
in October 1790. Tempest had been under contract as 
millwright at Walk Mill, Keighley, in 1783, with a secrecy 
clause regarding the details of machinery there, though he 
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may not himself have made machinery then. 37 By 1793 he was 
buying rollers from Richard Hattersley and was presumably 
then producing spinning frames. But at Ponden he is known 
only to have advised on the design of a waterwheel, and 
perhaps oversaw the installation of a transmission system. 
Mr Joseph Tempest's Plan for a Mill to spin cotton at 
Roydhouse - Suppose the Water Wheel be 30 feet in Diameter, 
The Pitt Wheel must be 23 feet 9 inches and contain 324 
teeth in 18 segments, 18 teeth each. The Crown Wheel mýgt 
be 3 feet 1 inch in Diameter and Contain 41 teeth ... 
Heaton also noted that Tempest had placed orders for 
transmission parts at Sowerby Bridge. 39 There is no mention 
of him as a machine-maker. After being appointed engineer at 
Ponden, John Brigg took over the purchase of components, 
buying bobbins, brass wheels, an 'engine' and other parts in 
Keighley, and travelling to Halifax and Leeds for tools and 
engineering equipment. 
40 Before Brigg was hired, Heaton had 
himself superintended the construction of mill and machinery 
despite his lack of mechanical experience. 
Recognizing the advantages of mechanical expertise in such a 
situation, the partners at Greengate Mill, Keighley, in 1784 
employed an engineer called James Greenwood with 'a genius 
well adapted for constructing the machines and other works'. 
Despite his lack of capital, Greenwood was intended to become 
a partner. Though this never came to pass, he stayed long 
enough to oversee the construction of mill and machineryq 
following the pattern which was soon widespread of buying 
metal parts from local suppliers. 
41 
Even when ready-made machinery became available, the quality 
was questionable and quantities limited. One of Benjamin 
Gott's suppliers in 1794 was Samuel Fortune of Halifax, whose 
letter suggests a certain lack of sophistication: 
... we shall send billey and plucker and the willy on Thursday and cume with them to set them up, As we do not 
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cast for ouýplf we shall put wood bends to carrey the 
roulers .. 
Gott bought one or two machines from different engineers in 
Yorkshire, Lancashire and the West Country. Although the net 
was spread wide, there is an impression that much on offer 
was less than satisfactory. 
John Marshall, the Leeds flax-spinner, was establishing his 
factory at the same time as Gott, though Marshall's approach 
was in certain ways exceptional. He, like other 
entrepreneursq was centrally involved in developing 
machinerys but more unusually kept systematic records of 
technical information and experiments conducted. 43 His notes 
almost certainly date from the early 1790s, when new 
factories in Holbeck were planned - Mill A and several other 
buildings were completed by 1792, and Mill B in 1794.44 
Marshall differed from others in that he was not an 
established textile manufacturer, and he had chosen a much 
more risky venture than cotton-spinning. Success with flax 
hinged upon his ability to overcome technical difficulties, 
and consequently Marshall's methods differed from those of 
other factory builders. He already employed the smith Matthew 
Murray, an exceptionally talented mechanict whom he had 
sought out and recruited with particular aims in view. He did 
not need a millwright or other agent, though potentially 
useful pieces of information, from books or picked up in 
conversation with millwrights, engineers and other 
manufacturers, were noted. Although Marshall produced a list 
entitled 'Names of Mechanicks &C, 
45 only four of those 
recorded were machine-makerss none of whom were in West 
Yorkshire, the remaining ten being roller and/or spindle 
makers or other component suppliers. Marshall, like 
specialist machine-makers of later years, planned to buy 
precision parts for machinery of his own, or more accurately, 
Murray's. construction. Marshall's flax-spinning experiments 
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were more closely related to cotton than to the woollen 
branches, and the few machine-makers who then existed in 
Leeds could not satisfy his needs. The Leeds machine-making 
industry was small and probably less advanced than that in 
Keighley, where there was considerable experimentation with 
roller-spinning machinery during the 1790s. After Marshall 
had achieved success in mechanizing flax-spinning, he 
continued to keep more than usual control over the 
development and construction of machinery, maintaining close 
links with a succession of machine-makers Murray and Wood, 
Taylor and Wordsworth, and Peter Fairbairn whom he had 
helped to become independently established. But even 
Marshall, with his keen technical understanding, did not 
attempt to continue making his own machinery after Murray and 
Wood left him in 1795. Indeed, it was probably a condition of 
the agreement between Murray and Marshall that the flax- 
spinner would obtain his machinery from his former employee. 
As late as 1800-4, when machinery was much more readily 
available from specialist suppliers, Ard Walker, who was not 
a textile manufacturer but a spirit merchant, personally 
supervised the construction of his cotton mill in Hunslet. 
46 
He bought a 30 h. p. steam engine from Fenton, Murray and 
Wood, while other unspecified payments to them may have been 
for machinery. Ten spinning frames and other items were 
bought from Halifax in December 1800, and it has been 
suggested that these were used as models to be copied by 
Leeds engineers. 47 Walker's accounts do not make clear 
exactly how the machine-making was organized. A range of 
Leeds engineers and other tradesmen were employed on the 
project. Walker kept separate lists of expenditure on 
buildings and machinery, the latter including transmission 
equipment. The machinery account shows payments to Richard 
Pullan for a boiler, with castings and other metal parts from 
local founders, including Joseph Shaw, Martin Cawood, and 
Salt and Gothard, rollers and spindles from William Farmery 
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and others, and deal, oak and beech planks in large 
quantities. John Nicholls, a millwright, was paid weekly, in 
cash and in copious quantities of ale for his men, during 
separate and lengthy periods of the mill's construction, on 
both the building and 'machinery' accounts. The 'machinery' 
work could have been confined to traditional millwrights' 
jobs and excluded textile machine-making. William Milner, a 
whitesmith, was also retained for many weeks, probably to 
construct machines. In 1803/4 'Samuel Lawson, clockmaker', 
actually a machine-maker newly out of his apprenticeship at 
Murray's, was paid 94 4s Od for four week's work. Walker also 
brought in joiners, plumbers and painters to work on 
machinery. Overall supervision, along with tight financial 
control, was carried out by Ard Walker himself. The master 
millwright was only one of a number of contractors used, and 
his work was probably limited to structural metalwork and 
power transmission. Significantly one of Walker's last 
recorded payments was to a wood-worker, and not to the 
millwright: 
Iveson, joiner, at sundry times for inspecting the make of 
all the new machinery 97 7s Od 
Tann says that 'for the entrepreneur who lacked practical 
expertise the millwright was a vital consultant, 
48, but 
Iveson is an example of a new kind of adviser on technical 
aspects of textile machines. Smiths were also coming to the 
fore in this respect. These consultants assumed even greater 
importance where speculative factory builders had no 
knowledge of the textile industry. One such was William 
Robinson of Pudsey, who wrote to Walter Stanhope of Horsforth 
Hall in 1784: 
Thomas Marsden tells me that you intend building a 
Scribbling Mill at Horsforth and that he had recommended to 
you to employ rp as being a proper Person to superintend 
the Works 
-29- 
Robinson was able to estimate the costs of constructing three 
scribbling machines, broken down into wood, forged ironwork, 
cast ironwork, cards and workmanship, besides suggesting 
probable running costs and projecting annual profits. 
But even those with little or no experience in textiles or in 
mechanics sometimes managed without a consultant. Richard 
Smith, lord of the manor of Addingham, built High Mill there 
in 1788/9 apparently without direct assistance from any 
specialist millwright or machine-maker. He jotted 
specifications for the building in the back of an account 
book, did various calculations on the comparative costs and 
profits of spinning cotton or worsted, and bought parts from 
Leeds and Skipton - spindles from Skipton, and cast iron 
wheels from Salt and Gothard in Hunslet. 50 A local blacksmith 
turned spindles and carried out other unspecified work. 
Edward Brumfit, who had supplied iron wheels for the 
machines, drew a rough sketch on a scrap of paper showing 
Smith how to set up machinery for roller-spinning. 51 Brumfit 
appears to have been a haulier and may have acted only as a 
conduit for parts and information to Smith. 
Castle Hill Mill, Gomersal, which was started in about 1794 
but not completed until 18009 was also an isolated 
speculative venture by a landowner not experienced in textile 
manufacture. 52 Although it is not clear who was in day-to-day 
charge of the project, accounts for 1799-1800 draw a clear 
distinction between the work of the millwright, David 
Popplewell, that of a machine-maker called Samuel Holdsworth, 
and that of Benjamin Ross, a local blacksmith. 53 Wood and 
castings were brought in separately and the machinery erected 
at the mill. When work was complete, an inventory and 
valuation was taken, and while the Leeds millwright and 
machine-maker John Jubb (I) was one of the valuers of 
scribbling, carding and spinning machinery and transmission 
gear, a specialist engine maker, Edward Smalley, was employed 
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to list and value parts of the steam engine. 
54 Demarcation 
lines1were emerging between the branches of mechanical 
engineering. 
Such evidence of how early factories, both urban and rural, 
were built and equipped shows that it was usual for 
entrepreneurs to supervise the building and commissioning of 
their own factory. Whether the entrepreneur was a specialist 
or a speculator, millwrights played a much less central part 
than has often been claimed, being generally confined to 
advising on plans, carrying out structural work I or 
installing gearing and power transmission systems. Using 
rollers, spindles and flyers bought in from local specialist 
makees, machines were assembled by smiths or other metal- 
workers, usually under the supervision of the factory-owner. 
This role may have been forced upon textile manufacturers, as 
suitably qualified contractors were few, though there were 
also advantages in such close involvement as costs could be 
closely controlled and valuable technical lessons learned. 
There is no evidence that such practices continued after 
about 1805, when the throstle was coming into widespread use 
in the worsted industry. It was then no longer practical for 
machine-users to make their own machinery, as most did not 
have the technical competence which had become necessary. A 
local textile engineering industry, recognisable and 
distinct, had taken machine-making into a new and specialist 
phase. This new industry had precedents quite unconnected 
with those factory owners who had built their own machines. 
MAKING MACHINERY: USERS AS MAKERS 
If it is true that machine-users made machinery only as a 
temporary expedient during a period of transition, S. 1780 to 
c. 1805, and that specialist textile engineering had quite a 
separate ancestry, then certain evidence suggesting that 
machine-making by users continued after 1805 requires 
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explanation. A clear impression was given by some witnesses 
to two Select Committees investigating the machinery trade 55 
that machine-users produced their own machinery throughout 
the first half of the nineteenth century. Some were well 
qualified for this, particularly those who had changed from 
machine-making to become textile manufacturers, such as 
MIConnell and Kennedy in Manchester and Berry Smith in 
Keighley. 56 Many textile manufacturers, though, had neither 
the ability nor the desire to make machines, preferring if 
possible to buy from specialist suppliers. That a contrary 
impression emerged from the parliamentary evidence can be 
explained, for the sample interviewed was far from 
representative. The Select Committees concentrated upon 
cotton manufacture in Lancashire, where machines were indeed 
produced by some of the larger textile firms. In the 
Yorkshire woollen and worsted industries, between the opening 
years of the century and Samuel Lister's emergence as a 
machine-maker in the 1840s, it was much more unusual for 
users to make their own machinery. 
Indeed, the claims that many Lancashire users made textile 
machines require cautious examination. In 1824 Thomas Cheek 
Hewes, a Manchester-based millwright, suggested that a great 
many did. 57 Thomas Ashton of Hyde, described as a spinner and 
powerloom manufacturer who had introduced the powerloom into 
his neighbourhood, was one such: 
It is the general rule with us now, to make our own 
machinggy ... solely for my own use; I do not make any for 
sale. 
This may have been a means of dealing with periodic 
shortages, when demand for machinery far outstripped supply. 
Hewes and Ashton were giving evidence at a time when 
powerlooms were being introduced into the cotton branch ' and 
specialist engineers were unable to satisfy demand. Henry 
Holdsworth had experienced similar problems when he moved to 
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Glasgow from Manchester in 1799 and found it impossible to 
buy the machines he needed. 59 Reluctantly he tried to make 
his own, but failing to find good workmen, and deterred by 
the high price of tools, instead managed to commission a 
young mechanic to do the work. By 1803 the arrangement had 
broken down as his machine-maker was busy using Holdsworth's 
specifications to reproduce the same items for others, even 
though, in Holdsworth's view, these machines were already out 
of date. So Holdsworth bought improved parts from Manchester 
and managed to recruit a few workmen who could fabricate 
machinery using heavy components made in Glasgow. Continuing 
supply problems with cotton spinning machinery had forced him 
to continue this practice as late as 1824. 
But Holdsworth had long experience of machine-making, dating 
back to his days in Manchester. For non-specialists to 
attempt machine-making was not usually cost effective. In the 
1790s MIConnell and Kennedy were willing to supply metal 
components for mules, but warned customers contemplating 
building their own frames that 'making machinery is generally 
very expensive to those who are not in the habit of iti. 60 To 
the 1841 Select Committee, Grenville Withers, an engineer 
conversant with the machine-making industries of Belgium and 
England, suggested that it was uneconomic for textile 
manufacturers to make machinery. For a Belgian machine-user 
to produce his own 'it must necessarily cost very dear made 
in that way' and would have been cheaper from either an 
English or a Belgian specialist. 
61 In that case it is 
unlikely that users would have built their own machinery 
through choice. Thomas Ashton claimed in 1841 that 'a very 
great increase [in machine making] took place in consequence 
of the demand ... many manufacturers now make their own 
machinery', implying that this had been a new phenomenon 
since 1824 in the cotton industry. 
62 But for the flax 
industry, James G. Marshall of Leeds was unequivocal in 
stating that English spinners ordered machines 'almost 
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entirely from parties who are machine-makers ... I understand 
it to be the same on the continent'. 
63 
Marshall's comments may well have applied to the whole of the 
Yorkshire textile industry, for no other evidence has been 
found that users made their own machines between about 1800 
and the 1840s, except where the textile manufacturer was, or 
had formerly been, primarily a machine-maker. In Lancashire 
it appears that a few large manufacturers embarked upon 
machine-making when demand for machinery was so high that 
specialists could not quickly satisfy it, though this course 
would have had its own difficulties, notably in finding 
suitable mechanics at a time of shortage. But once equipped 
with a machine shop, these users may have chosen to continue 
making their own machines. 
It is possible to show that the production of machinery by 
textile manufacturers was exceptional, even in Lancashire. A 
high proportion of mechanics in factories was employed on the 
repair and maintenance of machinery throughout the period. 'I 
suppose there are as many employed in repairing, as there are 
in making [machinery]', said Ashton. 
64 And Peter Ewart, a 
machine-maker turned cotton spinner: 'In cotton mills in 
general, there are as many persons employed in keeping the 
machinery in order, as there are employed in the making of 
itt. 65 In 1841, William Jenkinson of Salford, representing 
the machine-makers' committee, referred to 'immense numbers 
of mechanics employed in mills, not only in the making of 
machinery, but in the repairing of it; almost every mill has 
its mechanics, more or less'. 
66 The Leeds flax-spinner 
Marshall, who bought in all his machinery, employed 1200 
people in 1833,70 or 80 of whom were mechanics 
67 and who 
must therefore have been engaged solely upon repair and 
maintenance. In 151 firms in Lancashire in 1833 which 
employed in total 31,444 on preparing and spinning cotton, 
and 16,040 on weaving, the numbers of 'engineers, mechanicso 
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firemen, roller coverers etc. ' came to only 1,161, or fewer 
than 8 on average per firm. 
68 Considering that these firms 
each averaged over 300 employees, and that every factory 
needed a number of mechanics to attend to steam engines and 
boilers as well as routine maintenance and repair, Ure's 
figures show that there were not enough engineers and 
mechanics to provide a viable machine-making department in 
more than a handful of the 151 Lancashire factories. It is 
plain that the great majority of textile manufacturers there 
relied upon specialist machine-makers. In Yorkshire, there is 
little indication of machinery being made for personal use 
during the early nineteenth century. A change may have come 
as a result of the powerloom shortage in the 1840s. Black 
Dyke Mills at Queensburys which despite its remoteness had 
not even acquired a repair shop until 1838, began to make its 
own looms in 1844, and having started continued, so that by 
1887 Foster's own machines accounted for 459 looms out of a 
total of 785 in use. 
69 But Foster's never made spinning 
machinery, and produced only a few combs, which suggests that 
machine-making by such firms was embarked upon only as a last 
resort, with buying from specialist engineers the preferred 
option. 
MAKING MACHINERY: THE GENESIS OF A SPECIALIST INDUSTRY 
During the last two decades of the eighteenth century there 
emerged in West Yorkshire a nascent machine-making industry 
which attempted to cater for the needs of local textile 
entrepreneurs. Although a range of trades was involved in 
these early efforts, in general the new machine-makers stood 
apart from domestic machine-making and from textile 
manufacture itself. The early phase peaked in about 1800, and 
by 1805 almost all those woodworkers and miscellaneous 
craftsmen who had been involved in textile machinery had 
disappeared from the trade. Only the most technically 
competent survived, notably smiths and others with metal- 
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working skills. At this point a recognisable, specialist 
textile engineering industry began to exist. 
The end of the first phase of modern machine-making coincided 
with a change from wood to cast iron as the main material for 
machine frames. 70 Perhaps more significantly, the years 
around 1800 saw an increasing sophistication in spinning 
machines. Roller spinning spread and the throstle was 
introduced, developments demanding new levels of precision 
from engineers. 71 In specialization and precision the 
industry still had some way to go, but by the 1820s the skill 
of a common smith was no longer adequate for machine-making. 
With the introduction of improved machine tools, skill 
requirements were altered, though generaily undiminished 72 
and at the same time larger concerns were integrating 
production, acquiring foundries and bringing under one roof 
processes which had previously been carried out by 
subcontractors. 73 During this third phase, dating from 
perhaps 1830, some firms which had previously concentrated 
upon components made a transition into machine production, 
particularly in response to demand for powerlooms in the 
worsted and woollen branches. A fourth phase, around the mid- 
century, saw a consolidation of the industry, confirming the 
market leaders, and a new emphasis upon overseas markets 
after the lifting of the export ban in 1843. There emerged a 
professionalism in the sales effort, and a protective 
attitude towards technology, which had not previously 
existed. 
By the 1840s, mechanical engineering was seen as having three 
clear divisions. 
I should make three classes of the mechanical arts: the 
manufacture of steam-engines, mill-gearing, hydraulic 
presses and such other heavy machinery, I should call one 
class; the next, and a separate branch, I should sayq was 
tool-making; and the third I should call machine-making, 
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with its varioqý branches of spindle and fly-making, and 
roller-making. 14 
These components, rollers, spindles and flyerss far from 
being spare parts, had from the start been central to any 
attempt to build operational machinery. It was because 
Richard Hattersley developed an expertise in making such 
components that many of the non-specialists in the first 
phase of the industry in Keighley were able to function at 
all as machine-makers, as Hattersley supplied every would-be 
textile engineer in the area with rollers, spindles and 
flyers before 1805.75 The dependence of the industry upon the 
likes of Hattersley was recognised by contemporaries: 
The parts of machines are made to fit-the rollers and 
spindles, and not the rollers and spindles to fit the 
parts; for it is chiefly in the rgilers and spindles that 
nicety and accuracy are required. 
Rollers and spindles were 'those parts which a stranger would 
be most desirous of gettingi 77 and in Manchester further 
specialization produced 'two or three classes of spindle 
makers, separate and distinct trades, masters and men'. 78 
Likewise roller-making employed 'a distinct set [of 
mechanics]; it has been a business in itself'. 
79 In 1841, the 
manufacture of spindles was still largely unmechanized, and 
highly skilled. It required accurate forging, precise 
grinding, then setting land I should say that there is not 
one man in a thousand that could set a spindle, unless he had 
given his time to that particular part of the art'. 
80 Though 
specialization brought increased efficiency along with 
improved quality, prices of rollers and spindles continued to 
rise, by as much as thirty per cent over a few months in 
1824.81 Roller and spindle manufacturers were overwhelmed by 
orders - 'the persons of whom I have rollers and spindles are 
anxious to keep out of our sight, for they have promised more 
than they can perform, 82 - and even when the machinery market 
was flat continued a brisk business in repairs and 
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replacements. 83 Inevitably mechanization put an end to this 
profitable trade, in the shape of a forging machine invented 
by William Ryder in 1840.84 
Richard Hattersley's career illustrates precisely the 
changing role of component manufacturers. In the 1790s 
Hattersley supplied mainly machine-makers and cotton spinners 
in Keighley and nearby. From 1805 he developed a network of 
specialist subcontractors in Keighley and important customers 
among the worsted and flax machine-makers of Leeds - Taylor 
and Wordsworth, Samuel Lawson, Peter Fairbairn and others - 
and had more orders than he could promptly meet. His 
correspondence files contain a stream of complaints about 
delays in supplying these parts during the 1820s, and about 
poor quality and high prices. 
85 Until Richard Hattersley's 
death in 1829, the firm's main products were rollers, 
spindles and flyers. Perhaps anticipating the demise of 
roller and spindle-making as such a profitable activity, 
George Hattersley began to make looms in the 1830s, and was 
primarily a powerloom manufacturer by the mid-1840s. 
Even as large firms integrated their processes within 
factories, a small-scale sector remained significant, and 
within it subcontracting continued to be widespread. This 
served partly to provide flexibility for the larger concerns. 
Additionally smaller firms mopped up repair and renewal work 
in a pattern which has continued. For instance in the 1980s 
the machine-shop at Joshua Ellis's of Dewsbury bought all 
patterns and tools necessary to make spares for Dobcross 
looms when the Dobcross works closed, and continue to supply 
these parts to other users; William Hardill of Cleckheaton, 
formerly subcontractors to P. and C. Garnett, still produces 
parts for Garnett's machines even though the larger firm has 
closed. There is an established practice of making spares for 
other people's machinery, and it is by such adaptability, 
diversification, and dis-integration (for example shedding 
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foundries and again using subcontractors), features upon 
which the early industry was built, that a rump of the 
textile engineering industry has managed to survive. 
THE SCALE AND LOCATION OF TEXTILE ENGINEERING 
In 1907 textile engineering was the largest single branch of 
engineering, and had become 'an overwhelmingly dominant force 
in world trade' exporting 45 per cent of its output. On the 
eve of the Great War the industry employed 40,000 men, and 
even in the United States, the only place in the world not 
dependent upon Britain for the majority of its machines, 
Keighley firms monopolized the market for worsted 
machinery. 86 An inkling of the industry's size at the mid- 
century comes from census figures in 1851, when engineering 
in Leeds employed 7.400 people (almost all of them men), nine 
per cent of the occupied population. 87 Of these the majority 
were making textile machines,, and many were already 
concentrated in establishments employing hundreds of 
workers. 88 In Keighley, where only two firms had a workforce 
whose numbers reached three figures, a polarization of large 
and small concerns was nonetheless evident. 
Keighley and Leeds emerged as major centres of textile 
engineering. Keighley, which had started with cotton 
machinery, quickly switched to worsted and the main firms in 
the town, William Smith and George Hattersley, by the mid- 
century specialized, respectively, in worsted spinning frames 
and looms. A large part of the Leeds industry was devoted to 
flax machines, though some of the same firms were also 
involved in worsted and silk machinery. Bradford and Bingley 
were considered worthy of inclusion in a list of machine- 
making centres in 1841, though textile engineering in 
Bradford was never of a size to match the worsted industry 
there. 89 The Spen Valley produced woollen machinery as well 
as card clothing, and Huddersfield had a sizable machine- 
making industry. Many firms continued to make a variety of 
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products, perhaps for more than one branch of textiles. Even 
in Lancashire, where specialization had advanced further, 
there remained a certain flexibility. For example Thomas 
Marsden, a machine-maker of some repute, was serving the 
woollen and flax industries as well as cotton from his 
premises in Salford in 1836.90 He may not have been typical. 
The trend in both Yorkshire and Lancashire was strongly 
towards specialization, particularly for larger firms, as the 
mid-century approached. 
CONCLUSION 
The industry which from the late eighteenth century produced 
new kinds of textile machines had not grown out of 
traditional machine-making. Nor did it descend directly from 
the efforts of factory owners producing their own machinery 
before 1805, though the Marshall/Murray partnership, in 
several ways exceptional, also provides an exception to this 
generalization. The idea that machine-users continued to 
engage in machine-making after 1805 is disproved both by 
anecdotal evidence and by the overall figures of mechanics 
employed in textiles. Distinct phases can be identified in 
the development of textile engineering, coinciding with 
changes in products and processes. The phases are 
distinguished by changing skill requirements for tradesment 
and by a growing scale and specialization among the leaders 
of the industry. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL ORIGINS OF ENTREPRISNIKU S 
We have a number of men who have risen from being common 
mechanics to being men of great eminence. 
(PP (HC) 1841 (201) VII, p. 1069 evidence of William 
Jenkinson) 
Contemporary, or near contemporary, sources suggest that 
Yorkshire machine-makers were generally men of modest 
beginnings. According to James Watt junior in 1802, Leeds 
engineers were 'men without character and without means', 
none of them 'eligible connections' for Boulton and Watt*' 
Later machine-makers who achieved great financial and 
technical success received the full attention of Victorian 
hagiographers with pointed emphasis on their humble origins. 
From such nineteenth century biographies grew an enduring 
notion that entrepreneurs in many industries emerged from 
diverse backgrounds, an idea which has only recently been 
systematically challenged. 
2 Honeyman has stressed the need 
to recognise as exceptional any great success achieved by 
those from the lower rungs of society. 3 
But are Honeyman's conclusions applicable to a new and 
highly technical industry with a rapidly expanding market? 
Machine-making did not require a large or sustained 
investment in fixed capital, though it was increasingly 
essential that engineering entrepreneurs should possess a 
high degree of technical expertise. In these respects 
textile engineering differed from the cases which Honeyman 
studied. In some industries, where large numbers of 
ambitious small men were attracted by low entry costs, the 
resulting overcapacity led to the failure of the smallest 
firms. 4 If, in general, entrepreneurs who lacked resources 
were less likely to survive and succeed., what of the men of 
small capital in a new industry whose market was growing 
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fast? If their failure or withdrawal cannot be attributed to 
a declining market, what were the reasons? It is more likely 
that the explanation lies in technical inadequacy than in 
lowly social and financial status. If humble men had wider 
opportunities during periods of change, as Alfred Marshall 
believed, then textile engineering, as a new industry 
without direct precedents, and consequently without 
established vested interests, offered great possibilities. 
Erickson suggests that small men were more likely to succeed 
in small-scale highly competitive industries like hosiery, 
than in the likes of steel-making. 5 Level of skill could 
have been the decisive feature, allowing a small but 
technically competent entrepreneur to become established 
while the market was booming, accumulating assets to cushion 
against a downturn. 
Koditschek, in identifying a new bourgeoisie emerging in 
Bradford during the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century, places engineering entrepreneurs among 'the new 
6 
generation of nascent bourgeois elites'. But 
entrepreneurship does not have to be synonymous with 
bourgeoisie. It could be practised by manufacturer or 
artisan, and was 'a quality possessed by a whole host of 
7 petty producers'. Smail, whose study was based on Halifax 
textile manufacturers in the early eighteenth century, 
believes that 'the initial stages of industrialization ... 
were accomplished within the terms of an artisanal culture' 
and that 'even some aspects of [the manufacturers'] economic 
8 
practice were artisanall. Smaills conclusions provide a 
useful hypothesis which may be applicable to machine-making: 
that artisanal culture and economic practices characterized 
the early stages of the industry, and that only later in its 
formation did entrepreneurs develop into 'a distinct 
cultural type', acquiring different aspirations and 
behaviour in the process. 9 
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The technical ancestry of machine-making has to be explained 
if this point is to be proved. There is an enduring belief 
that machine-making descended from a miscellaneous 
collection of millwrights, clockmakers, woodworkers and 
others. That is incompatible with an lartisanall view, that 
the industry grew from entrepreneurs of modest backgrounds, 
sustained by a common and growing expertise, specialization, 
knowledge and skill. The first objective of this chapter is 
to explain the role of millwrights, in particular, and also 
that of clockmakers and engineers, all of whom were of a 
rather higher social standing than artisans in general. 
Having in the opening chapter dismissed pre-industrial 
machine-makers and textile manufacturers as founders of the 
textile engineering industry, and if it is possible to 
consign to a marginal role millwrights, clockmakers and 
middle class engineers, then there remains a group of 
artisans, perhaps already established as small entrepreneurs 
when machine-making was developing as an industry, who made 
a key contribution to textile engineering. The social 
standing and technical competence of this latter group, and 
the factors leading to entrepreneurial success, are the 
subj6ct of the later part of this chapter. 
In such an analysis it is important that those who were not 
conspicuously successful are included. The 'submerged' 
sector, whose later importance in engineering Floud has 
emphasised, 10 includes downright failures as well as modest 
successes and those who left the industry through choice. 
Even in the industry's earliest days, such firms had their 
significance, if only as negative evidence of the qualities 
necessary for success. So although early engineering in 
Yorkshire cannot provide the large population of 
entrepreneurs which Crouzet believes necessary for 
conclusive study, 11 it is certain that the whole 'submerged' 
sector which was operating in Keighley, and a substantial 
proportion of the group in Leeds before 1850, has been 
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traced. This approach has the advantage of highlighting the 
importance of the training and trading networks which 
existed in engineering, and will perhaps provide an 
explanation of why certain firms survived. 
MILLWRIGHTS 
There is a deep-rooted conviction that millwrights were 'the 
forerunners of present day mechanical engineers'. 12 Despite 
a paucity of evidence, this belief has been confidently and 
uncritically repeated, and amplified, until there seems no 
room for doubt. 'We know that millwrights contributed 
heavily to the mechanical developments of the Industrial 
Revolution'. 13 'Millwrights, who had formerly been itinerant 
craftsmen, established shops for building machinery'. 
14 
Morris has the 'shadowy figures' of millwrights and machine 
builders in Leeds working together on a vast range of 
products from power sources, including steam engines, and 
gearing, to both heavy and fine machinery. 
15 Commonly 
millwrights and machine-makers are considered as a single 
occupation. 
16 
This is very misleading, for there was a social as well as 
a technical distinction between millwrights on the one hand, 
and artisans such as smiths and carpenters on the other. 
Tann has hinted at the superior education and trainingo and 
the wide horizons, of many late eighteenth century 
millwrights. 17 That Yorkshire millwrights enjoyed relatively 
high status is suggested by the form of address, the title 
'Mr', used in many instances, and the description 'yeoman't 
applied for example to John Jubb. 
18 They were also engaged 
upon a kind of work quite distinct from textile machine- 
making, their involvement in the latter industry being 
peripheral. It is true that some millwrights experimented 
with machine-making, and that a few actually converted to 
become machine-makers, but their numerical and technical 
importance was no more than that of woodworkers or founders. 
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By the time that machine-making was entering its technical 
phase, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, it was 
an exceptional millwright who remained involved in machine- 
making, in Yorkshire at least. Jubb is the only such example 
known in the county, managing to combine his millwright's 
work with machine-making, for Peter Fairbairn had never 
worked in Leeds as a millwright. 
What is the origin of the idea that millwrights founded 
textile engineering? The belief that millwrights and 
clockmakers were the first machine-makers probably stems 
from standard phrases used in late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century insurance policiesI9 where the contents 
of textile factories, apart from steam engines and boilers, 
were subdivided into Imillwrights work' and Iclockmakers 
work'. The former generally included heavy transmission and 
'going gear', the latter the machinery itself. Though 
clockmakers have even less connection than millwrights with 
machine-making, these two trades-have retained a near 
monopoly on the foundations of mechanical engineering, in 
popular imagination at least. The idea that millwrights were 
of paramount importance was further reinforced by the 
overblown claims of William Fairbairn about the development 
of the trade, and in particular his own contribution to it. 
His ideas were influential. An obituary in The Engineer in 
1874 suggested that Fairbairn had 'abolished the millwrights 
and introduced the mechanical engineer'. 20 The latter part 
of this statement is wildly exaggerated, the former clearly 
untrue. The millwright continued, and continues, to function 
as a distinct trade in his own right. 
Millwrights possessed a wide range of skills in many aspects 
of engineering though their main expertise lay in making and 
mending prime movers and transmission equipment. They were 
able to adapt to new circumstances, for example becoming 
involved in designing and building early factories in 
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various industries. 21 The trade of millwright was long- 
established, dating at least from the middle ages. 22 A 
definition written in 1747 suggests that a level of 
education was required which would have been beyond many 
artisans at that time: 
The Trade is a Branch of Carpentry (with some assistance 
fromthe Smith) but rather heavier work, yet very 
ingenious, to understand and perform which well a person 
ought to have a good Turn of Mind for Mechanics, at least 
to have some knowledge in Arithmetic, in which a lad ought 
to be instructed before he goes to learn this Art; for 
there is a great variety in Mills, as well as in the 
Structure and Workmanship of them, some being worked by 
Horses, some by Wind, others by Water shooting over and 
others by its running unq5r. And why not in Time by Fire 
too, as well as Engines? 
The sum of E100 to E150 which would set up a millwright in 
business was larger than the capital required for most 
artisan trades. Furthermore, apprentice millwrights were 
charged a premium of 95 or glo. 
24 Millwrighting was 
therefore open only to those with some means - modest, 
perhaps, yet beyond many common working men. Even allowing 
for some poetic licence, Sir William Fairbairn's much-quoted 
account essentially makes the same point, describing 
millwrights as a profession rather than a trade: 
... the millwright of the [eighteenth] century was an itinerant engineer and mechanic of high reputation. In the 
practice of his profession he had mainly to depend on his 
own resources ... [he] was a kind of Jack-of-all-trades, 
who could with equal facility work at the lathe, the anvil 
or the carpenter's bench ... he could handle the axe, the hammer and the plane with equal skill and precision; he 
could turn, bore or forge ... 
2.5 
The common view of the millwright, said Fairbairn, was of 
one of 'superior attainments and intellectual power'. 
26 
Generally he was a fair arithmetician, knew something of 
geometry, levelling and mensuration and in some cases 
possessed a very competent knowledge of practical 
mechanics. He could calculate the velocities, strength and 
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power of machines; could draw in plan and in section ... 
and 2guld construct buildings, conduits or watercourses 
*so 
Such paragons of versatility do not represent the whole 
story of millwrighting, for there was also a 'pre- 
industrial' type much more akin to a carpenter, who 
concentrated upon repairs and simple work. 28 Such men, 
lacking the lauded adaptability of Fairbairn's super- 
millwright, are even less likely to have involved themselves 
in a new and demanding trade like textile engineering. 
Millwrights worked in any industry which used a power 
system, notably corn milling and fulling. 29 As the first 
power-driven textile machines, slubbing billies and 
scribbling and carding engines, were housed in fulling 
mills, millwrights were involved in installing them and in 
connecting them'to the power source, though not, generally, 
in building such machinery. Millwrights concentrated upon 
what they were best qualified to do, as their traditional 
skills were in great demand in the closing decades of the 
eighteenth century, 30 especially connected with the 
expansion in new factories. 'There was a vast amount of new 
work in building factories and equipping them with power 
sources and transmission equipment, and their subsequent 
repair and maintenance. As a result millwrights were in 
demand in their own trade, and consequently had no need to 
be involved in textile machine-making. The millwrights' 
society regulated their rate of pay, which was substantially 
higher than that of a smith or equivalent artisan. There 
were therefore strong economic incentives to employ smiths 
rather than millwrights to build machinery, other things 
being equal. Millwrights were also conscious of possessing a 
superior status and were reluctant to let go of their 
traditional work and privileges. This sense of superiority 
caused them to maintain a distance from textile engineering, 
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though later concessions had to be made to the newer 
industry. 
We make our machines so much better, and so much cheaper, 
that [the millwrights'] trade, that used to scoff and 
spurn at the name of an engineer, are obliged to take up 
the name of an engineer, and conduct their business by the 
engineer's economy, and thaS, change in the short progress 
of fifteen or twenty years. 
After the first phase of textile engineeringo when a few 
millwrights experimented with the new machines, millwrights' 
involvement in machine-making was generally confined to the 
heavy equipment associated with finishing processes, like 
fulling stocks, washing machines, and later tentering 
machinery. Tann's examples from the Somerset and Wiltshire 
woollen district fit into the same categories, either an 
early experiment, or the manufacture of heavy finishing 
machinery. 32 Leeds provides similar instances, such as 
William Kilburn of Holbeck, whose products included stocks 
33 
and accessories, washing machines and teazling machines, 
The trade of millwright which still exists, no longer 
identified with the construction of factories or 
transmission systems, is understood in the textile trade as 
a manufacturer of milling or finishing machinery. 
34 
Demarcation lines between the work of machine-makers and 
millwrights were in place at an early phase. This is clear 
even where entrepreneurs engaged in both types of work. 
Thomas Cheek Hewes was 'extensively employed in erecting 
mills, and filling them with machinery' in Manchester. 
35 Of 
his 140 to 150 employees, Hewes counted about 40 who were 
engaged on heavy mill work, in which he included: 
water wheels and shafting, and mill wheels of different 
descriptions, and the framing, and all the appendages till 
it comes to machinery, which is detached from the heavy 
mill work generally by a belt or rope; 5gat distinguishes 
the millwright work from the machinery. 
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It is said that Hewes had quite distinct views of the two 
parts of his company, with machine-making the 'bread and 
butter' activity which allowed him to pursue his interest in 
power supply, until eventually machine-making was allowed to 
decline and the firm concentrated upon building water-wheels 
and fireproof mills. 37 
Published works of the time reflect the distinction between 
millwrights' work and that of machine builderst and 
furthermore show technical dynamism within the millwrights' 
trade. A debate on optimum methods and efficiency was 
continuing from John Banks' work of the 1790s, to 
Nicholson's Operative Mechanic in 1825. In most cases the 
machines referred to were waterwheels, windmills or plant 
for processing agricultural products. 38 Sutcliffe did 
discuss some aspects of cotton machinery, though related to 
setting up and gearing rather than manufacturing machines, 
and the emphasis of his work was upon civil engineering, 
factory building and power. 39 
Although a type of pre-industrial millwright appears to have 
survived into the nineteenth century, overall the trade took 
a progressive view in overcoming practical problems posed by 
new industrial processes, and consequently retained a high 
reputation and standing. But the millwright's sphere, though 
wide enough to include factory construction, power sources 
and transmission, and building heavy machinery for textile 
finishing and for other industries, did not encompass the 
manufacture of textile machinery. 
CLOCKMAKERS 
On the surface there appears a strong case that clockmakers 
were involved in early textile engineering. Unlike 
Imillwrights work', the 'clockmakers work' mentioned in 
insurance valuations undoubtedly refers to textile 
machinery. If 'clockmakers work' were actually carried out 
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by clockmakers, then clockmakers were indeed textile 
machine-makers. 
The alleged movement of artisans from clockmaking into 
textile and machine tool engineering has been explained by a 
decline in their original trade. It is said that crisis in 
the clock- and watch-making industry, linked to division of 
labour and de-skilling, was exacerbated by Pitt's tax on 
timepieces in 1797, and the loss of foreign markets to Swiss 
competition after 1815.40 Landes suggests that Coventry 
journeymen once noted for their skill moved into rough 
manual jobs, 
41 though clockmakers elsewhere are assumed to 
have turned skills they possessed to more appropriate uses. 
For instance from 1823, when a patent on lace-making 
machinery expired, Birmingham clockmakers found that they 
could almost double their incomes making the 'insides' for 
bobbin net machines in Nottingham, and master clockmakers in 
Birmingham produced the same parts on subcontract, 
42 Felkin 
noted the attractions of frame-making: 
All were very highly paid and the profits of the masters 
were great in proportion. During several years the demand 
was so great that it could not be supplied: the news of 
such wonderful wages, independence and jollity spread like 
wildfire so that speedily machine smiths, locksmiths and 
blacksmithss together with every watchmaker ... within 50 
or 80 miles 43 came together in the garret workshops , of Nottingham. 
It is therefore a possibility that a sustained depression in 
their trade motivated clock- and watch-makers in Yorkshire 
and elsewhere to seek opportunities in trades like 
mechanical engineering. A number of well-known instances are 
often cited as evidence of a connection between textile 
machines and clockmakers in the eighteenth century. Howevert 
the possibility must be recognised that these were not 
clockmakers in the conventional sense, but that the term was 
being applied to mean machine-maker. Arkwright and Strutt of 
Cromford advertised in 1771 for 'two journeymen Clock-Makers 
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or others that understands Tooth and Pinion well ... 
44 In 
Manchester in 1782 there was advertised 'Employment for 
Clock-Makers ... Would be more agreeable, if they have been 
before employed in Cotton Works' and in 1789 a machine maker 
wanted 'Clockmakers and Turners'. 45 A missing employee, 'by 
trade a Clock smithl but lately a 'Filer and Turner' was 
sought by cotton mill owners in 1785.46 John Kennedy, a 
prominent machine maker and cotton spinner in Manchester, 
told the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society in 
1815: 
By degrees, a higher class of mechanics such as watch and 
clock-makersq white-smiths, and mathematical instrument 
makers, began to be wanted; and in a short time a wide 
field was opened for the application of their more 
accurate and scientific mechanism. Those workmen were 
first chiefly employed in constructing 4 Pe valuable machines invented by Mr Arkwright ... 
Another claim on behalf of clockmakers is that they 
developed machine tools for use in industries other than 
their own. If this were true, it could only have been in the 
Prescot area of Lancashire where the watch and clock tool- 
making industry was exclusively concentrated. 
48 John Wyke of 
Prescot and Liverpool (d. 1787), for example, is said to have 
made a wheel-cutting engine and other tools for machine 
making. 
49 It is also suggested that lathes, drills and 
wheel-cutting engines used by instrument-, clock- and watch- 
makers were developed into heavy power-driven machine tools 
from the late eighteenth century onwards. 50 Such claims are 
largely or wholly speculative, although the publication of a 
detailed catalogue by John Wyke in the early or mid 1760s, 
aimed at a range of trades besides clock- and watch-makers, 
could have been a means of disseminating tool design. 51 But 
the notion that clockmakers' tools, and indeed clockmakers, 
were significant in textile machine-making is unconvincing, 
because the precision which they supposedly brought to 
mechanical engineering did not start to be a reality until 
- 53 - 
after 1820.52 Clockmakers may have designed improved lathes 
and developed a rudimentary slide rest. 53 but the essential 
innovations in machine-making tools, notably to the lathe 
and the planer, were the work of engineers such as 
Wilkinson, Bramah, Maudslay, Clements, Roberts, Whitworth, 
Fox, Nasmyth and Murray, none of whom was connected with 
clockmaking. 54 
If clockmakers' tools. were not of use in textile 
engineering, what of clockmakers themselves? If the trade 
had been thoroughly de-skilled, as has been alleged, then 
its value to machine-making was diminished, for precision 
and adaptability were the skills needed in making new types 
of machinery. Contemporary definitions of clockmaking make 
no reference to connections with other engineering tradeso 
suggesting on the contrary that the trade had become 
increasingly narrow: 
If we were to define the word clockmaker agreeably to the 
derivation of the term, we should simply say that it means 
a man who makes clocks, and this-definition, at one period 
of the art, would have been sufficient for our purpose; 
but since clocks have become so common ... the art of 
making them has not been confined, as at first, to one 
department of mechanics$ but has gradually ramified into 
various branches so distinct from one another, that the 
maker of one part is frequently unacquainted with the 
operations requisite f? 5 the manipulations of another, 
equally essential ... 
Rees listed seventeen operations involved in clockmaking, 
explaining the subdivision of labour as a result of 
increased use of machinery which had brought 'expedition, 
and consequently ... cheapness'. 
56 The trade in Lancashire 
at that time was highly departmentalized, 
57 though 
separation of processes had started much earlier: 
Of late years the watchmaker .. scarce makes anything belonging to a watch, he only employes the different 
tradesmen ... and puts the several pieqgs of the movement 
together, and adjusts and finishes it. ' 
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The term 'clockmakerl, quite apart from any application to 
machine-making, had many meanings. Some clockmakers were 
goldsmiths or jewellers, others carpenters or cabinet makers 
who produced clock cases. Yet others calling themselves 
clockmakers never made clocks, but were retailers or perhaps 
blacksmiths or locksmiths who repaired church and other 
clocks. 59 Watchmaking was concentrated in certain centres, 
whereas clock parts, which were larger and similar to 
blacksmiths' work, were produced over a much wider area. 60 
Diversity within the watchmaking/ clockmaking trade is 
significant, as watchmakers and jewellers had no affinity 
with machine-making, while those who made and repaired metal 
parts of large clocks were working on a scale which 
resembled that of early textile machines. 
61 In Glasgow, 
where there were many public clocks, it is known that their 
repair was carried out by smiths. 
62 
So on the face of it some sections of the clockmaking 
industry could have possessed the means and the motivation 
to enter textile engineering. There is, however, much 
contrary evidence. Some contemporary testimony actually 
suggests that clockmakers were not suitable as textile 
machine-makers. Peter Ewart, who had trained as an engineer 
under both Rennie and Boulton and Watt, told the Select 
Committee in 1824: 
*** the clock and watch tool and movement makers in Lancashire *, are considered the best workmen ... their 
workmanship is excellent; they use the same sort of tools 
that the cotton machine makers use, but they are brought 
up to no employment but making those clock and watch tools 
and movements; and when those men come to be employed in 
making cotton machines, we find that they have almost as 
much to learn as if they had never learnt any working in 
metal at all ... We have found them quite insufficient to do any ordinary filing and turning, when they have been 
taken fro V3 the work at which they have been exclusively 
employed. 
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Ewart was speaking at a time when textile machine-making had 
entered a specialized technical phase, but the same point 
had been made by James Lawson, Boulton and Watt's northern 
agent in the 1790s, who thought the Lancashire watch 
movement makers., who 'had only been used to small work', 
unsuitable for heavier engineering. 64 
But the most convincing evidence to counter claims that 
clockmakers were significant in textile engineering, can be 
found by looking closely at those clockmakers who were 
supposedly early machine-makers. Certainly there were a few 
Yorkshire clock- and instrument-makers who transferred to 
other branches of engineering. Benjamin Huntsman (1704- 
1776), the steel maker, was originally a clockmaker, as was 
William Flather of Halifax (1810-1879) who became a piano 
pin-maker. The engineer John Smeaton (1724-1792) trained as 
a mathematical instrument maker. 
65 But there are few known 
links even between those clockmakers who appear on Loomes's 
exhaustive list, and the textile industry in general. Thomas 
Lister (II) of Halifax (1745-1814), who was a famous and 
successful clockmaker, owned a half interest in a cotton 
spinning mill, but this was merely a kind of local 
investment which any wealthy man might have made. 66 Loomes 
knows his clockmakers by the clocks they made, listing 
hundreds active in the county from the seventeenth to the 
early nineteenth century. With the exception of one or two 
whose position is ambiguous (see below), none of those 
listed made textile machinery. Yorkshire appears not to have 
been unique in this lack of connection between genuine 
clockmakers and engineering, as, for example, a 
comprehensive list of Wigan clockmakers from 1650 to 1850 
mentions no links with machine-making. 67 Furthermore, in 
Switzerland, where British expertise was imported to help 
build early machines, there is no suggestion that native 
clockmaking skills were recruited to use in engineering. 
68 
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In Keighley, of eighteen entrepreneurs who made textile 
machinery before 1830, only two were ever referred to as 
clockmakers. William Lawson, whose clocks are described by 
Loomes, came from a line of watch- and clockmakers working 
in the town from 1740 or earlier. 69 Lawson was already a 
customer of Richard Hattersley in 1793, buying parts such as 
'clock irons' and 'ironwork for ongin' which may have been 
intended for either clocks or machines. 70 During the 
machine-making boom of 1800-1, Lawson was making throstles, 
for he bought large numbers of rollers and flyers from 
Hattersley. But the purchases fell sharply in 1802,71 and a 
directory of 1822 shows that Lawson had reverted to clock- 
and watch-making. His contribution to machine-making seems 
to have been negligible. 
The case of the other Keighley clockmaker/ textile engineer 
was quite different. From a humble start in 1795 William 
Smith created a business of world renown making spinning 
frames. 72 Although by then well-established as a machine- 
maker, Smith was described as a clockmaker in the list of 
West Riding voters for 1807, and the same appendage was used 
in Hattersley's sales ledger and subsequently repeated by 
Hodgson. 73 It is certain, though, that William Smith never 
made clocks. Loomes was unable to cite any. 
74 Smith was in 
fact one of the first men in Keighley, perhaps the very 
first, to be trained as a textile engineer, receiving his 
grounding in 'the art and mystery of machine making' on 
Arkwright's water frames as an apprentice at Low Mill, the 
first cotton factory in Yorkshire, from 1780.75 The career 
of William Smith shows not a clockmaker turned machine- 
maker, but rather application of the term clockmaker to 
someone closely identified with Arkwright's machinery. 
In Leeds there was one significant machine-maker connected 
with clockmaking. Samuel Lawson started his business in 
1812, so was actually part of a second wave of machine- 
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making entrepreneurs, and he was not himself a clockmaker. 
It was Lawson's father Thomas (b. 1754) who had made the 
transition from clockmaking to textile engineering. 76 Thomas 
and his father Samuel (b. 1728) were clockmakers of repute in 
Keighley. Thomas could have been a brother of William Lawson 
(above), as they were both recorded as working in Keighley 
in 1793 77 but he left the town shortly afterwards to act as 
agent in establishing a factory in Burley-in-Wharfedale. 
Thomas Lawson was said to have had 'considerable skill as a 
mechanical engineer' and was 'in request among those who 
established textile manufactories'. 78 He left Burley in 1803 
to join J. and J. Holroyd of Sheepscar in a new cotton mill 
in Mabgate. Samuel Lawson (1782-1866) served an 
apprenticeship with Fenton, Murray and Wood, according to 
notes made by a descendant, though this would have meant 
that he went to Leeds some time before his father's move 
there. He would also have been one of Murray's first 
apprentices. Samuel described himself in 1812, when he 
started in business, as a blacksmith and maker of flax- 
spinning machinery. One reference has been found to Samuel 
Lawson as a clockmaker, in the accounts of Ard Walker's mill 
in 1803/4 when he had recently completed his apprenticeship 
and may still have been employed by Murray. Samuel Lawson 
was certainly renowned for intricate work, such as the 
planetarium shown at an exhibition in Leeds in 1839 and 
subsequently exhibited at his Mabgate engineering workso but 
he never made clocks professionally. 79 
The inevitable conclusion is that Iclockmakers work' in 
Yorkshire factories was not carried out by clockmakers, and 
therefore clockmakers, in the generally understood meaning 
of that trade, were not textile machine-makers. Evidence 
which suggests the contrary can be explained. The Babbage 
and Felkin evidence, though quite specific, relates only to 
the Midlands frame-making industry, where machines were much 
more delicate and had an inner mechanism providing 
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apparently suitable work for clockmakers. The finer parts of 
northern textile machinery, rollers, spindles and flyers, 
although requiring precision, were on a different scale and 
remained the province of the smith. There was no separate 
inner mechanism. Secondly the 'advertisement' evidence, from 
Arkwright and others, comes from a very early period of 
textile engineering, the 1770s and 1780s. At this time some 
clockmakers did try out machine-making in the way that many 
other metal- and wood-workers experimented in it. In 
Yorkshire, the only clockmakers discovered to have been 
working in textile engineering came from one family, the 
Lawsons of Keighley, and only one of them successfully 
sustained a transition into machine-making. There is another 
explanation of the advertisement evidence, which is that the 
word 'clockmakerl was used interchangeably with 'machine- 
maker', especially when referring to Arkwright's machinery. 
William Smith and Samuel Lawson were not clockmakers, but 
were described as such because a terminology within the new 
industry had not become generally established, and for a 
time 'clockmakerl was understood to refer to machine-maker, 
80 
as 'clockwork' could mean any mechanical device. 
'Clockwork' was used in the eighteenth century to describe 
any kind of mechanism. Models 'moved by clockwork', in the 
way that the word now means: 
the automatic and mechanical nature of the action, or its 
unvarying regularity; hence such phgqses as 'like 
clockwork', 'regular as clockwork' " 
In Lancashire, M'Connell and Kennedy served apprenticeships 
during the 1780s, undoubtedly as machine-makers, but they 
82 too have been described as clockmakers. There is no 
evidence that they made clocks, nor any reason for them to 
have done so. The description was applied because that term 
was still synonymous with machine-maker. Arkwright, who had 
employed a Warrington clockmaker, John Kay, to help develop 
his first spinning frame, later applied the description to 
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himself and may have been the originator of this application 
of the word. 83 Perhaps he intended to summon an association 
with an old and respected trade. The image persisted into 
the next century -I... as to spinning frames, they are now 
made with all the nicety of clockwork ... ' 
84 
- though the 
term had ceased to be used in place of machine-maker. 
In Yorkshire, and probably also in Lancashire, most 
clockmakers made clocks but never machines. A very few who 
had trained as clockmakers experimented in textile machine- 
making with limited long-term success, while some who were 
described as clockmakers worked entirely in textile machine- 
making and had never made a clock. The contribution of 
clockmakers, as a trade, to the new industry was rather less 
even than that of millwrights. 
DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS 
The problems of terminology which obstruct an understanding 
of clockmakers' work also apply to other trades related to 
machine-making. There is a particular difficulty with the 
term 'engineer', which suggested a man of professional 
standing, but was ambiguous, including within its scope 
military and civil as well as mechanical pursuits. 85 As Rees 
defined it, 'engineer' 
... in its general sense, applies to a contriver or maker 
of any kind of useful engines or machines. In its more 
proper sense, it den 99 es an officer in an army or 
fortified place ... 
It is said that until the mid-nineteenth century there was 
no clear differentiation between 'civil' and 'mechanical' 
engineering. 87 In the 'mechanical' sense there had sometimes 
been a presumption that the description related to those 
connected with steam engines, and that such an engineer 
required capital and connections: 
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The Engineer makes Engines for raising Water by Fire, 
either for supplying Reservoirs or draining Mines ... The Engineer requires a very mechanically turned head ... He 
employs Smiths of various sorts, Founders for his Brass 
work, Plumbers for his Leadwork, and a Class of Shoe- 
makers for making his Leather Pipes. He requires a large 
stock (at least 9500) to set uP8w' th, and a considerable 
Acquaintance among the Gentry. ' 
But Watt, who thought of himself as a natural philosopher, 
tried to distance himself when he claimed in 1771 to have no 
experience of 'engineering in the vulgar manner'. 
89 The 
definition of engineer was already broadening. 
'Engineer' was certainly adopted in some cases by early 
textile machine-makerst but was only one of a range of 
descriptions applied to them. The term 'machine-maker' was 
in existence in the 1780s, though it had not found universal 
application. 'Mechanic' was used but carried a connotation 
of belonging to the lower orders, perhaps as a journeyman 
carrying out maintenance work in a textile factory. 
'Millwright' carried weight but was not a relevant 
description for most machine-makers. So until suitable 
terminology was settled, many of those engaged in textile 
engineering continued to describe themselves, at least in 
official documents such as parish registers and the muster 
roll, by their original trade. When they began to rise in 
the world, difficulties were encountered in finding suitable 
labels. Matthew Murray called himself 1whitesmith', the 
trade in which he had been apprenticed, on his first patent 
in 1790.90 Later he was sometimes said to be an ironfounderg 
for a foundry formed part of his business. The term 
lironfounderl could be used as a catch-all, a blanket word 
for someone who founded and forged iron into various 
products, carrying the suggestion of higher status as 
ironfounding was an established trade associated, like coal- 
mining, with land ownership and higher levels of capital 
investment. In 1807 Murray was the only man in Holbeck's 
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list of voters to be styled lengineerl, 91 a term which 
indicates more about his growing social standing than it 
tells of his actual trade. The problem of terminology 
followed both Murray and Wood to their graves. Murray's cast 
iron obelisk of 1826 in Holbeck churchyard refers to him as 
92 a 'civil engineer" distinguishing him from the military 
and with the advantage of brevity, but hardly adequate to 
describe the work for which he is famed. To his partner 
David Wood, originally a blacksmith, was applied the curious 
appendage 'mechanician' on his tombstone in 1820.93 Some 
thought had gone into this. Wood was much more than a humble 
mechanic, but unlike his son, referred to at the time as a 
gentleman, had not the education or background to claim 
membership of a higher class. 94 Similarly Richard 
Hattersley, despite his substantial achievements as a 
textile engineer, continued up to his death in 1829 to call 
himself whitesmith, and occasionally machine-maker, though 
he had made few actual machines. 95 These examples suggest 
that suitable terminology had not been found for the new 
industry by the 1820s, with 'engineer' so widely used that 
it was misleading. For instance, Murray's sons-in-law were 
described as 'engineer' when they married, though one had 
been apprenticed to Murray as founder, another as machine- 
maker, and the third has left no evidence of any superior 
antecedents. 96 
The term 'engineer' should therefore be treated with 
caution, and should not be allowed to infer middle class 
origins. No evidence has been uncovered to show that any 
middle class engineer was engaged in textile machine-making 
in Yorkshire. More usually artisanal descriptions continued 
to be employed, providing further indication that the roots 
of textile engineering lay with that class of worker. 
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ORIGINS OF THE FIRST MACHINE-MAKING ENTREPRENEURS 
If millwrights, clockmakers and middle-class engineers were 
of only marginal importance, then who founded textile 
engineering? If. as Smail suggests, 97 entrepreneurship was a 
feature possessed by many small artisans, then it is quite 
possible that such a group laid the foundations of this new 
industry, and that those who eventually achieved success 
moulded themselves only later into something more 
recognizable to the modern observer as a businessman. 
Accepting that technical ability was the key to success as a 
machine-maker, as entry costs were low it is feasible that 
men of humble beginnings dominated the early industry. 
Artisans like blacksmiths lacked the social status, and 
perhaps even the modest capital, of millwrights and 
clockmakers, but had a distinct technical advantage in 
machine-making. Social or financial disadvantage need not 
rule out success if a degree of mutual support, in the 
artisan tradition, were available. 
The continuance of traditional patterns of organization, 
characterized by a lack of any kind of business record, 
explains in large part why the real origins of engineering 
have been so misunderstood by historians. But this 
$submerged' sector is capable of illumination. Through 
detailed study of early centres of engineering, in this case 
Keighley and Leeds, it is possible to identify a population 
of machine-makers which is complete, or almost so. The key 
indicator of origins, both technical and social, is trade, 
and such information is readily available as many machine- 
makers continued to describe themselves by their apprenticed 
trade, even long after they had given it up. Another 
advantage of this 'complete population' approach is that 
some assessment can be made of success and failure, and the 
reasons for particular outcomes in particular cases. It is 
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rarely possible to be absolutely certain why a particular 
enterprise thrived, or failed to survive, or continued with 
apparent success yet did not expand. But with a whole group 
of machine-makers, some common qualities of 
entrepreneurship, technical ability, or support from an 
artisan network, may be discernible among those whose 
careers followed similar paths. 
Keighley, being clearly defined and well documented, has 
provided comprehensive evidence of an early machine-making 
industry. Richard Hattersley's sales records, which run from 
1793, were central to this exercise, for by cross-checking 
with information from Hodgson's account of the first textile 
engineers, from the Craven Muster Roll of 1803, and from 
parish registers, along with directories and other 
miscellaneous sources, it can be established that Hattersley 
supplied every would-be machine-maker in the town with 
rollers, spindles, and other parts. 98 For the Leeds 
industry, which was in any case less clearly defined, such 
thoroughness is not possible as sources comparable to those 
in Keighley do not exist. Yet although its peripheral parts 
are less well known, Leeds can provide better evidence of 
the growth of very large engineering firms before 1850, so 
that views of the industry in Leeds and Keighley in many 
ways complement each other. 
Eighteen textile engineers worked in Keighley in the late 
eighteenth century or into the first decades of the 
nineteenth (Table 2.1). All the firms were very small, 
employing at most a handful of journeymen and one or two 
apprentices. Some of the eighteen listed may never have been 
more than a one-man business, and some may have made only 
one or two machines. Because they are few in number and each 
career was highly individual, the origins of entrepreneurs 
are difficult to categorise into a form which can be 
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expressed statistically. It may not be possible to go 
further in summary than to say that there are as many 
woodworkers as metalworkers among the group as a whole, 
though the later entrants to entrepreneurship were 
metalworkers. The outline of the Leeds industry (Table 2.3) 
is less satisfactory during this early phase, relying mainly 
upon directory evidence and what is known of major firms. 
Because the Leeds evidence is slanted away from the smallest 
and least successful firms, those from a metal-working 
background gain more prominence than woodworkers (Table 
2.4). But as in Keighley this was a new industry with no 
standard career path, and it was possible for Joshua 
Wordsworth, a carpenter by trade, to become one of the most 
successful machine-making entrepreneurs in Leeds with a 
career spanning the first half of the nineteenth century - 
though possibly he was carried, technically at least, by his 
partner Joseph Taylor. 
The majority of early firms were of short duration, failing 
to survive through the industry's watershed of c. 1805. The 
lifespan of a company is not, though, a certain measure of 
its success. In many cases the reasons for a firm's failure 
to survive or grow can only be guessed. Sometimes the 
business folded when its head died and had no partner or son 
to carry on. There are also cases where entrepreneurs made a 
commercial decision to move into another industry without 
apparently having failed as a machine-maker. But much of 
this is speculative, as comparative standards of product are 
not known, nor is detailed information available about 
companies' finances. Nor is it possible to say exactly what 
contribution was made respectively by successful or failed 
firms to the emerging textile engineering industry. 
Twelve of the eighteen early Keighley machine-making 
entrepreneurs had left the industry by 1805. Most had 
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reverted to their original trade, though three, Brigg, 
Greenwood, and Tempest, disappeared from Keighley records 
and could have continued engineering careers elsewhere. But 
there is no definite evidence of that, and of the twelve 
leavers nothing substantial has survived, neither businesses 
descending from them, nor their former trainees carrying on 
the machine-making trade. There is a suggestion that two of 
the leavers, Nicholson and Weatherhead, collaborated on the 
invention of a hand throstle, 99 but no confirmation has been 
found. Possibly the two men introduced some minor 
improvement to the spinning operation. That apart, there is 
nothing to suggest that the leavers made any contribution to 
technological progress in the industry. 
If the dozen leavers had a negligible impact on the local 
machine industry, that is not to say that their careers 
always ended in outright failure. Some, like Thomas Corlasst 
whose machine-making was ancillary to his cotton-spinning 
business, were clearly unsuccessful commercially. 100 But 
others were able to make the most of changing opportunities, 
showing versatility as entrepreneurs rather than as 
technicians. Lodge Calvert, for example, was a joiner who 
made throstles for a few years, perhaps only for his own 
use, until about 1805 when he gave up machine-making to 
concentrate first upon cotton-spinning, and later worsted- 
spinning, both with great success. 101 Such detailed 
information is not available about those who dropped out of 
the Leeds engineering industry during its formative phase. 
But if there is a generalization to be made, it is that 
woodworkers did not survive as entrepreneurs in the industry 
unless they had made a thorough transition, effectively re- 
training as Titus Longbottom seems to have done, or unless 
they could partner someone with superior technical 
abilities, like Wordsworth with Taylor, and Fenton, who took 
care of the book-keeping while leaving the engineering 
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business to Murray and Wood. 102 Mechanical skills, 
particularly those of smiths, were all important for 
entrepreneurs at this stage. 
To have survived past the first decade of the nineteenth 
century may have been an achievement, but continuing success 
was by no means assured. Six Keighley firms lasted through 
that watershed, but by the mid-dentury only two of them were 
still in existence, though neither of those survived 
unscathed the death of their founder. This experience 
emphasises that the demands placed upon entrepreneurs during 
a period of rapid technological change were heavy, for it 
was generally when an entrepreneur was unable to continue, 
and inadequate arrangements had been made for the 
succession, that the business folded. This generalization 
applies to those Keighley firms which passed the watershed 
of c. 1805 but failed to reach the mid-century: William Carr, 
whose business declined after his retirement in 1817 as his 
sons were not of equivalent stature; Michael Merrall, killed 
in 1819 when his sons were too young to take over; and Titus 
Longbottom, who left no heir and whose firm died with him in 
1831. Berry Smith had lost interest in machine-making by 
about 1830 and switched to the textile industry, which may 
have seemed more profitable and less demanding to an ageing 
man who lacked a son to share the burdens of business. In 
Leeds, similar examples prove how imperative was the role of 
the business leader in a dynamic new industry. John Jubb 
(II), whose father had started a transition from 
millwrighting to machine-making in the 1780s, outlived the 
older man by only eight years, and because his own sons were 
not even into their apprenticeships when he died in 1816, 
the firm was soon forced out of business. 
103 Fenton, Murray 
and Wood lost its impetus after Murray's death in 1826 and 
eventually faded away after several years under the guidance 
of the lacklustre Richard Jackson. 104 though the technical 
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legacy from its early period was outstanding (see below). 
Zebulon Stirk, who had been among the leading makers of 
textile machines and steam engines in Leeds during the 
1820s, saw his firm decline to employ only half a dozen in 
his old age. 105 He too seems to have lacked male heirs. 
Those whose businesses survived long-term in Keighley, 
Richard Hattersley and William Smith, had numerous sons but 
that in itself presented a problem, for firm and competent 
direction was needed to maintain viability as machine- 
makers. Both companies had to reorganize after the death of 
the founder, in order to exclude sons who did not fit in 
personally or technically. This strategy was self-evidently 
successful. 106 
The first generation of textile engineers emerged from a 
group of wood- and metal-working trades, small-scale 
craftsmen working on their own account, or for another as a 
journeyman. As sons commonly followed into their father's 
trade, information about fathers' occupations further 
reinforces a perception of their social status. The early 
machine-makers ran businesses much as they would have 
carried on a more traditional craft, on a modest scale 
usually as sole traders, though there were exceptions. 
Hattersley had a partner, Thomas Binns, from 1793 to 18109 
who has been omitted from Table 2.1 as his interest seems to 
have been purely financial. In Leeds there were a few more 
partnerships. The only known sleeping partner there was 
Lister, of Fenton, Murray and Wood. Otherwise partners 
either made a wholehearted commitment to engineering, like 
Wordsworth, or had another part to play, like Fenton and his 
book-keeping, or Mark Walker whose textile background 
enabled him to make a significant contribution to technical 
developments with Samuel Lawson. 
107 But without metal- 
working skill invested in their principal, firms did not 
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survive the first decade of the nineteenth century. In the 
main it was blacksmiths and whitesmiths who lasted through 
that period, and those trained by smiths who came to call 
themselves machine-makers. 
In many ways the vast majority of machine-makers operating 
before 1805 are irrelevant to understanding the mid- 
nineteenth century industry as such a great discontinuity 
had taken place, most of the early group leaving no 
discernible legacy. The important question is how the early 
experience of machine-making transmitted itself through to a 
new and more technical generation. 
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TRAINING NETWORKS 
The second generation of machine-making entrepreneurs, those 
who went into business after about 1805., were technically 
far ahead of most of their predecessors. In Yorkshire's two 
leading centres of machine-making there had been little 
overlap with the first phase of textile engineering. The 
hiatus of c. 1805 was bridged by only six firms in Keighley, 
already referred to above, and by two or perhaps three firms 
in Leeds - Jubb's, which soon failed, Fenton, Murray and 
Wood, and possibly Taylor and Wordsworth which may have been 
a continuation of the older firm of Drabble. The 
discontinuity in the industry is striking. It seems 
particularly puzzling that such a reduction in the existing 
firms coincided with a period when machinery was apparently 
in great demand, and expertise was at a premium. The 
explanation is that many of the earliest makers had not 
possessed high degrees of proficiency. Consequently, when 
iron replaced wood as the main material in the early years 
of the nineteenth century, and greater precision was 
demanded of machinery, at the same time as a severe downturn 
in trade following the boom of 1800-1,108 less competent 
machine-makers were forced out of business. This is 
illustrated in Richard Hattersley's sales, for while the 
newly established business of Berry Smith thrived and grew 
exponentially during years of supposed depression, many 
other machine-makers were giving up altogether. 109 Berry 
Smith was a newly-trained specialist machine-maker who had 
learned his trade from William Carr, whereas the drop-outs 
were relative amateurs who failed for want of technical 
ability, apparent from their lack of any enduring legacy in 
the form of technology, techniques or trained labour. 
Hence the building of an industry which was already highly 
specialized in the 1820s, and employed thousands of skilled 
employees by 1850, was the achievement of a very small group 
-77- 
of entrepreneurs. To show how the process worked, how 
expertise was transmitted to a new generation of business 
leaders, it is possible to trace the ancestry of the largest 
firms working at the mid-century. For the Keighley industry, 
Table 2.2 confirms that George Hattersley and William Smith 
were the sole direct descendants of the pre-1810 generation. 
However, almost every firm of substance in the half century 
to 1850 can be seen to have come down from three textile 
engineers who had started in business in the town between 
1789 and 1795 (see Table 2.6). All these three were by trade 
metal-workers, Richard Hattersley a whitesmith from 
Ecclesfield, William Carr an engineer from Preston, and 
William Smith, trained as a mechanic at the Arkwright system 
mill in Keighley during the early 1780s. 
The three leading engineers passed on their expertise direct 
to apprentices or by re-training skilled metal workers from 
allied trades. Some of these went on to become entrepreneurs 
themselves. Michael Merrall, after finishing an 
apprenticeship as a blacksmith in Keighley, gained 
specialist knowledge of rollers, spindles and flyers while 
working for Richard Hattersley from 1796 or earlier, until 
about 1808. He was still close to Hattersley after setting 
up in business on his own, as the two supplied each other 
with parts and materials, although Merrall also made boilers 
and repaired steam engines. Merrall's business did not 
survive his sudden death in 1819 in an accident with his own 
steam engine. 110 More enduring was the firm of Hattersley's 
former apprentices John and Samuel Smith, which was 
established in about 1818, employed 80 hands in 1851 and 
between 400 and 500 by 1866.111 Titus Longbottom was another 
who had converted to the trade. After completing his 
apprenticeship as a joiner/ machinist with his father, 
Longbottom gained experience as a machine-maker for two 
years with Berry Smith, himself an ex-apprentice of William 
-78- 
Carr., before setting up alone in 1809.112 Although 
Longbottom's firm did not survive him, it was a significant 
one and he too had trained a future entrepreneur, John 
Midgley. 
The technical ancestry of six of Keighley's ten mid-century 
machine-makers can be traced to those three textile 
engineers who bridged the gap between the industry's first- 
and second phases (Tables 2.2 and 2.6). Of the rest, Bailey 
and Ross, both woolcombing machinery makers, seem to have 
been one-man operations which were as short-lived as they 
were small. Any training links which may have existed 
between George Bland or Briggs and Banks and the rest of the 
Keighley industry remain unconfirmed. Bland was a blacksmith 
from Addingham who was working in Keighley as early as 1822, 
becoming a noted powerloom maker in his own right in about 
1835.113 It is almost certain that Bland, and probably his 
sometime partner Fox, worked for one of the large Keighley 
engineers before 1835. Briggs and Banks was a young firm in 
1851, already employing 31, with partners aged 29 to 35, all 
Keighley born. 114 They made powerlooms, rollers, spindles 
and flyers, the products for which Hattersley was noted, and 
it is possible that they too were Hattersley-trained. 
The picture of a training network in Leeds is even more 
stark, reflecting the pervasive influence of Matthew Murray. 
Murray and Wood survived almost alone through the hiatus of 
c. 1805, as John Jubb's firm had folded before 1820 and no 
links between Jubb and the continuing industry have been 
proved. Of the four major Leeds firms in existence at the 
mid-century, probably three had been founded by ex-employees 
of Murray - Maclea and March, Samuel Lawson, and perhaps 
Taylor and Wordsworth (Table 2.7). The exception was Peter 
Fairbairn, a late arrival to the industry whose skill had 
been imported to Yorkshire. So though Murray's title of 
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'Father of Leeds Engineering' was supposed to relate to his 
pioneering works in introducing various branches of 
mechanical engineering to the town, 115 he was in a different 
sense the father of textile engineering in Leeds for he had 
trained many of the significant entrepreneurs of the 
nineteenth century. 
Proving the training links within Leeds and Keighley 
indicates how skills and knowledge, both technical and 
entrepreneurial I were disseminated to a new generation. It 
also undermines the idea that self-sufficiency was possible, 
for success in the maturing industry depended upon a 
thorough grounding in the trade from one of those few who 
had carried machine-making through to the nineteenth 
century, Furthermore, a trading network was as important as 
these training links in enabling men of few means to embark 
upon entrepreneurship. The trading connections enabled some 
pooling of technical resources, a sharing of work by means 
of the subcontract system to help new firms over lean 
periods, and financial help via extended credit. For 
established firms to assist up-and-coming entrepreneurs was 
not altruism, as Hattersley found, for although some of the 
newcomers would fail and perhaps remain indebted, it took 
only one or two like Berry Smith for the favour to reap a 
handsome dividend. That is not to say that such patronage 
was a mere cold calculation, for in the continuing artisan 
tradition there was a propensity to assist others, 
especially ex-apprentices branching out alone. The second 
generation of entrepreneurs was still imbued with the spirit 
of the class of artisans from which they had sprung. 
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(in 
WILLIAM CARR 
business 1790-c1817) 
.1 
(sons) Edward Carr 
John Carr 
Thomas Carr of Bingley 
(partner 1793) Richardson 
who later took Thomas 
Mills as partner c. 1814 
(Mills in busin7e-ss in 
Keighley in 1853) 
(apprentice) Ber. ry Smith (c. 1790) 
I 
(employee) Titus Longbottom 
(1807-9) 
(apprenticel John Midgley 
(in business as power loom 
maker c. 1837-1850s) 
I 
(sons) Charles and Allan 
Smith 
(in business in 1853) 
RICHARD HATTERSLEY 
(in business 1789-1829) 
.1 
(sonsl 
George Hattersley of Keighley 
Samuel Hattersley of Bradford 
Jonathan Hattersley of Leeds 
(all in business in 1853; 
George and Samuel direct 
successors of Richard) 
I 
(apprentice) Thomas Smith 
(left by 1815) 
(employee- 
c. 1796-1808) 
Michael 
Merrall 
(d. 1819) 
(apprentices) 
John and Samuel Smith 
business c1818- both dead 
1850 but firm continued) 
(in 
TABLE 2.6: 
Keighley textile engineers: 
training and entrepreneurial links 
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by 
MURRAY AND WOOD 
(in business c. 1794-1826) 
ýson-in-law 
and 
ex-apprentice) 
Richard Jackson 
(continued firm as 
Fenton, Murray and 
Jackson) 
(ex-apprentice? ) 
Joseph Taylor 
(Taylor and 
Wordsworth c. 1806) 
(sons-in-law'and one 
or both ex-apprentices) 
Maclea and March 
(1825) 
(ex-apprentice) 
Samuel Lawson 
(1812) 
TABLE 2.7: 
Leeds textile engineers: 
training and entrepreneurial links 
CONNECTIONS AND COMMUNITIES 
So it was usual for engineering entrepreneurs to maintain 
close commercial and technical links with others in the 
local trade, based upon trading and training connections, 
and positively to assist young journeymen setting up as 
small masters. As the first group of successful machine- 
makers had in common a background in skilled crafts, this 
may have been a manifestation of an artisan tradition. It is 
also possible that there were other features of their 
origins which had created a bond between machine-makers, 
perhaps that they had come from the same villages or shared 
religious affiliations, and that such common features 
affected their commercial behaviour to each other. 
As far as geographical origins, of the three influential 
early engineers in Keighley, two were in-migrants, 
Hattersley from Sheffield in 1789, Carr from Preston the 
following year. William Smith was Keighley-born. All the 
-82- 
significant entrepreneurs of the period up to 1850 were 
either born and apprenticed in Keighley, or born in nearby 
villages and trained in machine-making in Keighley. After 
the first small influx of metal-working skill in 1790, 
expertise in textile engineering was almost entirely 
generated from within Keighley. 
Leeds seems to present a much more cosmopolitan picture in 
the geographical origins of its entrepreneurs (Table 2.5). 
Of the major entrepreneurial figures, only March was born in 
or near Leeds. Others came from the Sheffield area, from 
Scotland or the north-east, or from Keighley. But though 
they may have brought with them metal-working skills, apart 
from Peter Fairbairn, a late-comer exceptional in many ways, 
the group of entrepreneurs acquired their knowledge of 
textile machines in Leeds. Murray and Wood, both smiths, 
learned from their experiences with John Marshall, and most 
of the rest learned as apprentices or journeymen with Murray 
and Wood. The success of the machine-making industry both in 
Keighley and in Leeds resulted from developments within the 
community of textile engineers, rather than by an 
importation of skills and knowledge from elsewhere. The 
places of origin of these men are too scattered for any 
sense of communal identity to have existed between them 
before they moved to Leeds, though it is possible that some 
of the textile engineers had already known each other and 
that this may have influenced their business dealings. 
As far as religious groupings are concerned, the Leeds 
machine-makers belonged to a spread of established and non- 
conformist churches (Table 2.5). In Keighley, although 
Hattersley and Berry Smith shared allegiance for a time to 
the Swedenborgian church, which had an appeal to scientists 
and engineers, there is little common religious ground 
between the machine-makers as a whole. 
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Other than in their growing skill and their artisan 
background, there is little to connect these entrepreneurs, 
Social cohesion was something which developed among the 
group as their industry assumed its own identity. The 
resulting social and personal connections will be further 
explored in chapter 5. 
CONCLUSION 
Early machine-making entrepreneurs were almost all from the 
class of skilled artisan, from backgrounds which were humble 
though not the very lowest. To succeed in the first phase of 
the industry required skill in metal-working, though a few 
wood-workers were able to adapt. In the second phase, it was 
essential to have directly relevant training in machine- 
making, a grounding which could come only from the few 
engineers who had managed to survive an hiatus in the 
industry around 1805. Entrepreneurs in the maturing industry 
were consequently 'home-grown', qualifying for a place in 
the community of engineers by virtue of skills acquired from 
within that group rather than through external factors such 
as capital or other connections. In fact capital and 
connections could not deliver success if the necessary 
skills were lacking. On the other hand, with expertise and 
drive it was possible to succeed despite modest origins. The 
overcapacity which drove out small firms in the industries 
which Honeyman studied did not occur in textile engineerings 
because skill was crucial and remained relatively scarce. 
Small firms which failed in machine-making generally did so 
because their principal lacked such expertise. 
Despite the 'high tech' products of textile engineering, 
relationships within the new industry continued to be 
influenced by an artisan tradition of mutual support. This 
state of affairs did not begin to change until process 
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methods modernized and some businesses grew much larger, 
from about 1830. Koditschek's 'nascent bourgeois elite' was 
a minority within machine-making, with many small-scale 
entrepreneurs continuing to organise their affairs in a way 
which may better fit Smaills definition of lartisanall. 
The enterprise and versatility displayed by the earliest 
group of machine-makers confirms Smail's idea that 
entrepreneurship was then a widespread quality. That so many 
failed has been shown to be due to a lack of technical 
rather than entrepreneurial abilities. But the technical 
hurdles, in stopping so many, actually provided a means by 
which men of lowly origin could achieve great success, by 
preventing overcapacity in the industry. Hence textile 
engineering can show genuine cases of rags to riches, though 
there was no such thing as an entirely self-made man when 
machine-making relied upon close connections in an artisan 
tradition. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMEMT OF A SKILLED LABOUR FORCE 
By the middle of the nineteenth century a workforce of many 
thousands had been trained in machine-making. These workers 
belonged to the class which came to be called an aristocracy 
of labour, relatively well paid and widely acknowledged as 
skilled. The vast majority, though, were actually in 
situations of dependency, employed by others, and apparently 
carrying out a more narrowly defined range of duties, in 
much larger establishments, than their immediate 
predecessors had done. Whether it is true that machine- 
makers at the mid-century were becoming de-skilled and 
losing touch with the artisanal traditions which had 
supposedly sustained an earlier generation, are issues which 
this chapter will explore. 
It might be expected that the earliest workers in textile 
engineering would have come from backgrounds similar to 
those of the first entrepreneurs, and would in that case 
have had sufficient know-how and opportunity to move into 
entrepreneurship. But the number of artisans who turned to 
entrepreneurship was small, and falling as a proportion 
through the period. The engineering workforce at the mid- 
century had progressed a long way from supposedly artisanal 
roots to become, in the large shops at least, a regimented 
industrial proletariat. These thousands of skilled workers 
had chosen, or been forced into, a path away from the 
relative independence of self-employment to which earlier 
generations of their class might have aspired. This may have 
been a result of heavier capital requirements to set up in 
the later industry, though the small-scale sector in 
engineering continued to be very significant. But another 
possible explanation is that these workers, though presumed 
skilled, were not really so, and that their position owed 
more to trade protectionism than it did to intrinsic worth, 
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with their lack of competence covered up by a division of 
labour and a range of modern machine-tools which were 
possible only in the largest factories. 
So alongside questions about the origins of this labour 
force in a new trade, and how they had acquired the 
necessary skills and knowledge to make machinery, there is 
another set of issues about the level of new skills which 
were needed, the ways in which a labour force was recruited 
and used, and whether specialization had developed to such a 
degree that opportunities for textile engineering journeymen 
to be mobile, either geographically or upwards into 
entrepreneurship, had become extremely limited because the 
trade in general was losing its broad-based competence. 
SKILL AND SPECIALIZATION 
Pre-industrial machinery was produced by local tradesmen 
such as smiths and joiners who also pursued other 
activities, or, in the case of fulling machinery, by 
millwrights who worked full-time in engineering, though not 
exclusively in textile engineering, and were constantly 
moving to where their skills were required. This workforce 
could therefore be described as part-time, as its members 
were partly occupied elsewhere, either in other industries 
or in other districts. The labour force was skilled, but it 
was not highly specialized. 
Changes in machine-making -a growth in demand for the 
products, the increasing complexity of those products, and 
new production techniques - meant that the workforce had to 
adjust, in its size, location and degree of specialization. 
New and more technological products initially demanded a 
higher degree of skill from the workforce, though once 
changes had been absorbed, processes mechanized and machine- 
making re-organized by further division of labour, then it 
is entirely feasible that the result could have been a de- 
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skilling of the machine-maker's trade. Like other craft 
trades, machine-making around the turn of the nineteenth 
century was frequently referred to as an 'Art and Mystery' 
though at some stage its emphasis shifted to become 
technical/ scientific. Cardwell has argued that the 
development of textile machinery in the eighteenth century 
happened totally independently of science, but that once the 
process of innovation was established, a host of new 
problems arose that stimulated scientific enquiry and gave 
rise to new forms of industry. 1 This proposition, which may 
explain a changing ethos in the engineering industry, will 
be further examined in the following chapter. 
There is also a dimension to the development of a new labour 
force which goes beyond an acquisition of manual skills and 
technical knowledge. As one nineteenth century engineer 
explained 'The life and education of the workshop ... is 
twofold - technical and sociall. 
2 The social context is what 
3 Wright called the 'inner life of workshops'. This aspect of 
skilled work was portrayed by Wright as partly a protective 
device to ensure that the boundaries of the trade, who was 
'in' and who was 'out', were carefully defined and 
preserved. The phenomenon had many positive elements, 
including a duty among tradesmen to help those of their 
members fallen on hard times, and a pooling of information 
4 about jobs and employers in other towns. The 
generalizations in Wright's account regarding social aspects 
of initiation into a trade are echoed by George Sturt, 
writing about the whee1wrights' trade in the late nineteenth 
century. Sturt refers to 'the waggon builder's lore' being 
'a tangled network of country prejudices ... for the most 
part the details were but dimly understood', though 
'necessity gave the law at every detail, and in scores of 
5 ways insisted on conformity'. It was essential that the 
waggon builder had grasped manual skills and technical 
details, though not in any scientific way - 'reasoned 
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science for us did not exist' said Sturt6 - but the trade 
was more than that, encompassing local custom as well as an 
empirically-founded technical skill, all acquired through 
apprenticeship. 
In a new trade such as machine-making, one would expect the 
'lore' to be less firmly entrenched. This could be a 
positive advantage, enabling greater flexibility in entry to 
the trade, mobility and entrepreneurial activity. It is 
possible, though, that 'custom' could be quickly created to 
protect the position of those already in a new trade, with 
restrictions upon the passing of information so that a body 
of knowledge was contained and an air of mystery introduced. 
More positively, in other ways the new trade would need to 
develop its own networks and modus operandi. Relationships 
had to be forged between buyer and seller, engineer and 
subcontractor, along with an understanding of what was 
required in each of these roles I and information must be 
available about who was 'in' the trade and what kind of work 
they could perform. 
Skills essential to the development of machine-making grew 
from more traditional occupations. Geographically, a few of 
the Leeds and Keighley machine-making entrepreneurs have 
been traced back to south Yorkshire (see Table 2.5), and in 
particular can be linked to the nail-making trade. It might 
be expected that employees in the machine-making industry, 
if they were in-migrants to West Yorkshire, could have 
originated in those same trades and villages near Sheffield. 
There is evidence that an 'old order' in the South Yorkshire 
metal trades was breaking up before 1780 when, for example, 
iron production had undergone substantial change. 
7 Nail- 
making was an industry in transition, and its demise as a 
part of a dual economy in the area centred on Ecclesfield, 
8 the 'metropolis of the nail trade', appears to have 
displaced a number of skilled metal-workers. 
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Nail-making has long been recognized as significant in the 
process of industrialization. W. H. B. Court said that it was 
impossible to understand the industrial revolution of the 
West Midlands without assigning to 'this apparently trivial 
and uninteresting occupation a high place as one of the 
factors making for change', and Hey believes the same to 
have been true for South Yorkshire, 9 attributing a key role 
to 'the humble nailing trade' in the development of the 
South Yorkshire iron industry after 1750.10 Although the 
Ecclesfield nail-makers attempted to limit entry to their 
trade by an agreement insisting upon seven-year 
apprenticeship, 11 the reality was that it was 'the least 
skilled of the iron trades'. 12 In the West Midlands it was 
carried on by women and children with little training. 13 The 
Ecclesfield nailing trade was finally killed by 
mechanization in the early nineteenth century. 14 but had 
long been in terminal decline thanks to over-manning and the 
loss of agricultural holdings which had traditionally been a 
mainstay of the nailer's income. 15 Not all the nail-makers 
fled the area, for many of the backyard smithies were 
converted to file shops16 and file-making flourished for 
years after that. Richard Hattersley continued to obtain 
files for his Keighley machine shop from his old home 
village. 
It might be expected that some of these displaced smiths 
would have moved to West Yorkshire, where a new metal- 
working industry was in process of foundation. The distances 
were small, the metal-working background appears relevant, 
and some of the smiths may have also had a knowledge of 
textiles, as the domestic linen industry was widespread 
around the area west of Barnsley. 17 There are a few examples 
of such migration into textile engineering in Keighley or 
Leeds, though these come mainly in the group which became 
successful entrepreneurs, rather than employees, in machine- 
making. Hattersley came from an extensive nail-making family 
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in Ecclesfield, where two Hattersleys had been listed among 
the masters of 39 nail-shops there in 1707, and five of that 
name were signatories to the Ecclesfield Nailers' Agreement 
of 1733.18 Richard Hattersley had settled briefly in 
Sheffield in the 1780s before his final move to 
entrepreneurship in Keighley in 1789.19 The cutlery trade in 
Sheffield was closely controlled by guild2O and therefore 
not open to displaced nailers. That such artisans would 
consequently move into a neighbouring new industry where no 
such restrictions applied, is a tempting conclusion which is 
unfortunately not supported by any firm evidence. This class 
of worker left little trace of their movements. Though it is 
known that Richard Hattersley recruited a number of kinsmen, 
presumably from Ecclesfield, for long and short periods in 
the 1790s (see below), on the whole he relied upon local, 
Keighley, labour. This conforms to a pattern identified by 
Rowlands in the West Midlands, where both capital and 
manpower for the transition to new trades in the eighteenth 
century were, she believes, 'drawn from the community 
itself' with 'no evidence to suggest that there was any 
marked recruitment of men from outside the region'. 21 
THE THEORY AND REALITY OF SKILL 
Skill can be defined in a number of ways. For example More 
has distinguished between the economist's view that skill is 
something essential to a job which is acquired by training, 
and a sociologist's perception of skill as a social 
construct which is strictly unnecessary to the efficient 
functioning of industry. 22 More's area of interest, however, 
starts in the late Victorian period, when much greater 
formal knowledge was required of skilled engineering 
workers23 and the trade had acquired an institutionalized 
framework, as well as an acknowledged group of lesser 
trained semi-skilled workers. That is not to say that the 
'social' aspect of skill had not existed in the earlier 
engineering industry. For example, it had been used to limit 
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entry to nail-making in the Ecclesfield district in the 
eighteenth century, for although two years was quite long 
enough to learn the trade24 a seven-year apprenticeship was 
insisted upon to prevent young men from prematurely setting 
up as masters. However it would have been difficult and 
generally undesirable to apply such restrictions to a new 
and dynamic trade like machine-making, and no evidence has 
been found of any such attempts to control entry. Supporting 
the leconomist's' view, it does seem that a degree of 
training, to inculcate both manual skills and technical 
knowledge, was a necessary precondition for the efficient 
manufacture of machinery. Semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
could be used to carry out certain tasks in the textile 
engineering workshop and factory, but a core of skilled 
labour remained essential. 
Because the products of textile engineering were new, and 
the processes employed were improvised from other 
industries, for a time there could be no fixed body of 
knowledge in the new trade which could be used to define a 
path of training. Expertise in the new skills had to be 
acquired by a variety of means. When the first textile 
engineers started in business, apprentice-trained machine- 
makers could not have existed. How much skill was then 
required is debatable. Clearly not just anyone could 
successfully survive as a machine-maker, even in the 1780s 
and 1790s, though a broad range of wood- and metal-working 
tradesmen did try. An early advertisement by John Jubb, the 
noted millwright and machine maker, suggests the vagueness 
of qualifications for such work: 
MECHANICKS WANTED - three or four good workmen who 
understand t ý9 making and fitting up of cotton or worsted 
machinery... 
It was only later, after about 1805, that a genuine barrier 
to entry emerged, in the form of a higher degree of metal- 
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working skill and the possession of a body of technical 
knowledge. A general definition of skill is adequate to 
understand the requirements for early machine-makers: a 
skilled worker might be 'one possessing a special ability 
acquired through a learning process either of formal 
apprenticeship or, increasingly, in an informal manner, and 
that from this skill derives clear notions of an artisan 
, 26 status ... 
Using this general definitiong what was the level of skill 
of those workers who came into the new industry, and how 
much knowledge of textile machines did they possess? Even a 
humble nail-smith was a relatively skilled worker, showing a 
great facility with the hammer. The work was endlessly 
repetitious yet it involved a high degree of precision: 
[I remember] as a boy, watching the making of hand-made 
nails ... The rod of iron was cut into the required lengths across a 'cold-sate' let into an anvil, with the 
cutting edge upwards, and was then deftly picked up and 
dropped into a hole in the anvil. A sharp blow with the 
hammer not only completed the head at one operation, but 
jumped the,; ail out of the hole, leaving it ready for the 
next nail. " 
Such skill could be adapted to use in other metal-working 
industries. As Mathias has pointed out, before precision 
machine tools came into being, everything was a 'one-off', 
so that much rested upon the individual skills of an 
artisan. Mathias emphasises the scarcity of specialized 
skills, and how few centres existed where precision metal- 
work could be carried out. 28 
This makes it all the more surprising if skilled metal- 
workers were not being drawn from South Yorkshire. But 
movements of migrating journeymen are difficult to track, 
and it may be that the problem is one of evidence, that 
migration was occurring but cannot easily be proved. In 
Leeds, for example, with its growing and shifting 
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population, large numbers were moving in, out and around the 
town, presenting major problems in tracing the origins of 
workers even in such a relatively small and specialised 
industry. Keighley may provide a partial solution to this 
problem, for although existing evidence is inadequate to 
show precise movements of skilled workers, there is the 
possibility of analysing the town's entire labour force at 
the end of the eighteenth century. If it can be demonstrated 
that this workforce was numerically and technically adequate 
to adapt to the requirements of textile engineering, then 
perhaps in-migrants were not required, for the South 
Yorkshire nail-smiths' skills were actually no more directly 
relevant to textile engineering than were those of a local 
smith. Any tentative conclusions about Keighley, though, 
would not necessarily apply to Leeds, for the larger town 
was less self-contained and is much nearer to South 
Yorkshire, so may have been a greater magnet than Keighley 
for displaced smiths. 
The Craven Muster Roll of 1803 29 listed local men who were 
available for military service. As in many official records, 
respondents often cited their original occupation, the one 
in which an apprenticeship had been served, rather than the 
trade in which they were working in 1803. The list is 
therefore informative about occupational structure in 
Keighley before the emergence of a fully-fledged machine- 
making industry, and ýhows the bed-rock upon which textile 
engineering was built. It provides the names of 1118 men, 
supposedly the entire male population of Keighley parish who 
were aged between 17 and 55 at the time. With the exception 
of apprentices, whose trade was unspecified in the roll and 
some of whom were too young to have been included, it can be 
assumed that all men forming part of a potential pool of 
labour for the machine-making industry would appear on the 
roll. Most of the 'engineers' listed in Keighley parish 
lived in the town itself, though those based on the rural 
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Brass filer 2 
Blacksmith 9 
Whitesmith 8 
Smith 4 
Machine Maker 1 
Engine Man 1 
Founder 2 
Brass founder/ brazier 3 
Tinworker 2 
Clockmaker 2 
Shuttlemaker 1 
Woodturner 3 
Turner 2 
Joiner 20 
Carpenter 7 
Apprentices known to 
have been engineers 2 
Nailmaker 4 
Combmaker 7 
Total number of men listed in the parish 1118 
SOURCE: North Yorkshire County Record Office, Craven Muster 
Roll 1803 
TABLE 3.1: Tradesmen in engineering and broadly related 
industries in Keighley Parish, 1803 
outskirts of the parish may never have come into contact 
with textile engineering. The purpose here, though, is to 
show a pool of labour potentially capable of forming a 
skilled labour force of machine-makers. 
Totals for each 'engineering' trade are reproduced in Table 
3.1. The definition of 'engineering' used here is a loose 
one, taking in all kinds of wood- and metal-workers, 
although by this time wood-workers were of decreasing 
significance in textile engineering. The roll lists 34 
metal-workers, 33 wood-workers, and two apprentices known to 
have been textile engineers, though the actual number would 
have been higher. The parish did not have a single 
millwright listed. There were four nail-makers and seven 
comb-makers, trades which do not seem to have had any direct 
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input into machine-making in the Keighley area. Nail-making 
remained an important industry in the nearby village of 
Silsden from about 1760 until the end of the nineteenth 
century, with up to 250 forges there30 and over 30 nail- 
makers recorded in the 1803 muster roll " but no connections 
have been found between these neighbouring industries. 
ORIGINS OF THE EARLY LABOUR FORCE 
The Craven Muster Roll shows that small yet significant 
numbers of specialists, in the form of brass filers, 
tinworkers and engineers, then existed. The size of the 
workforce in textile engineering was very small at this 
time, for firms were operating upon similar principles to 
artisan workshops. 31 Some of those on the Muster Roll were 
already entrepreneurs in machine-making, though not 
necessarily describing themselves as such. As for the 
remainder, is it possible to tell who was working as an 
employee in textile engineering, what exactly they were 
doing, and how competently they were doing it? Information 
is more difficult to find than for the entrepreneurial 
group, as many of those involved were less fully committed 
to the trade, for example combining machine-making with 
other work for other employers. But at some stage, when a 
combination of skill and knowledge come to amount to 
specialization, machine-making became a trade in its own 
right. 
The first apprentice-trained machine-makers entered the 
trade as trainees during the 1780s, like William Smith, who 
nevertheless described himself as a brass filer in 1803, or 
in the 1790s, such as Berry Smith who was the first in 
Keighley to adopt the name of machine-maker. There were 
others who did not call themselves machine-makers because 
they did not make machines, but who were training with firms 
which were beginning to specialize in aspects of textile 
engineering, like Samuel and George Hattersley who were 
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apprenticed to their father. These individuals are known 
about because they belong to that well-documented group 
which provided an entrepreneurial lead in the early 
nineteenth century. Their early specialization gave them an 
edge in the industry, which is why they were able to build 
successful entrepreneurial careers. It is therefore unlikely 
that they are typical of a wider labour force, and one has 
to look beyond them to establish the nature of employees in 
the early industry. 
Two early series of wages records for Richard Hattersley's 
employees, covering the periods January 1796 to December 
1798 and October 1808 to June 1809932 provide information 
from which Tables 3.2 and 3.3 have been drawn up. In some 
cases the type of work done by these workers was indicated, 
though information in Hattersley's books is generally 
sparse. Details of individuals from the Craven Muster Roll 
of 1803 have been used to supplement the Hattersley data, 
though there are sometimes uncertainties about whether the 
correct individual has been identified on the muster roll. 
For the period 1796-1798 (Table 3.2), Hattersley employed a 
total of 19 people. These can be divided into three 
categories. First there was a core of three skilled workers: 
Hattersley himself, usually described as a whitesmith, 
Thomas Eamet or Emmet, a whitesmith or smith, and Michael 
Merrall, referred to as a blacksmith or whitesmith in 
various records and later to become an entrepreneur 
himself. 33 These three men were kept in constant employment. 
The second category was family members who were taken into 
the firm as apprentices: Samuel Hattersley at the age of 
about 10, George Hattersley at about nine, and Solomon 
Hattersley, who was not Richard's son though presumably a 
relative. Solomon was employed from 1796 (and perhaps 
earlier), was still described as an apprentice in 1803, and 
continued to work for Richard for many years, being his 
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highest paid regular employee in 1808-9. The thirdl and by 
far the largest, category of employee was casual staff, who 
numbered 13 in all. Some of these did very little work for 
Hattersley during the period, while others seem to have been 
used on a regular basis during busy times. Two of them, John 
and N. Hattersley, may have been relatives who visited 
Keighley to help out for a few weeks, for they were not sons 
of Richard or residents of the town. A characteristic which 
many of the casuals seemed to share was that they were not 
skilled in engineering, either in metal- or wood-working. A 
number were described as weavers or labourers in 1803. They 
were mainly young people, perhaps children, and the listing 
within the Craven Muster Roll suggests that they lived in 
very close proximity to Hattersley and his workshop. (The 
roll appears to have been drawn up in a topographical way, 
so that people living in the same hamlet were grouped 
together. ) Hattersley was therefore employing mostly very 
local, young, untrained labour rather than engaging men from 
related trades such as joiners who certainly existed in some 
numbers in Keighley at the time. 34 Presumably it suited 
Hattersley to have a flexible pool of cheap labour on his 
doorstep, rather than having to ensure constant employment 
for skilled, and hence more expensive, employees. None of 
the 13 casuals used during 1796/8 appears on his list of 
employees in 1808/9. If their skills were of a relatively 
low order they could easily have been replaced, and 
Hattersley need not have made great efforts to retain any of 
them. This is evidence that different levels of skill were 
recognized and employed within the early industry, 
indicating that a separation of tasks, or division of 
labour, already applied. If not, how could precision parts 
have been produced by unskilled people without machine 
tools? 
But perhaps there is another explanation for the absorption 
of unskilled or semi-skilled workers. What exactly was the 
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work they were engaged upon? From examining any eighteenth 
century textile machine a modern observer would conclude 
that no exceptional degree of skill was required in its 
manufacture. 35 The theory behind its operation was simple, 
and the construction techniques not difficult for anyone 
with a training in wood- or metal-working. The fact that 
even Richard Hattersleyq working at the skilled end of the 
trade, was able to function with a proportion of relatively 
unskilled labour, could be seen as supporting the view that 
only a low grade of expertise was demanded. There are 
several arguments in contradiction of this, in particular 
relating to the skill shortages which continued to afflict 
engineering and which will be further considered below. But 
on the specific point of the complexity of the work, Landes 
has suggested that early textile machines, 'modest, 
rudimentary, wooden contrivances', were nonetheless 
'complicate*d ... to contemporariest. 
36 Intricacy is in the 
eye of the beholder. 
It can be demonstrated that Richard Hattersley's work 
required a high measure of skill. By 1796 his firm made and 
repaired rollers, spindles and flyers, and continued to 
produce nails and screws as well as carrying out general 
jobbing work. 37 All three branches of Hattersley's work 
demanded a skilled input. The precision of rollers, spindles 
and flyers was central to the success of mechanized 
spinning, 38 and Hattersley's command of the local market in 
these products rested upon his technical superiority. 
Secondly, as discussed above, nail and screw making was 
still a hand craft requiring dexterity and specialized 
skill. Third, general jobbing work and repairs were reckoned 
to be no less skilled than other aspects of a trade, being 
considered 'the true test of aptitude' of a craftsman. 
39 
Peter Fairbairn in 1841 concurred that this work was most 
demanding, suggesting that repairs were the only type of 
work still requiring an all-round skill. 
40 The equipment 
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used by Hattersley in the 1790s was simple: his workshop had 
bellows and hearth, benches with vice, a 'cutting ingen', 
but otherwise only handtools such as brace and bit, files 
and hammers. 41 So customers were paying not for 
sophisticated machinery, but for skills and knowledge which 
they did not themselves possess, otherwise they could have 
made or repaired the items themselves. For Hattersley to 
carry out so much precision work, division of labour must 
have been used to enable uniform items to be made without 
machine tools, and without even a high concentration of 
skilled men. Presumably this was possible only if certain 
workers specialized in certain tasks. Boulton and Watt had 
used a similar idea, though on a much grander scale, to 
achieve the maximum precision possible without machine tools 
at Soho in the 1780s and 1790s. 
42 
If customers were putting the parts together, then fitting 
was a skill which Hattersley's men did not need. But his 
practice of supplying precision parts for others to assemble 
conforms to a general pattern within the machine-making 
industry. For example, before 1800 Boulton and Watt were 
consulting engineers rather than engine manufacturers, 
supplying customers with plans and drawings, and precision 
parts which came from subcontractors such as John Wilkinson. 
The customer usually ordered boilers and pistons from their' 
own local supplier, and arranged for local engineers to fit 
the engine, perhaps under the supervision of a Boulton and 
Watt erector temporarily taken into their employment. 43 
M'Connel and Kennedy, Manchester machine-makers in the 
1790s, bought in components from small manufacturers: 
rollers from Matlock, Mayfield (Derbyshire) and Mosley, 
cards from Halifax and spindles from Stalybridge. 
44 The 
increasing size of machines, along with a change from wooden 
to iron frames evident before 1800, meant that it was often 
convenient to supply machines in pre-fabricated form. 
M'Connel wrote to a Belfast customer in 1797: 
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Would it not be cheaper and more convenient for you to 
have all the iron and brass work made here and sent over 
ready to be put together, and to have a confidential and 
experienced journeyman machine maker or two to go from 
here and make the woodwork and fit up the mules with you, 
and to have one or two complete mules made here and sent 
over for a patternt that yýý might see that those fitted 
up with you were the same. 
Specialization among the workforce was a continuing trend 
which is apparent from Hattersley's next series of wages 
records, covering a nine month period in 1808-9 (Table 3.3). 
While the emphasis in Hattersley's products remained upon 
rollers, spindles and flyers and other parts for textile 
machines, the nature of the customers had changed. In the 
1790s, Hattersley was supplying many of his products direct 
to textile manufacturers. By 1808, even though Hattersley 
retained a large number of such clients, there had been a 
shift towards a few machine-makers, who between them 
accounted for a large proportion of the value of his output. 
Machinery had become the province of metal-workers as iron, 
rather than wood, became the dominant material used. 
Although Hattersley had still not taken on fitting, the 
volume of work he was processing and increased standards of 
precision expected by his customers meant that his labour 
force had been upgraded to cope with the growing 
specialization. There is an impression of greater stability 
and growing professionalism, and it is perhaps at this point 
that a trade of textile engineering had begun to exist in 
its own right. 
Apart from members of his family, the individuals employed 
by Hattersley were entirely different from the group of 
workers recorded ten years earlier. The core of skilled 
workers still consisted of only about four men: Richard 
Hattersley, who had doubled his own wage to two guineas a 
week, Richard Fowler, a whitesmith by trade who seems to 
have specialized in turning and fluting rollers, Robert 
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Scafe or Skaife, a smith, and Nimrod Holmes, formerly a 
weaver who had perhaps been re-trained as an engineer as he 
was paid the same wage as Scafe. John Driver, also a former 
textile worker, received a slightly lower wage and worked 
for most of the period. There were several ways in which 
flexibility was introduced into the workforce. Firstly, 
casual labour was used, though of a different type from the 
young and unskilled workers brought in during the 1790s. 
Some of these occasional workers were used for specific 
skilled tasks such as fly forging or screw cutting. One at 
least of the casuals was paid the wage of a fully skilled 
man. A second method of achieving flexibility is 
demonstrated by Hattersley's use of day rates, piece rates 
and laying off labour. In many cases it was Hattersley's 
sons, George, still an apprentice, and Samuel, now out of 
his time, and the kinsman Solomon, who were temporarily put 
out of work so that 'core' workers, who were probably men 
with families, could maintain a wage. At other times there 
were opportunities to work on piece rates in order to boost 
weekly earnings and presumably help Hattersley cope with a 
sudden rush of work. But almost every worker was laid off at 
some time during these nine months. 
The two series of records of Hattersley's employees point to 
the use of similar means of organizing work in each period. 
A small core of skilled workers was supplemented by a 
flexible and varying number of casual and subcontract 
labour. In the second period the group of casual workers was 
more specialized than their equivalents had been in the 
1790s. It seems that some of Hattersley's work could be 
broken down into simple tasks, capable of being carried out 
by unskilled or semi-skilled labour. The role of the skilled 
'core' would be to carry out any tasks which were more 
difficult and also to supervise the work of the less 
skilled. When work was short, the whole of the tasks were 
reserved for the 'core'. Thus Hattersley would be paying 
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NOTES TO TABLE 3.2: 
1. It is not clear from the cash book whether casual 
labourers were paid by the hour or by the piece. 
2.1803 occupations are taken from the Craven Muster Roll 
(NYCRO). Other occupational information was extracted 
from the Keighley Parish Register. 
3. Merrall (born c. 1774) was apprenticed to William Parker, 
a blacksmith. He joined Hattersley in about 1795. 
Described as blacksmith in 1803, and whitesmith in parish 
registers for 1813 etc. 
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more to have unskilled work carried out at such times, but 
was looking to safeguard his supply of skilled men for 
periods when more work became available. 
GROWING SKILLS AND LABOUR SHORTAGES 
Among Hattersley's workforce, the trade of central 
significance in the 1790s and 1800s was that of the smith, 
whether whitesmith or blacksmith. The term Ismith' can be 
used very broadly to denote a craftsman working in wood or 
other materials 9 as well as the more usual metal-working 
definition. The Oxford English Dictionary of 1919 defined 
whitesmith as: 
a. a worker in 'white iron'; a tinsmith. b. one who 
polishes or finishes metal goods, as distinguished from 
one who forges them ... 
A whitesmith may then have been what in 1747 was described 
as a 'Vice-man': 
In all Smith's Shops they are divided into three classes; 
the Fire-Man, or he who forges the work; the Vice-Man, or 
he who files and finishes it; and the Hammer-Man ... the Vice-Man requires the nicest hand and the mut mechanic 
Head, especially if concerned in Movements. 
Because some of the Keighley men were described sometimes as 
whitesmith, and at other times as blacksmith, this suggests 
that the demarcation line between the branches may not have 
been at all rigid. Smiths could be versatile enough to move 
into fine and specialised work, as Rowlands has shown in the 
West Midlands industries during the eighteenth century, 
where even such crafts as jewellery and toy-making can be 
traced from the trade of the smith. 
47 Hattersley's efforts 
to cushion his skilled workers against unemployment or 
under-employment suggest that these men, although still 
describing themselves as smiths, had become more specialist 
and were in possession of skills which made them of 
particular value to a textile engineer. After all, there 
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were apparently plenty of general smiths available to 
Hattersley, had he wanted them, in Keighley parish, or from 
the south Yorkshire nail-making districts. Thomas Cheek 
Hewes, the Manchester machine-maker, confirmed the increased 
specialization of smiths in 1824, when his own workmen 
'[would] not allow a common blacksmith, that only has to 
forge iron into any kind of shape, to work at our trade, 
because he has not worked in the cotton tradel. 
48 Peter 
Fairbairn's workforce included 'a corps of blacksmiths' in 
1841, their work highly mechanized and presumably of a 
repetitive nature. 
49 
Advertisements for engineering workers showed a growing need 
for technical knowledge as well as craft skills. As early as 
1789, George Lyster of Revolution Mill, Retford, who wanted 
" number of joiners, whitesmiths and turners, was asking for 
" 'Blacksmith who has been used to work a Steam Engine, or 
wishes to be instructed and employed in working one of the 
, 50 Patent Engines *00 In 1792 Wright and White, opening a 
textile machine workshop in Leeds, were specific enough to 
ask for a 'Billy-maker', or one who could construct slubbing 
billies, as well as requiring general joiners. 51 John Jubb's 
advertisement in the Leeds Intelligencer of 1794 demanded 
technical knowledge from would-be machine-makers: 
John Jubb, Mill Wright and Machinery Maker, Leeds, is in 
want of 3 journeymen Mill-wrights and the same number of 
joiners who have been accustomed to work at Scribbling and 
Carding Machines, also a whitesmith who understgýds the 
above Businesses. An apprentice is also wanted. 
The skill of joiner or smith alone was becoming inadequate. 
Although the wording of Jubb's advertisement is ambiguous, 
the millwrights he needed were almost certainly destined for 
work other than machine-making. As millwrights played only a 
limited role in entrepreneurship in this new industry'53 so 
their journeymen equivalents seem not to have been involved 
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in the machine-making labour force. As already noted, 
Keighley, which was to become a leading centre of textile 
machine-making, did not have a millwright listed among its 
inhabitants in 1803. Nor have millwrights been identified in 
the employment of any Keighley machine-maker. The 
relationship between millwrights and mechanical engineers on 
an entrepreneurial level has been investigated in some 
detail above (chapter 2), but the same issue arises in a 
context of the engineering workforce as a whole. For 
example, it has been claimed that the skills of the 
millwright were vital to the development of specialized 
engineering, that Imillwrights' many skills were gradually 
parcelled out among distinct classes of workmen' until 
eventually the millwright was displaced by 'semi-skilled' 
engineers such as fitters, turners and drillers. 54 The 
notion of the millwright as founder of modern mechanical 
engineering is roundly contradicted by the Keighley 
evidence, which supports the idea that millwrights should be 
relegated to a minor role in the origins of engineering. 
More has attacked the 'pervasive myth' that millwrights were 
the ancestors of nineteenth century engineers, emphasising 
instead the importance of smiths, in particular the 'vice- 
man' who filed and finished the work of the smith or turner 
and can be considered forerunner of the fitter. 55 
The same considerations which would have deterred 
entrepreneur millwrights from engaging in textile 
engineering apply equally to journeymen millwrights. The new 
industry was risky, whereas their own trade offered plenty 
of work, independence and mobility, and was strictly 
controlled by their society, ensuring that, before 1814 and 
the ending of wage regulation, millwrights could command a 
weekly wage of about 42 shillings. 56 From the point of view 
of Hattersley and others like him, there was no advantage in 
paying such high wages for skills which were no more 
relevant to textile machine-making than those of a smith who 
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could be employed at less than half the cost. Millwrights 
maintained a clear identity as a separate trades organized 
in societies quite apart from the first engineering trades 
unions, which admitted a miscellaneous selection of skilled 
and semi-skilled men. 57 Once de-regulated, though, the wages 
of millwrights did not sustain their previously high levels. 
Journeymen millwrights in Leeds were paid about 26 shillings 
a week in 1839. Although still among the highest paid and 
fullest employed in the Leeds workforce, this represented a 
drop in status from 1814.58 The rigid practices of 
millwrights had undermined their position in the longer 
term, though they managed to hold on to their traditional 
pay and conditions in some places. Alexander Galloway told 
the Select Committee in 1824: 
... in engineer shops, new men's wages are generally fixed 
after working a fortnight on trial: we give as much as we 
can afford to the most expert men, and then bring down the 
reward upon that standard; but in the business of a 
millwright, all the men have two guineas a week, and a man 
of that class formerly was employed to turn a grindstone, 
while one at 18s. a week would have done as well ... The 
consequence has been, that engineers have become 
millwrights, and ... [millwrights] are obliged to take up 
the name of an engineer, and conduct their business by the 
engineer's economy, and thaýqchange in the short progress 
of fifteen or twenty years. 
Elsewhere is evidence that Imillwrights men would not work 
with an engineer' and that having a carding machine repaired 
by London millwrights had 'cost double the money that a new 
engine would have cost in Manchester'. 
60 These separate 
testimonies confirm that the trade of millwright still stood 
apart from other branches of engineering in 1824, even if 
some journeymen millwrights had by then been obliged to 
accept a reduction in wages or go to work for machine- 
makers. A reported shortage of work for millwrights compared 
with an abundance of employment available in machine 
manufacture may account for this. 
61 But the idea that 
millwrights in general had fallen upon hard times during a 
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period of high activity in factory building is unconvincing. 
Perhaps too many had been trained, and at an inadequate 
level. 
The labour shortages are further confirmation that skills 
needed for mechanical engineering at this time were real 
enough. Boulton and Watt had experienced numerous problems 
in finding and retaining suitable labour, especially fitters 
and founders. Watt wrote to John Smeaton in 1778: 
We wish we could join you in saying that we can easily 
find operative engineers who can put engines together 
according to plan, as clockmakus do clocks; we have yet 
found exceedingly few of them. 
In the same year, Boulton wrote to his partner about 
difficulties with some of the engine erectors, who were 
smiths trained by Watt and who worked directly for the 
customer: 
Sam Evans and young Perrins at Bedworth are two drunken, 
idle, stupid, careless, conceited rascals and have used 
the engine and their masters so ill that they wish to 
change them, but these two fellows say, and their masters 
seem to believe, that it requires the learning and 
knowleýge of a University man to keep an engine in 
order. " 
Boulton seemed to suggest that the level of skill was not as 
high as the customer might believe. Is it possible, though, 
that workers as unsatisfactory as these would have been 
retained if there were any prospect of replacing them? Tann 
has suggested that a select few engineers of high reputation 
were able to attract a disproportionately large number of 
skilled workers 
64 in which case the problems of smaller 
firms in attracting skilled workers would be further 
intensified. There was also a general shortage of trained 
workers in the iron and steel industries as a whole after 
1770,65 specific local instances including Matthew Murrayts 
difficulties in keeping a full complement of skilled men at 
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the Round Foundry in Leeds. 66 The only real solution to 
these general skill shortages would have been a concerted 
effort to train new labour. 
GRADES OF SKILL 
Because engineering workshops differed so much in the way 
that they organized their production, there was wide 
variation in the degree of specialization expected of 
workers. So although textile engineering acquired an 
identity separate from other industries in the early 1800s, 
a training in the trade of machine-maker could imply 
different kinds of skill according to the type of 
establishment involved. Furthermore, while the shortages of 
labour and other evidence show skills to have been real 
enough in the period before machine tools were introduced, 
it is feasible that the trade could later have become de- 
skilled, in parts at least, from the 1820s following process 
mechanization. 
As early as the 1790s, some engineering factories had 
developed a high degree of division of labour. This was a 
particular feature of steam engine manufacturers and 
foundries, where obvious benefits followed from a highly 
organized through-flow of work. Heavy capital investment, in 
large machine tools, some of which had to be permanently 
bedded-in if they were to be of any use, 67 and in other 
items such as overhead lifting equipment, was a feature in 
this type of establishment. Such an arrangement was economic 
only for those involved in producing relatively large 
quantities of heavy items, but neither desirable nor 
possible for many textile machine-makers. The shops of 
Boulton and Watt and of Matthew Murray were in 1800 as 
atypical of engineering as the early factories of Benjamin 
Gott and John Marshall had been in the textile industry. As 
late as the 1830s and 1840s, when a few large factories were 
beginning to dominate textile engineering, and improved 
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machine tools were readily available, small workshops still 
played an important role. Nowhere is this contrast between 
the small and the large, between old and new methods, better 
illustrated than in the autobiography of Thomas Wood of 
Bingley (1822-1880). Wood served his apprenticeship with a 
powerloom maker in his home town, leaving there in 1845 for 
Hibbert and Platt of Oldham. Platt's employed nearly 2000 
men and used tools mainly of Whitworth's make. 
I, who had never worked in a shop with more than 8 or 10 
men and with country-made tools, the very best of which 
Platts would have thrown away as utterly useless ... had 
cause to fear that I should not succeed and be found as 
efficient go other men in a place where no favour was 
shown ... 
But Wood found that he was able to 'drop into place' at 
Platt's, although the demands were so different from those 
in a small shop, particularly in the narrowness of the tasks 
set: 
Men in large shops are not troubled with a variety of 
work, but had one class of work and special tools. The men 
soon became expert and turned out a large quantity of work 
with the requisite exactness without a little of the 
thought required of those who work in small shops where 
fresh work continually turns up, but always the same old 
tools. I learned quickness and accuracy '6glso that hard 
work and application were indispensable. 
The implication is not that work was more or less skilled in 
the larger establishment, but that techniques were entirely 
different. The quantity of work processed enabled a fine 
sub-division of labour, much greater repetition and 
consequently a higher degree of accuracy. When Wood was laid 
off by Platt's a year later, he found work in 'a small 
engine shop with no proper order or economical way of 
working' in Darlington. 
70 His account suggests that as 
standards were generally improving, skill was no less 
required: 
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At my work I was gaining confidence, of which I was sadly 
deficient. of course the class of work was something new 
to me, but I often saw men pose as good hands, 'clever', 
who I was persuaded owed their all to bounce and brag ... The improved method of working a 91 supervision has been 
the death of ... these windbags. 
The other possible means of achieving specialization in 
textile engineering, and hence improved standards of 
accuracy with or without machine tools, was for an 
individual firm itself to specialize by concentrating upon 
particular types of component or machine. Richard 
Hattersley's specialist niche in rollers, spindles and 
flyers is an example. There are indications that these 
specialist trades had themselves become further sub-divided 
by the 1820s: 
... there are two or three classes of spindle makers, 
separate and distinct trades, masters and men. Before the 
demand was so great as it is, one master spindle maker 
would make several kinds of spindles; now since the demand 
has increased so much, he confines his work to one kind of 
spindles only; each man confines his work to a smaller 
variety of spindles, and by that means produces them 
better adapted t 92 the purpose, and cheaper than others 
could do before. 
Roller-making had also developed as a separate trade: 
Are not a distinct set of mechanics employed in making 
rollers? -A distinct set, it has been a business in 
itself. 73 It is one of the subdivisions of labour? - Yes. 
Employment contracts which Hattersley issued at this time 
show how he further divided work within his firm. 
74 Many of 
these agreements relate to subcontract work, where 
Hattersley offered enhanced piece rates in return for a 
commitment to serve him for a number of years. For example, 
in 1818 William Sharpe of Keighley, worsted spindle maker, 
accepted an offer of 36 shillings per gross for spindles, 6 
shillings more than he had previously been paid, in exchange 
for binding himself to Hattersley for six years and 'taking 
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the whole management of the spindle department'. Samuel 
Haggas and William Denton were contracted for five years 
from 1820 to forge flyers at 13 shillings per gross, with 
Hattersley undertaking to reserve all such work for them. 
Joseph Midgley was taken on in 1822 for six years, with a 
sliding scale of rates according to the size of spindle 
forged, and was also given the job of repairing tools. In 
1825 Midgley's contract was altered to accommodate the 
management of the spindle forging department, Other 
contracts in the 1820s refer to flyer forging, flyer 
finishing, roller turning and flyer repair, each as distinct 
specializations. 
The separate classification of these activities as trades in 
their own right, when taken with Hattersley's strenuous 
efforts to bind these workers to him, does not support the 
idea that textile engineering was becoming de-skilled. Not 
long after this, though, when machine tools had become much 
more widespread, William Jenkinson told the Select Committee 
on Machinery that 'by the production of tools, machinery is 
made by almost labourers', 75 9 Jenkinson though was trying to 
argue that the export of machinery should be allowed so that 
Britain could maintain an advantage, over foreigners with 
machine tools who could potentially produce equally good 
machines with unskilled labour. Elsewhere in his evidence 
Jenkinson drew distinctions between those employees he 
considered inferior, and his much less dispensable 'best 
meni. 76 He also spoke of how a machine-maker would make 'one 
kind of machine his principal study ... by that means each 
is able to make cheaper and better than they otherwise 
could'. 77 If de-skilling had progressed to the extent that 
Jenkinson's earlier evidence had suggested, such 
specialization within firms would have been unnecessary. 
At about the same time, and also in Lancashire, James 
Nasmyth was claiming that a machine tool revolution in his 
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factory had broken the hold of the skilled worker upon 
engineering. Nasmyth, like his former master Maudsley, 
frequently introduced new tools in an effort to reduce 
reliance on 'mere manual strength or dexterity'. 78 Even his 
semi-skilled employees, it is said, were threatened by 
'totally unskilled labourers, including young boys, who were 
competent to act as machine minders'. 79 After a strike in 
1836 Nasmyth went to Scotland where 64 1whee1wrights and 
carpenters, smiths and stonemasons' were recruited, later 
sending for their relatives so that Scots made up a majority 
of Nasmyth's new workforce. However these men were later 
unable to gain employment with other Lancashire engineers. 80 
Nasmyth said that this was because they were considered 
'Nobs' or blacklegs, but the proposition must be considered 
that they did not have the necessary skill to hold a job in 
a less automated workshop. 
That skill continued to be necessary in all sections of the 
industry throughout the period is borne out by the failure 
of machine-makers to use the labour of women and children. 
As textile engineering before 1850 was a young and dynamic 
industry which had not developed or inherited restrictive 
employment practices, in theory there was nothing to prevent 
the use of cheap female and child labour, had such labour 
been of use at any stage in the industry's growth. Although 
women are said to have been excluded from new industries in 
the nineteenth century. 81 sections of the engineering trade 
retained features such as small workshops and a widespread 
use of subcontract, which had more in common with evolving 
industries than with those distinctly new ones like 
railways, gas and electricity. But women and children under 
14 were conspicuously absent from machine-making. It is 
hardly feasible that social constraints alone would have 
stopped women's employment in engineering, in an age when 
females were readily allowed into mines or into newly 
automated occupations like weaving, which had traditionally 
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been reserved for men. It is likely then that this pool of 
cheap labour was not employed in textile engineering because 
it did not have the necessary skills, possession of which 
could come about only through a specific training which had 
not been offered to women. Berg has suggested that the 
labour of women and children was not only cheap, but a 
bargain, and though called unskilled could offer a degree of 
manual dexterity capable of being turned to good use in a 
factory. 82 Women and children were cheap, available, 
dexterous, not apparently debarred by any legal or 
institutional constraints, but still were not employed in 
textile engineering. They had no access to the body of 
technical knowledge in the trade, but that did not matter, 
for as semi-skilled workers they would have had jobs broken 
down and allocated to them by people with greater expertise. 
What debarred them from any part in the machine-making trade 
was their lack of familiarity with tools and techniques in 
metal-working. Women had never been smiths, perhaps because 
they were not considered strong enough, or perhaps just 
because they were not considered. Whatever the reason, their 
past absence from participation in metal-working placed them 
at a severe disadvantage in the new trade. The result was 
that the widows of Michael Merrall and John Jubb were unable 
to sustain their husbands' businesses as machine-makers 
until a time when sons were old enough to take over, in the 
same way that widows managed to carry on family businesses 
in many other trades. If women could run firms in other 
industries, the failure of the machine-makers' widows cannot 
be attributed necessarily to a lack of entrepreneurial 
ability, or prejudice against their sex. The problem lay in 
their inability to take close personal control of the 
technical aspects of business. 
Further evidence to support the idea that textile 
engineering remained highly skilled comes in the lack of 
opposition made to the introduction of process machinery 
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within the industry. McClaine says of engineering in the 
period after 1824, that 'while many of the operations 
previously done by hand could be done by machines, the 
machines must be operated by skilled men, since an unskilled 
operator would spoil more work on a machine than he would if 
engaged in handworkl. 
83 If automation did not bring about 
de-skilling, then there was no point in a skilled labour 
force opposing the introduction of machinery. A high 
proportion of skilled labour was still needed among the 
workforce engaged on batch work in the larger factories, as 
technical knowledge and intelligence to some extent replaced 
traditional manual skills. Peter Fairbairn confirmed that 
the numbers of skilled men needed remained high: 
In the manufactory of machinery, though more machinery has 
been introduced, which has greatly improved the accuracy 
and finish of the work, yet I am of opinion the demand for 
workpeople in this line is at Jýast equal now to what it 
has been at any former period. ' 
In smaller workshops, where repair work and one-off jobs 
were carried out, all-round skills were needed. Even where 
parts were produced in larger numbers, it may have proved 
economic to retain fully skilled men and occasionally use 
them for lower grade jobs, rather than have semi-skilled 
workers whose abilities were too limited to allow them to do 
other tasks in the workshop. 
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CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
The 'characteristic irregularity' of late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century working habits 
85 was turned to 
economic advantage by early engineers. Piecework and day 
rates could be used flexibly to increase output or control 
costs, according to the state of trade. Some casual 
employees were available to come into the main workshop when 
needed, or would receive work at home, and apparently filled 
other parts of their working lives with casual or 
subcontract work for other employers or in other 
industries. 86 This 'semi-domestic' system was not universal, 
and probably faded away in the early years of the nineteenth 
century, though the use of subcontractors, both large and 
small, continued to be a distinctive feature of the 
industry. In contrast, more formal arrangements existed in 
establishments like Murray's in Leeds, where articled labour 
was regularly employed as early as 1802.87 Richard 
Hattersley's use of fixed term contracts from about 1818 has 
been referred to already. By engaging in such agreements 
employers lost some flexibility, and employees gained 
security, though at the expense of being free to accept any 
better offer. The use of contracts indicates a growing 
importance to employers of a stable and regular workforce 
possessed of specific skills. 
In larger shops, combinations of piece and day rates were 
intended to maximize high quality production, and to 
motivate, and consequently retain, those workers who had the 
most prized skills. Thomas Cheek Hewes, whose millwrights 
continued to receive pay by the day in the traditional 
pattern of their trade, had been obliged to shift from two 
thirds day work to two thirds piece work in his machine- 
making division to achieve greater productivity. His piece- 
workers would make perhaps 36s to 40s a week, compared with 
30s if paid by the day. Hewes did not wish to convert 
entirely to piece-rates as he thought that some of his men 
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would be unable to maintain an acceptable quality of product 
if they worked at higher speed. 88 The standard rate of pay 
for 'operative machine-makers' was reported to have remained 
at about the same level, 26s to 30s a week, in 1841, though 
much depended upon 'the cleverness of the men'. More were 
employed on regular wages than on piece rates, but 'the 
piece hands are generally first-class men, and some of them 
will earn as much as 31. and 41. a weeki. 89 
Even under the most formal contracts, employers overlooked 
certain types of irregular behaviour. Watt's early problems 
with drunken engine erectors have been mentioned. 90 Thomas 
Wood, while stressing the importance of technical competence 
and hard work at Platt's in the 1840s, described his fellow 
workers as 'wicked and reckless' satisfied only by 'a rough 
and rude plenty' and given to gambling while at work. 91 
George Hattersley noted absences of workers and apprentices 
in the 1830s, going to the length of having them ordered 
back to work by a magistrate in some cases, but he did not 
dismiss these recalcitrant employees. 92 That such behaviour 
was tolerated indicates the value placed upon key skilled 
workers. 
The social aspects of life as a tradesman, along with a 
sense of who was 'in' and who 'out', emphasised by Wright 9 
93 
suggest that a strong solidarity existed within the tradee 
But no evidence has been uncovered to show that this craft 
consciousness translated itself into more tangible form. 
Although skilled workers may have combined to exert 
influence within some of the larger engineering 
establishments, there is nothing to indicate that trade 
unions or societies were influential in regulating wages, 
entry or training in the early stages of mechanical 
engineering in West Yorkshire. The workforce was mainly 
dispersed, and heterogeneous, consisting of both employees 
and the self-employed in a variety of occupations and 
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arrangements. Under such circumstances highly-organized and 
influential unions could not be expected to function. They 
came later, with the concentration of the industry in 
factories. 
APPRENTICESHIP AND TRAINING 
From a tiny nucleus in the early years of the nineteenth 
century, the engineering workforce grew to number thousands 
by 1850. As it was essential for a high percentage of this 
machine-making labour force to be skilled, whatever their 
degree of specialization, it follows that there had been a 
concerted effort within the industry to train new workers. 
The only possible method of training was 'on the Job' in 
establishments which produced textile machines, and the 
process of inculcating skills and knowledge was a long one: 
We cannot make machine makers so quickly as any other 
description of persons; they require a long time to learn, 
though all is done and has been, for9ý considerable time, 
to increase the number of mechanics. 
The bulk of the training was carried out under a system of 
apprenticeship which was a continuation of the traditional 
one for skilled trades. 95 In large establishments the 
apprentice was bound to a journeyman, though in smaller 
engineering workshops an artisan-type system continued where 
the teaching was done by the master himself. 
It has been argued that apprenticeship in its true sense had 
ceased to exist by 1800.96 There were also contemporary 
suggestions that apprenticeship was no longer relevant to 
needs. Some of these claims amount to political rhetoric 
advanced in support of deregulation of the workplace, while 
others hinge upon different understanding of what was meant 
by apprenticeship. Nasmyth's opposition to a traditional 
type of apprenticeship was bound up with his 'heroic' view 
of technical progress. He believed that a 'Free Trade in 
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Ability' had been responsible for the greatest advances in 
mechanical invention. Brindleyq Smeaton and Watt 'owed very 
little to the seven years' rut in which they were trained' 
and everything to their 'innate industry, skill and 
opportunity'. 97 (In fact, neither Brindley nor Smeaton nor 
Watt had served a conventional seven-year apprenticeship). 
Apprenticeship, 'the fag end of the feudal system', which 
encouraged bad work, bad behaviour and bad example, he 
considered should be abolished. 98 Nasmyth himself dispensed 
with apprentices, instead employing trainees who were 
allowed to progress according to ability. As discussed 
above, his technically advanced factory was not a typical 
one. Other examples of claims to have abolished 
apprenticeship, for instance at Platt's of Oldham in the 
1860s, 99 were in similarly modern shops. Peter Fairbairn 
told the Children's Employment Commission in 1834 that he 
did not indenture anyone, though every one of his employees 
had, he said, entered the trade at 13 or 14, suggesting that 
formal apprenticeship was still operating even if it was 
called something else. 100 
Nasmyth's case in favour of nurturing exceptional talents 
overlooked the fundamental needs of the engineering 
industry. Though he relished the notion of having a new 
James Watt emerge under his tutelage, there was a limit to 
how many such heroic figures could be accommodated within a 
firm. The real need in Nasmyth's time was for skilled 
workers to perform routine shop-floor duties. As Roll has 
pointed out, 'the great inventive genius' Watt was 'entirely 
unsuited for a business career'. 101 New engineering 
factories equipped with modern machine tools demanded 
closely defined skills, while smaller workshops preferred 
all-round manual abilities to a less exacting standard, but 
every machine-making establishment demanded high levels of 
skill and knowledge which somehow had to be imparted to new 
entrants to the trade. Whether these new employees were 
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called apprentices or trainees, whether formally indentured 
or not, whether trained in general skills or in methods 
specific to a large firm, and however long it took, still 
they-had to go through a programme of education before they 
could carry out skilled work and qualify for skilled rates 
of pay. 
It could have been advantageous to a large firm to confine 
training to specific aspects of their own operations, and in 
this way retain trained workers because the skills were not 
transferable. This might avoid wasting money on training 
workers who could then sell their skills elsewhere in the 
market place. There were few large engineering firms in 
Yorkshire before the 1830s who were big enough to use such a 
practice, though the likes of Peter Fairbairn with his 
'corps of blacksmiths' may have been approaching it in the 
1840s. 102 Fairbairn had always displayed an open mind about 
formal qualifications, instead concentrating on finding 
certain abilities and qualities in his workers. In 1830 he 
advertised: 
Wanted a man who is perfectly competent to engage the 
grinding and polishing of machinery items Nonmeed apply 
who are not well acquainted with the busi; ess. 
A week later Fairbairn was looking for three 'vice men' who 
could 'bring recommendations as being good and steady 
workmen'. 104 Even such skilled recruits would have needed a 
degree of further training to enable them to fit into his 
highly departmentalized factory. 
As in any new trade, a first generation of skilled workers 
had to be trained by those who had converted from other 
occupations. The first apprentices were recruited to 
machine-making in the early 1780s. Prominent examples 
include James MIConnel, sent from Scotland to an uncle in 
Lancashire in 1781 when aged about 19, and his later partner 
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John Kennedy, who was 15 when he joined the same master 
making carding engines, jennies and water frames in 1784.105 
William Smith, son of a corn miller, was apprenticed in 
Keighley in the mid 1780s. 106 But for the new trade to have 
expanded as it did in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, it had to recruit from beyond the range of 
'engineering' occupations 107 with which it had first been 
associated. Some apprentices were boys whose fathers 
followed dying trades such as handloom weaving. In 1836, the 
14 year-old Thomas Wood, hoping to be relieved of the 
'bondage of factory life', wanted to be a weaver like his 
father, or a woolcomber, and eventually become his own 
master, 
Father would not hear of it, so I was put to be a 
mechanic. Perhaps it caused as much remark among our 
neighbours as it would now if I put a son to be a doctor 
oes I wonder if anyone thought of the anomaly of sending 
me to a powerloom-maker for my trade while powerlooms were 
slowly and surely drying up industrial life. Perhaps my 
father accepted the inevitable, or, more likely still, I 
was sent there because there was no other opening. 
Mechanics, though so plentiful now [1878] were rather 
scarce then; I am quite sure in saying there wef8 8 not twenty in Bingley either in shops or factories. 
Wood's father's earnings were less than ten shillings a 
week. Thomas, the eldest of ten children, had been earning 
4s 9d in a mill. As an apprentice, he worked a month or two 
for nothing, then three months at ls 6d, gradually rising to 
8s in his final year, when aged twenty. Wood's parents made 
a considerable short-term financial sacrifice to enable him 
to train as a mechanic, implying that the decision had been 
taken more positively than he suggests. In Armley, formerly 
a centre of handloom weaving, it was reported that twenty 
boys had become apprenticed to mechanics in 1840.109 An 
impression from the 1851 census in Keighley is of a very 
young workforce in the engineering industry, many of them 
sons of men who were not themselves engineers. 
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By then a seven year training in machine-making was usual. 
Given that 21 was the age at which skilled status was 
conferred, boys had to join when 14 or 15. Apprenticeship 
had become more formal than when the 19 year-old MIConnel 
started in the trade, or when Matthew Murray offered 
training to: 
... a Number of Young Men from Sixteen to Eighteen Years 
of Age, that would engage for a Term of Years to work in a 
STEAM ENGINE MANUFACTORY, where they may learn maluable 
Business and meet with constant Employment ... 
This more casual approach to apprenticeship and training had 
suited the industry during its formative years when skilled 
labour was in acutely short supply. Someone like Murray 
could employ traditional artisans or unskilled labourers, to 
be trained up in new methods which at that time were still 
in process of formulation. 111 Formal regulation of 
apprenticeship and wages was finally abolished in 1813/4 
112 
but the system had long been in disarray and in any case new 
industries such as textile engineering were not bound by 
Elizabethan statutes. There was therefore an opportunity, 
and a need, for new systems of training to develop. The way 
in which Richard Hattersley tailored a skilled workforce, 
employing traditional craftsmen such as smiths, and also 
training unskilled people for specific tasks, has been 
described above. After 1810, when products and methods were 
better established in textile engineering, the main source 
of new skilled labour was the seven year apprenticeship. 
More has shown that apprenticeship, far from being an 
obstacle to the spread of skills, continued to be necessary 
in skilled trades through the nineteenth century. 113 
Hattersley's had employed apprentices during Richard 
Hattersley's time, but started to keep formal notes of 
apprenticeship dates and birthdays only in about 1829. In 
the years 1832 and 1833, a total of 14 apprentices were 
employed, most of them 14 or 15 years of age, and contracted 
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for six or seven years. But there remained other, less 
conventional, arrangements, where older trainees were 
recruited to serve shorter terms. William Preston, whose age 
was not specified but who was described as an artificer, was 
bound in 1833 'to be apprentice for two years to learn the 
art of making spindles, rollers, etc'. His wage of 15 
shillings a week suggests that he was already an adult and 
could offer some degree of skill, as the rate paid to final 
year apprentices at that time by Hattersley was only eight 
shillings. 114 Such a contract as Preston's demonstrates the 
value of formal arrangements, for to have been taught by 
Hattersley as a roller and spindle maker conferred a 
recognisable qualification which had its own value in the 
labour market. This was one of the great advantages of 
apprenticeship, that it had common currency, certifying that 
the holder possessed certain skills. The evidence that such 
skills were real rather than socially constructed is found 
in persistent wage differentials, says More. 
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Whether a full seven year training was always needed is 
arguable. The fact that Hattersley considered he could train 
some men in a shorter time suggests that it depended upon 
the trainee's previous experience, though William Fairbairn 
thought that even an expert workman in other kinds of 
machinery would take 'a considerable time' to train as a 
cotton machine-maker. 116 Training requirements would also 
depend upon the size of the firm and variety of work which 
the trainee was required to perform. As for 14 or 15 year- 
old apprentices, the first months were generally spent in 
running errands, not a wholly trivial pursuit as the trainee 
was becoming familiar with tools and materials. 117 Many of 
the apprentices who joined engineering firms at 14 had been 
working already for perhaps five years in textile factories 
where they would have acquired at least a basic knowledge of 
the workings of machines. Apprenticeship may have been 
artificially prolonged so that the employer could tie the 
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trainee to the firm for longer 
investment in trainingg paying 
year-old less than the skilled 
men newly out of apprenticeshi-, 
as fully skilled, being called 
to different firms in order to 
and recoup some of his 
a fully competent 19 or 20 
rate. But on the other hand, 
p were not necessarily viewed 
'improver' and often moving 
broaden their experience. 118 
PROSPECTS OF MOBILITY 
A degree of mobility had been a feature of some of the 
artisan trades associated with early machine-making. Young 
journeymen, often with the encouragement of employers, moved 
to different shops, to other districts, and even abroad, 
intending to broaden their experience. It was equally 
acceptable to set up in self-employment. As machine-making 
developed into a trade with its own identity separate from 
traditional craft skills, and with increasingly specialized 
sub-divisions, mobility may have become irrelevant or 
undesirable, or both. It may even have become impossible, 
for a highly skilled yet narrow training in an automated 
workshop could have extinguished any prospects of employment 
elsewhere, just as a broad general training on obsolete 
machines might have restricted Thomas Wood. 
Millwrights had been renowned for their frequent moves from 
place to place, partly because some of their work was site- 
based, but they also travelled in order to gain a first rate 
experience as young journeymen. Thus the 'restless 
wanderings' of Peter Fairbairn which have been considered a 
sign of an impatient nature 119 were actually firmly founded 
in the customs of his trade. Through these travels he gained 
the skill and confidence to convert entirely to machine- 
making. Fairbairn served his apprenticeship to a Newcastle 
engineer and millwright, went to Holdsworth's of Glasgow as 
foreman and then traveller, worked for his famous brother in 
Manchester for two periods, was employed by Rennie in London 
for a time, and spent a year in France where he worked for 
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British companies in Charenton and Paris. After three years 
of travel as a journeyman, he returned to Holdsworth's 
Anderston Foundry as a partner from 1824 until his move to 
Leeds in about 1826.120 On his travels, Fairbairn came into 
contact with the 'leading mechanicians and manufacturers of 
the day'. including Rennie, 'then at the height of his 
fame', and gained 'a fair knowledge of French industrial 
pursuits'. 121. With similar intentions the machine tool 
manufacturer John Stirk (1838-19i7), after completing an 
apprenticeship with Joseph Ogdin March in Leedsq moved to 
work for Peter Fairbairn, then Shepherd, Hill and Co., 
Darling and Sellers of Keighley, and Buck and Watkin and 
Scott Brothers of Halifax before setting up his own business 
in the latter town in 1866.122 Such mobility was encouraged 
by employers who hoped that the journeyman would eventually 
return better qualified. 123 Especially when technology was 
advancing fast and few technical books were available, 
directed 'restless wanderings' made good sense for a young 
man with ambition. 
Thomas Wood had this idea in 1845. He gave notice to leave 
the small shop in which he had served his time. 
I thought I was deficient in my trade, though I learned, 
and long practised, all I could learn there. But I heard 
about new tools, new machines, and new ways of working. I 
could never hope to see them in our shop, and if I was to 
learn, and improve, I wouI14 do so now before I either 
married or thought of it. 
Wood was clear about what he wanted, aiming straight for 
Platt's in Oldham. Experience of working in a large and 
modern shop maintained an attraction for engineering 
workers. A grapevine existed in workshops based on 'the 
travellers' tales of those who have been on tramp' through 
which information was passed concerning employment 
possibilities elsewhere. 125 Improving skills by migration 
could mean enhanced job prospects in an industry where there 
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was much repair work and versatility was prized. 126 On the 
other hand, the end of apprenticeship meant the end of job 
security, and a youth who could not prove his worth, or 
whose master was short of work, would be sacked even though 
his wage at 21 may have been only seventy per cent of the 
top rate. 127 Mobility then became a necessity. 
Labour mobility was one means of reconciling the supply of 
skilled workers to demand. Although the industry was 
expanding overall during the nineteenth century, it did 
suffer periods of stagnation during which employers could 
not or would not take a long term view on training a future 
skilled labour force. When a recovery came, there would be 
an immediate'skills shortage, and the long lead-in time and 
expense of training were reasons to poach skilled workers 
from other companies. There is evidence, though not in 
Yorkshire, of local agreements between employers to refrain 
from such behaviour. 128 The 'slow process of breeding' 
skilled workers was the main reason for such enticement, 129 
though employers may have been'looking also to acquire 
restricted technical information. 130 
The other avenue of mobility for the journeyman was into 
entrepreneurship. This too was an accepted route to follow, 
in the tradition of master/ journeyman relationships. 
Burnett attributes the closeness of craftsman and employer 
to their near equality in skill, intelligence and manners, 
with journeymen able to aspire to the role of entrepreneur 
because skill and connection were for a long time more 
important than capital and machinery. 131 Randall describes 
similar close links between masters and men in the West of 
England clothing industry, where 'nascent competitors' were 
not viewed with hostility but were given help and credit. 132 
In textile engineering, the distinction between the employed 
and the employer was not always clear cut. The putting out 
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of work to subcontractors, the way in which methods of 
payment switched between day rates and piecework I and the 
use of casual labour or the laying off of regular workers, 
all contributed to a blurring of relationships. There is 
evidence that when Hattersley's employees did make a break 
into entrepreneurship, close links continued to exist with 
their former master. An early example is Michael Merrall, 
who had left Hattersley by 1808, having worked for him for 
perhaps ten years, but continued to buy from and supply 
parts to Hattersley until Merrall's death in 1819.133 Two of 
Hattersley's key employees in 1808-9 were Richard Fowler and 
Robert Skaife. 134 The name of Skaife reappears in 
Hattersley's records in 1829 when spindles, flyers and other 
parts were supplied to ISkaife and Co, Banks Milli. 135 
Fowler had gradually moved from pay by the day to piece 
rates by 1809, and seems later to have broken away into 
entrepreneurship as various payments were made in the 18209 
to 'Richard Fowler, Son and Col, presumably for subcontract 
work on rollers. 136 Fowler and Skaife, working for 
themselves in a small way, did not establish firms which 
were to have a major impact upon the Keighley trade, but 
they were following the well-trodden path of a Journeyman 
into self-employment. 
As the main purpose of mobility had always been to extend a 
journeyman's range of skills and knowledge, any limitations 
imposed by narrow specializations in modern factory 
production, or by old-fashioned tuition in workshops, would 
not alone have held back an employee intent upon bettering 
himself. Many of those who moved around probably did through 
choice, as, in general, plenty of work was available as the 
industry expanded in Yorkshire. John Stirk had broadened his 
horizons with a few well-chosen moves around major firms 
within West Yorkshire. As far as entrepreneurship was 
concerned, there remained opportunities to go into small- 
scale self-employment, perhaps in repairs or in manufacture 
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of specialist components. With a rented workshop, and few 
tools and machines required for a limited range of work, not 
much capital was needed., and skill and connection remained 
paramount. But the growth of a large-scale sector in 
engineering had made a difference to opportunities for 
journeymen. It was no longer possible for a journeyman to 
compete as a manufacturer of whole machines, as he would 
have been unable to raise enough capital to set up as a 
mass-producer on an economic scale. Secondly, as a producer 
of components he would probably be very dependant upon a few 
large customers, lacking the broadly-based business of his 
equivalent a generation or two earlier. Thirdly, journeymen 
may have had wider opportunities within the large-scale 
sector. While it was still possible to move between firms to 
increase experience, skilled workers could also choose to 
specialize within a firm, confining their work to a narrow 
field in the expectation that they could improve their 
earnings potential through piecework. 
CONCLUSION 
Skills in textile engineering were very real throughout the 
period, though they varied in different sectors of the 
industry and also gradually narrowed and intensified. 
Persistent wage differentials are not the most convincing 
evidence for the reality of skill, as labour shortages may 
explain engineers' relatively high earnings. But as entry to 
the industry was not limited by institutional constraints, 
manpower shortages could have been eased by introducing 
obvious pools of cheap labour, such as local women, or less 
cheap but possibly more adaptable labour like the displaced 
South Yorkshire nailmakers. Such substitution did not take 
place, suggesting that skilled engineers did possess 
qualities which were not readily reproducible. 
The trade of textile engineer, in all its variations, 
originated in the same crafts which had produced the first 
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successful entrepreneurs, particularly that of the smith. 
The workforce was mainly locally recruited as communities 
had numerous potential machine-makers in the pre-existing 
wood and metal trades, and before 1805 were also using 
unskilled labour. After 1805 it was mainly metal-workers who 
made the conversion to the new trade, though sometimes other 
adults were re-trained. Such flexibility, of working 
patterns and entry paths, diminished during the first 
decades of the nineteenth century. The industry's massive 
expansion from the 1820s was achieved only through the 
development of a traditional system of apprenticeship, 
though skill shortages were a recurring feature during the 
1820s and 1830s. 
After 1820 most entrants joined as apprentices, attracted 
away from dying trades such as hand-weaving by the 
employment opportunities and relatively high pay and status 
of textile engineering. Even the growing regimentation of 
the industry may have appealed, offering a measure of 
stability which was attractive to those who had seen the 
insecurity of other trades. Mobility began to lose its 
relevance when broad-based skills were no longer a 
requirement, though workers could still move around if they 
felt it necessary, if they had ambitions to progress, or in 
times of unemployment. Apprenticeship in textile engineering 
brought a recognized qualification which could gain the 
holder access to larger or smaller engineering 
establishments. The skills were marketable, not so narrow 
that they could not be adapted to other engineering firms, 
yet specialised enough to benefit from exposure to other 
parts of the industry. At the same time, because of the 
changing scale of the industry, it had become much harder to 
move into entrepreneurship. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INNOVATION AND THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY 
The history of inventions is not only that of inventors 
but that of collective experienceeawhich gradually solves 
the problems set by collective ne s. 
Invention breeds invention. 
(Ralph Waldo Emerson 1803-1882). 
Between 1780 and 1850, mechanization was successfully 
applied to a range of processes in every branch of textiles. 
This was a significant achievementv for each major division 
of the textile industry - cotton, worsted, wool and flax - 
required a distinct range of machinery tailored to its 
precise needs at each stage of production. Converting raw 
wool into finished cloth involved 34 operations, in which, 
according to Baines in 1858,16 different machines were 
used. 2 In the worsted branch, where mechanization of 
woolcombing in the 1840s marked the end of hand labour 
3 altogether, the number of processes was fewer than in 
woollens, but the wide variety of worsted products, some 
incorporating other types of fibre, demanded a range of 
specialized machinery. Taking account of these many and 
diverse processes within the four main branches, allowing 
for major adjustments which may have been necessary to 
convert a machine for a different product even within the 
same branch, and keeping in mind also that many trials were 
carried out and inadequate machines improved before 
satisfactory solutions were achieved, it is beyond doubt 
that many hundreds of individual innovations were involved 
in the mechanization of textiles. 
To be more precise is difficult, for machinery underwent 
constant modification. An outline ancestry can be identified 
for certain machines, in the way that William Fairbairn 
4 described stages in the evolution of the cotton powerloom. 
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Most improvements, though, went unrecorded. Consequently it 
is impossible to use specific evidence of improvements in 
machines to prove or disprove the idea that particular 
economic circumstances might have dictated the pace of 
technological change, and impossible to be certain when, or 
indeed whether, technology developed its own momentum 
independent of external economic forces. 5 
There are in any case wider questions, for example about the 
influence of science in technological development, or 
concerning distinctions between invention and innovation, 
which even complete lists of adaptations and improvements to 
machines could not answer. Indeed an unsatisfactory aspect 
of much literature dealing with such issues is that evidence 
is used in a general way, and conclusions are consequently 
superficial, failing to explain adequately the dynamics of 
technological development and diffusion. By focussing upon 
one industry - and that industry at the heart of debate 
about industrialization and innovation - it is hoped that 
some of these issues can be clarified or more satisfactorily 
defined. 
A major question can be summarised as that of strategy 
versus tactics, whether innovation could be planned and 
directed, or whether it consisted merely of spontaneous 
responses to immediate problems. Related to this is a 
question of the value of individualistic invention, and 
whether that could have made a greater contribution to 
technical advance than did collective efforts. 
The term 'invention' itself presents a difficulty. The word 
has come to carry a connotation beyond its dictionary 
definition of 'a contrivance' or 'a thing devised'. While 
innovation can mean anything new, large or small, 
significant or not, and so encompasses any improvement made 
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to textile machinerys 'invention' is generally used to 
suggest something altogether original, perhaps even with a 
hint of that 'heroic' inventor whose existence has been 
generally declared untenable. Gilfillan suggests that the 
word 'invention' is perhaps the hardest in the language to 
define, but rather than give up on the attemptj interprets 
it as 'a combination of several ideas, and which ones are 
involved, and which are more important, is always a 
question', adding that invention is a thing without 
boundaries. 6 It is certainly difficult to find an 
indisputable example of an invention. For example, Leonardo 
da Vinci's late fifteenth century designs of textile 
machines would presumably be accepted in the popular 
definition of 'invention', as they contained a degree of 
originality. 7 But these 'inventions' were incapable of 
execution as they defeated contemporary engineering skills. 
There is doubt about whether some of them would have worked, 
but as they could not be built, they could not be tried and 
improved. On the other hand, the work of Arkwright, who is 
also generally considered an inventor, was far from 
original, owing much to earlier machines and to the work of 
collaborators. According to the criteria applied by Samuel 
Smiles, whose inventor was not a man of vision, but rather 
8 one who could practically execute an idea, Leonardo would 
presumably not have qualified for the title. Neither perhaps 
would Arkwright, relying as he had upon the work of others. 
Smiles, whose biographical works concentrated upon the lives 
of engineers and iron-workers, emphasised hard work and 
application as the keys to success and did not directly 
peddle the idea of the heroic genius as inventor. But his 
approach, in emphasizing the success achieved by 
individuals, was one of the planks upon which the 'heroic' 
myth of great inventors was constructed. 
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Enos tried to distinguish between invention and innovation 
by measuring the interval between a product first appearing 
in substantially useful form, that is, inventiont and its 
first commercial application, which he called innovation. He 
claimed that this process took several years, even in 
mechanical engineering where ideas were generally developed 
much faster than in other industries. 9 Rosenberg has 
criticised Enos's work specifically for overestimating the 
commercial feasibility of the 'inventions' used to prove his 
theory. 10 But Rosenberg also makes general criticisms, 
shifting the debate to potentially more useful ground. He 
reminds of the need to consider economic as well as 
technical influences, with commercial success depending on 
'a careful discrimination among those aspects of past 
practices which need to be rejected and those which need to 
be continued', 11 He complains of an 'artificial segregation 
of invention from innovation' and similarly of invention 
from diffusion. 12 Continuities in innovation, believes 
Rosenberg, have been overlooked while discontinuities 
received disproportionate attention, and the early stages of 
invention have been accorded 'excessive significance' while 
crucial later stages are ignored. 13 Accompanying this 
distorted picture of innovation is an exaggerated view of 
the importance of 'pure' scientific knowledge in comparison 
to 'lower' forms such as 'mere' technological or engineering 
knowledge. 14 There is a problem of semantics in 
distinguishing invention from innovation, or science from 
technology, or theoretical knowledge from empirical, which 
means that these terms have to be used cautiously and with 
qualification, but there is little point in trying to define 
them rigidly and artificially. 
A more useful way of thinking about innovation in textiles 
is to take Mathias's idea of 'continuum' improvement, those 
countless, unrecorded modifications which machinery 
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underwent. Collectively, Mathias believes, these 'may yield 
a cumulative advance in productivity greater than the 
identifiable discrete innovations'. 15 Gilfillan suggests 
that 'the very essence of invention ... [is] its 
evolutionary nature, its being almost wholly an age-old, 
multitudinous accretion of little details, modifications, 
perfectings, minute additions ... ' 
16 If this is so, then 
the workplace environment was of immense significance in 
generating ideas, and the 'heroic' inventor can be accorded 
the diminished role which he deserves, brought down to earth 
alongside other innovators. Musson points out that 'few, if 
any, scholars nowadays would subscribe to a naive 'heroic 
theory' of inventions', 17 and there, it might appear, is an 
end to the debate, except that several loose ends remain. 
Musson himself, though forced by the weight of scholarly 
opinion to dispense with heroes, will not let go of the 
notion of individuality in the process of innovation. He 
thinks that, because hard thought and effort and perhaps 
failure were involved in innovation, then 'inevitability', 
the idea of socially determined invention, is Iludicrous'. 18 
But he is wrong in claiming that the idea of inevitability 
'completely ignores the realities of individual achievement, 
the imaginative insight, sustained effort, and mixture of 
motives involved'. 19 By jettisoning the notion of heroic 
inventors, historians have been able to accord due credit to 
these qualities which Musson emphasizes, and there is no 
contradiction with 'inevitability'. 'Inevitability' does not 
mean that achievements are possible without hard work, 
bright ideas, and in some cases failure. There is plenty of 
evidence to show that, faced with a specific problem, it can 
be possible to 'invent' to order. This need not diminish the 
achievements of certain talented individuals, as Smiles, 
whose stories show the possibilities of using determinationt 
hard work and skill to solve a given problem, was still able 
to laud individual success. 20 For if inventions are not 
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inevitable, then the implication is that 'genius' is the 
main requirement for invention, and that brings the argument 
back to heroic inventors, whose day, even Musson would 
concede, is surely past. 
21 
If the notion of individual genius can be dispensed with as 
the major component of invention, can the 'inventor' be 
replaced by a community in possession of relevant skills and 
intense knowledge of its customer industry, and fuelled by 
economic imperatives? Such an idea would agree with a 
Marxist view, that social processes are more important than 
inspired flashes of individual genius, and that 
institutional and economic environments play a major role in 
the processes of invention and innovation. 22 
A further legacy of the 'heroic' view which has never been 
satisfactorily explained is the role in innovation of 
protection and secrecy. The close guarding of 'inventions' 
complements the 'great inventors' myth, and has proved to be 
a more enduring belief than heroic inventors themselves. But 
tales of secrecy may have been seriously exaggerated. It 
seems unlikely that secrecy could have been a general rule 
in the industry, being neither practical in a small 
community of machine makers, nor perhaps desirable. If much 
of the secrecy was a myth, and information was actually 
widely circulated and even shared, this is further 
indication that a measure of collaboration rather than 
intense and jealous competition helped develop technology in 
the textile engineering industry. 
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SCIENCE AND INVENTION 
It is well known that the most useful discoveries that 
have been made in every branch of art and manufactures 
have not been made by speculative philosophers in their 
closets, but by ingenious mechanics, conversant in the 
practices in use in their time and practical 13 acquainted 
with the subject-matter of their discoveries. 
Even in the eighteenth century, commentators slipped easily 
into a convention of treating technology and science as 
separate and distinct types of knowledge. By implication 
'pure' science, then called natural philosophy, was of a 
higher order than applied mechanics. James Watt, for 
example, is said to have considered himself a natural 
philosopher first, and an engineer second, claiming in 1771 
that he had no experience of 'engineering in the vulgar 
mannert. 24 Rosenberg attributes the persistence of this 
belief that technological knowledge was inferior to science, 
to the prejudice of economists. 
25 Whether or not Rosenberg 
is correct in this, the key issue is not whether science was 
in some way superior to technology, but rather the influence 
of scientific thought upon technological advance during the 
industrial revolution. This argument, about the relative 
importance of the contribution of science and of empiricism 
to the innovation process, was not settled by Musson and 
Robinson, and remains unresolved. 26 
It has been argued that little can be gained from an 
artificial separation of interests in natural science from 
interests in technique, as the same groups and publications 
were involved in both. 
27 That may be true at the level of an 
educated and leisured class, but even if links between 
science and technique can be demonstrated there, the point 
is still not proven that such largely theoretical work 
filtered down into the process of mechanical innovation. 
Furthermore, if science did indeed penetrate the early 
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engineering workshops, we do not know whether it arrived in 
the form of directly applicable packages of knowledge, or in 
the guise of the mathematical and mechanical tools of a 
scientist. 28 There is also a danger of expecting too much of 
science, in what Mathias has called 'a golden age of 
amateurs, cranks, quacks and crazy theorizing'. 29 There 
certainly existed a small international scientific community 
which engaged, via the medium of learned journals, in a 
debate which was accessible to the likes of the multilingual 
Smeaton. 30 Furthermore there was a body of practical 
workpeople whose skills and knowledge were considered of 
such value that their emigration was forbidden by law until 
the 1820s. But how far was the international debate of the 
first, educated, group, relevant to technical advance in the 
workshops of the second, artisan, group? Did these artisans 
come into contact with science at all? Cardwell thinks not, 
believing that men like Arkwright, Hargreaves and Crompton 
worked in a way 'totally independent of science' and that a 
scientific input to engineering came only later, in response 
to problems arising once processes had been mechanized. 31 
As far as formal education was concerned, mechanics was not 
considered a science at the universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge, where, as a branch of mathematics, it was taught 
by repetitive and non-experimental lectures. The elder 
Rennie, though keen on theoretical understanding, prevented 
his son from embarking upon such an education as he thought 
that it would turn him away from practical engineering, 32 
which implies that he saw theory and practice as scarcely 
compatible. Few English engineers had had any contact with 
university. In this as in much else, Watt was unusual, 
though his contact with theoretical science had been in 
Glasgow rather than at an English university. The Scottish 
education system, which had a high reputation for 
mathematics and practical subjects, did make some 
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contribution to early textile engineering in the north of 
England. The Fairbairn brothers, M'Connel and Kennedy, and 
Charles Gascoigne Maclea all received at least an elementary 
education in Scotland. The noted innovator Isaac Holden 
(1807-1897) described his good fortune at having been born 
in Scotland: 
I should not have had the education I had otherwise ... Forty years ago the ScotSý [sic] were the best educated 
nation in the world ... 
Holden's education had been spasmodic but included attending 
the school of John Kennedy, 'a man of considerable 
mathematical and scientific attainments', and Holden himself 
had worked as a mathematics teacher and later lectured in 
science. 34 The tone of comments on Holden's education 
suggests that his thorough training in mathematics and 
science had been unusual at that time in Yorkshire. 
If 'state of the art' mathematics and science in 
universities can be discounted as major contributors to 
technical development, was there a lesser form of 
mathematical and scientific knowledge accessible to 
innovating shop-floor engineers? Mathias has argued that 
abstract scientific or formal knowledge was not crucial in 
the development of artisan technology and skills, 35 and 
shop-floor mechanics would only with great difficulty have 
found and used such information. The literature on 
mechanics, engineering and drawing available in English in 
the 1790s and up to about 1825, when compared with that in 
French, was backward and in short supply. Cardwell describes 
the English textbooks as 'belonging to an earlier century' 
and suggests that English work on mechanics and mathematics 
had not progressed significantly since Newton. 36 But it is 
unlikely that many engineering workers before 1825 saw such 
books, which were expensive, scarce and probably 
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unintelligible to one of limited education. John Nicholson's 
, 
Millwright's Guide (1830) contains a two page bibliography 
of published treatises on millwork, of which the earliest 
date from the seventeenth century. Even if a reader could 
follow the science in these works, he would have needed to 
know German, Dutch, Latin and French as well as English in 
order to understand them all. Robert Heaton listed some of 
these books at the time that he was planning the machinery 
for a new factory at Ponden, near Haworth, in 1791. The 
books in which Heaton was interested were entirely 
theoretical, on mathematics, mechanics and natural 
philosophy, 37 many were over twenty years old, with two of 
them - Ditton's Laws of Nature and Motion (1705), and 
Moxon's Mecanic Exercises (1695) published almost a century 
earlier. The 'nadir of English science' which Cardwell dates 
to about 1800 did not find its renaissance until Babbage and 
Herschel after 1820 38 so these ancient theoretical works 
may have been the only books of even marginal relevance to 
Heaton's requirements, But it is not known whether Heaton 
bought the books he noted in his journal, and if so whether 
he used them to help in his work. As a merchant, and 
patently a man of some education, Heaton would have been 
better able to use such books than Checkland's 'untutored 
mechanic' for whom mathematical theory was impossible and in 
any case 'far removed from practice'. 39 
However there had appeared a new kind of handbook, 
ostensibly aimed at mechanics, which may have bridged the 
divide between abstract and empirical work. The first of 
these was John Banks's Treatise on Mills (1795), followed by 
his book On the Power of Machines (1803). Then came Andrew 
Gray in 1804 with The Experienced Millwright; or, a treatise 
on the construction of some of the most useful machines, 
published in Edinburgh, the American Oliver Evans with his 
Young Steam Engineer's Guide in 1805, John Sutcliffe's 
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Treatise on Canals and Reservoirs (1816), Robert Brunton's 
Compendium of Mechanics, published in Glasgow in 1825 and 
into its fourth edition by 1828, and John Nicholson with The 
Operative Mechanic and British Machinist (1825), reissued in 
part as The Millwright's Guide in 1830. Nicholson's first 
edition had been sold in thirty weekly parts at one shilling 
each, making it affordable to a wider audience than 
scientific works had hitherto reached. All the new handbooks 
adopted a straightforward style designed to appeal to the 
non-scientific reader. In fact the connections of these 
books to science were slender, their contents generally 
limited to the most basic mathematics and mechanics, 
practical calculations for the use of millwrights, and 
specific though simple diagrams of various machines, mainly 
in the province of millwrights. Brunton, 'a mechanic of 
Glasgow', ranged from weights and measures to the strength 
of materials, his work informed by experience rather than by 
abstraction, and he recognised the divide between his trade 
and the higher calling of scientist: 
eee that much-wished-for time appears to be at hand, when Mechanics shall not only be acknowledged cunning 
artificers, but men of Science: when the word Mechanic 
shall convey the idea of wisdom and understanding, and the 
profession, highly frau 0t with good to man, shall be 
honoured and respected. 
Unlike Brunton, Banks was not a practical workman, styling 
himself 'lecturer in experimental philosophy'. His 
introduction to A Treatise on Mills suggests that practical 
mechanics might have benefited from greater attention to 
theory: 
It is true, that we have in the kingdom many intelligent 
engineers, and excellent mechanics; and there are others 
who can execute better than they can design, otherwise 
there would not have been so much money expended in 41 
attempting what men of science know to be impossible. 
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In On the Power of Machines, Banks conceded that his own 
work could similarly be improved: 
The problem concerning the lathe is accurate, but not by 
any means what I could wish. Some person better acquainted 
with science may perhaps give a much short U and simpler 
solution, but it is the best I could give. 
Banks's criticisms of some of the claims made for 
waterwheels and other machinery suggest that a debate was 
taking place on the efficiency of various machines, though 
in the realm of technologists rather than in scientific 
circles. 43 Banks in turn was taken to task by Sutcliffe for 
mistakes in calculations on waterwheels. 44 There is little 
in these books which relates to textile machinery, beyond 
heavy items such as fulling stocks and the design of 
factories themselves, all of which was the province of 
millwrights. Sutcliffe had a section on 'the carding, 
roving, drawing, stretching and spinning of cotton' which 
was largely concerned with setting up and maintaining 
machinery. Only Nicholson, a civil engineer, included a 
lengthy section on textile machines, though this was a 
general and historical account of processes which included 
sections lifted from Rees's Cyclopaedia, 45 and significantly 
the textile sections were omitted from his 1830 edition 
republished as 
, 
The MillwriRht's Guide. The publishers of 
such books recognized that millwrights' work, relatively 
wide-ranging and slow to change, provided easier subject 
matter than did the new branches of mechanical engineering. 
To textile engineers, books offered neither scientific 
enlightenment nor useful technological information, as 
technology evolved too quickly for books to keep pace. This 
is shown in the list of subscribers to Banks's first book, 
which stimulated a wide interest in Yorkshire and Lancashire 
among proprietors of ironworks, cotton- and flax-spinners, 
merchants, millerst and others. Though the range of 
industries is wide, the backgrounds of subscribers is 
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narrow, overwhelmingly from the educated middle-class, with 
more ministers and schoolmasters than mechanical engineers. 
Ten pages of subscribers contain no identifiable Yorkshire 
textile engineer, which suggests that such books appealed 
more to a general, educated readership, than to an 
uneducated person who, even though engaged upon apparently 
relevant work, was not accustomed to buying or consulting 
books. Like Rees's Cyclopaedia, which was itself in an 
eighteenth century mould, such books were often a matter of 
record rather than design, at least as they related to the 
new machine-making industry. 46 
Most entrepreneurs and journeymen making machines before 
1850 had had, at best, a very elementary education. Andrew 
Ure in 1835 recognized the contribution of Imechanised 
talent' to the remarkable developments in textile 
engineering, acknowledging that this elite of skilled labour 
had had little or no formal education. 
47 Samuel Oven, who 
worked for Matthew Murray before 1804, noted the lack of 
basic education of the workforce at the Round Foundry. He 
had left Boulton and Watt after four years to join Fenton, 
Murray and Wood, whom he considered 'the best manufacturers 
of steam engines in England', but even so: 
Few knew the simple rules of arithmetic save the clerk in 
the office. Mr Murray made his calculations with a 
carpenter sliding rule. I was looked up to as a light and 
became a companion to my principals 48 and several workmen took lessons in arithmetic from me. 
Thomas Wood of Bingley, who attended a small local school 
where he learned to read, followed by two years at grammar 
school from the age of six where he studied Latin grammar 
and writing, though no mathematics, was probably better 
educated than the average journeyman engineer in the 
1820s. 49 Mechanics' Institutes, which started to appear in 
the 1820s, played little part in vocational education, 
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though they may have helped improve the basic arithmetical 
skills of some workers. In Keighley, for example, only about 
a quarter of the institute's membership belonged to metal- 
working trades, which was reflected in the general nature of 
lectures offered. 50 There were occasional classes in 
writing, arithmetic, geography and drawing, though technical 
drawing, which proved to be extremely popular, was not 
taught there until the 1850s. 
Had science, or even mathematics and theoretical mechanics, 
been considered a useful or relevant subject for application 
to textile engineering, then it could have been introduced 
to the industry through the education and training of sons 
of entrepreneurs. By the 1830s and 1840s the more successful 
machine-makers had the means to bring science into their 
sons' curriculum. The number of engineers who were wealthy 
and well-connected enough to send sons to university was 
limited, but even those few preferred an education which was 
commercial and mechanical, orý even linguistic, rather than 
scientific. Samuel Lawson's son John (. E. 1808-c. 1884), 'one 
of the most resourceful mechanics of his day' who was 
responsible for great extensions in the company after 
Samuel's death in 1866, served a conventional 
apprenticeship. 51 John's own sons, also successful 
industrialists, were Arthur, later Sir Arthur Tredgold 
Lawson, Bart., (1844-1915) and Frederick (1845-1915). Arthur 
was educated at St Peter's School, York, then Winchester and 
Cambridge, before returning for practical training to 
Mabgate Foundry, while Fred went to Leeds Grammar School, 
then served an eight-year apprenticeship in the machine 
works, eventually becoming a partner in 1876.52 Peter 
Fairbairn's only son, Andrew (1828-1901), was sent to 
schools in Leeds, Switzerland and Glasgow before Cambridge 
and the Inner Temple, where he was called to the Bar in 
1852. He ceased legal practice in 1855 to join the family 
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business. Andrew Fairbairn made extended visits to the 
United States and Hanover, where he studied German and 
familiarized himself with the workings of flax mills, and 
later investigated textile industries across Europe. 53 The 
Keighley industry, where social and financial status of 
entrepreneurs before 1850 was generally lower than that of 
Leeds, does not provide comparable examples. There, 
apprenticeship remained the usual route into the industry 
for owners and journeymen alike. George Hattersley was 
bankrupt in 1832, so his eldest son went straight to work as 
an apprentice while the firm was being rebuilt. In 1844, two 
younger sons were at a private academy near Ripon, and 
another was undergoing some kind of commercial training in 
Bradford. 54 There is no evidence that any of these sons, who 
were to inherit one of the two largest engineering 
businesses in Keighley, had any formal scientific or even 
technical education. 
If most significant technological progress was achieved in a 
workshop rather than in a laboratory, by machine-makers who 
apparently had little or no exposure to scientific books or 
any education in science, then Landes is correct in 
emphasising the importance of mechanical skills in the 
innovation process, and may be right in claiming for 
technology a role in the growth of scientific knowledge. 55 
Pickstone has suggested that eighteenth century science was 
a descriptive process, with analytical approaches developing 
from about 1800 and ideas of control and formal techno- 
science emerging later. 56 Checkland too puts practical 
skills before theory, suggesting that 'mechanical 
improvement on the basis of untheoretical perception' was 
possible for pragmatic mechanics who did not need to 
understand mathematics as they could judge stresses and 
safety limits by eye. 57 There is wisdom, though, in 
Mathias's caution against excessive generalization, as the 
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relationships between scientific knowledge and technical 
innovations were diffuse and complex. 58 
It may be, for instance, that the development of a quasi- 
scientific method in innovation had greater significance for 
textile engineers than the influence of 'pure' science. On 
the other hand, innovation was stimulated not by a 
scientific impetus, but by an encouraging technical and 
commercial environment. But these are elements of the same 
phenomenon, which can perhaps be described as a practical 
approach to problem-solving, informed by a strong commercial 
sense. Mathias distinguishes between the application of 
scientific method, also called the experimental tradition, 
and intrinsic scientific knowledge. 59 Referring to 
developments in naval medicine at the close of the 
eighteenth century, he points to a contemporary assumption 
'that the secrets of nature would yield to the efforts to 
understand them and that enhanced control ... would 
followt. 60 Such a belief may explain the dogged pursuit of 
solutions to engineering problems by certain innovators. 
Their methods of experiment were mechanical, practical and 
empirical, but could also be systematic. 61 Thus the 
influence of science can be seen in two forms, in the way 
that scientific method shaped an approach to innovation, and 
also in a growth of that positive philosophy born in 
scientific circles which gave engineers confidence that 
given problems could be solved. In addition, innovators were 
helped by advances in associated technology, such as 
bearings, lubricants, metals, and tools, which owed a direct 
debt to the work of science. Ultimately, though, quasi- 
scientific method must not be confused with science, and the 
empirical achievements of textile engineers should be 
recognised for what they were. The industry developed 
methods to suit its needs, which owed little to 
abstractions. Furthermore, the importance of a commercial 
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environment where improvements to machines could be swiftly 
evaluated must be recognised. 
Matthew Boulton, much more a businessman than James Watt, 
was trying to concentrate his partner's attention when he 
wrote: 
... we are not anxious about the honour of acquiring gold 
medals nor, qf making an eclat in philosophical 
societies. " 
Engineering may have been vulgar, but scientific distinction 
was superfluous to those seeking commercial success. Boulton 
and Watt, who were middle class, educated, and had access to 
the international scientific community, were not typical 
engineers of their time. Most machine-makers did not have 
the option of rejecting membership of philosophical 
societies, as they did not belong to the middle class. In 
any case, the work of such societies was at best marginally 
relevant to mechanical engineers. The small scientific 
societies in Leeds, dating from Joseph Priestley's residence 
in the town between 1767 and 1773, were interested in 
chemistry, medicine and other philosophical topics, but had 
no connection with the engineering industry which was 
growing up on their doorstep. 
63 Musson and Robinson's 
account of the supposed flow of scientific information 
around the industrial community of Leeds fails to pinpoint 
any real links with machine-making. 
64 Their evidence amounts 
to two prominent textile manufacturers beginning to apply 
scientific method in dyeing techniques, and a discussion of 
the constitutions of various amateur scientific groups in 
Leeds. Far from proving any link with engineering, these 
lists of members demonstrate the entirely middle-class 
nature of the groups. Matthew Murray joined one group in his 
old age, in 1818, when he had also joined the middle class, 
but notably had had nothing to do with the amateur 
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scientists during his most productive and innovative years. 
Science remained a pastime for the leisured middle class, 
and its body of knowledge had little effect upon textile 
engineering. 
THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY 
The channels through which eighteenth century technology was 
disseminated have been summarized as 'men, manuals and 
machines'. 
65 Of these, the particular importance of the 
individual in spreading technical information is emphasised 
by many historians. 
66 Though much of the historical 
discussion concerns the export of technology to continental 
Europe or North America, essentially the means of 
transmission were the same, whether in a local or an 
international context, But, as Bruland remarks, many 
historians who express interest in the history of 
technology, or in technological diffusion itself, have not 
explained precisely how technological change operates. 
67 It 
may be possible in a case study to be more specific about 
this process. 
It seems that any new machine which proved useful was 
quickly assimilated within the textile industry. For 
example, there were said to be 170 scribbling machines 
working within 17 miles to the south and west of Leeds by 
1786.68 What is not known is to what extent these machines 
were replicas of each other, or whether they had undergone 
modification to improve their performance or to apply them 
to different kinds of work. In communities where skills in 
textiles, and in basic engineering, were plentiful, it is 
likely that a process of gradual improvement was taking 
place, particularly as adjustments were needed simply to 
make these early machines work at all. Trials and gradual 
refinements were of great significance cumulatively, though 
mainly undocumented. 
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Though there were some attempts to impede the spread of 
technology (further discussed below), information circulated 
easily, and internationally. Even when it was illegal to 
allow machinery or technicians to go abroad, there are 
numerous instances of technology being exported by such 
means. 69 The activities of customs officials, the war with 
France, and prospects of heavy fines and commercial losses 
could not stop what Mathias has called 'technological 
Darwinism'. 70 So well established was this trade in 
technology that it was possible to insure illegal exports at 
a rate 30 to 40 per cent higher than standard premiums. 71 
But the flow of technology was not merely outwards, as new 
European ideas and techniques were constantly arriving, from 
the early modern period, to be joined later by imports of 
American innovations. 72 'We have derived almost as many good 
inventions from foreigners, as we have originated among 
ourselves', said a witness to the 1829 Select Committee on 
Patent Laws. 73 In 1841 it was claimed that: 
... the greatest portion of new inventions lately introduced to this country have come from abroad .. ý. not improvements in Aachines, but rather entirely new 
inventions i. 
Curtis thought that America was the source of many original 
ideas, the inventiveness of its natives stimulated by labour 
shortages and 'untrammelled by predilections in favour of a 
machine already in existence'. 75 But once imported to 
Britain, such machines were generally improved, he said: 
It is not the case that parties have come here to perfect 
the machines; they are perfect, as the foreigner imagines, 
when he brings them to this country; but when they come 
here they are placed in the hands of mechanics ... [who] from the more extensive knowledge they have of the working 
of the various machines, are better able to perfect them, 
the workmen generally pagýng great attention to the 
different working parts. ' 
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Peter Fairbairn told the Select Committee he had 'had 
machines from the inventions of Swiss, and the workmanship 
of those machines was exceedingly good .,. v 
77 It has been 
suggested that British textile manufacturers lost out by 
being insufficiently receptive to foreign ideas, for 
instance in their failure to adopt American and Belgian 
condensers until many years after the machines had first 
appeared. 78 Rosenberg, however, stresses European 
receptivity to new technologies, reckoning the ability to 
assimilate ideas perhaps 'as important as inventiveness 
itself'. 79 This ability to adapt and assimilate technology 
was the key to successful industrialization. 80 and in 
accepting this, the role of 'heroic' invention is further 
marginalized. The throstle, enormously important in worsted 
spinning during the first half of the nineteenth century, 
provides an example of this process, its ancestry traceable 
to Arkwright's cotton frame, which was modified as the 
technology moved around Leicester, Warwick and other places 
during the 1780s and 1790s. 
81 And Arkwright's frame itself 
had antecedents in the ideas of Wyatt and Paul and others. 
But how, specifically, was information conveyed? What was 
the relative importance of Inkster's 'men, manuals and 
machines' as conduits of technology? 82 Machines themselves 
are an obvious source of information and machine-makers, in 
selling their product, were inevitably disseminating 
technology. This has implications for the argument about 
whether secrecy was feasible (see below). The idea that 
textile manufacturers would under normal circumstances buy a 
machine in order to copy it seems far-fetched, as it would 
usually be cheaper and more practical to buy machines direct 
from a specialist maker. In an account of the diffusion of 
textile technology to the United States, Jeremy has shown 
that machines themselves could be successfully copied, and 
even improved in the rebuilding, but that there were major 
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delays and difficulties. British technicians were required 
to supervise American craftsmen who made the machinery, and 
acquisition of parts and ancillary items such as card 
clothing posed a problem. 
83 Where patentees charged a 
premium, as did Boulton and Watt for their steam engines and 
Lister for his combs, then there might have been a point in 
piracy, which is why Boulton and Watt and Lister so 
assiduously defended their rights through the courts. The 
examples of whole machines being used as models from which 
others could be copied arose where users wished to evade a 
prohibition, or they come from a time before a specialist 
machine-making industry could adequately meet demand. The 
case of the German in Leeds found in 1781 with 'a compleat 
spinning jenny' in his possession, and a 'scribbling mill' 
on order from Armley, both which machines were to be packed 
and exported, fits into both these categories. 84 A 
suggestion that the Leeds cotton spinner Ard Walker employed 
a spindle maker specifically to copy frames bought from 
Halifax in 1800 may be correct, though there is no firm 
evidence of it in Walker's records. 85 Several witnesses to 
the two Select Committees on machinery, fearing a widespread 
export of machines to continental engineers for use as 
models, confirmed that such emulation was possible and was 
indeed already occurring. 86 But the point was also made that 
the first copies would not be good ones, and that 'it would 
be a very long time before they could make them so cheap, 
and so well adapted to the purpose as ours'. 87 
Though drawings or reduced size models were easier to 
smuggle than whole machines, they presented similar, perhaps 
greater, difficulties to the machine-builder. 
No drawing or model, except it was as large as the machine 
itself; not a model but a machine can possibly point out 
the parts where the best work is necessarily to be 88 applied, in order to adapt a machine to its purpose. 
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From this it can be inferred that technical drawing and 
model-making were in their infancy. Engineering drawings, 
other than the most rudimentary of sketches, are rarely 
encountered in this early phase, and were still 'few and far 
between' in the industry as late as the 1920s. 89 As detailed 
drawings were required to accompany patent registration, a 
lack of drawing skill could have been another factor 
inhibiting the less educated from applying for patents. True 
engineering drawings were restricted to larger firms such as 
Boulton and Watt, who as consulting engineers issued 
drawings as part of the package they sold. In Yorkshire, 
Matthew Murray had a reputation as a fine draughtsman, but 
was exceptional, perhaps unique, in this respect. 
90 Almost 
the first item mentioned in Murray's will of 1825 was 'my 
Mechanical Drawings and Mechanical Books' which were 
bequeathed to his favoured son-in-law Richard Jackson. 91 
Other early drawings were the work of amateursq perhaps 
little more than a rough sketch or an aide memoire. A 
surgeon, variously described as French or from 
Gloucestershire though later claiming allegiance to the 
United States, when arrested in London after escaping from 
Leeds in 1784 was found to have had 'plans of a scribbling 
machine, a willy and a scribbling-dick' in his possession, 
92 along with models and parts for various textile machines, 
The same man supposedly appeared in Boston, UiS., 'to 
introduce the manufactory of woollens ... he has no models, 
but drawings upon paper of different machines'. 93 The 
American Zachariah Allen was able to sketch machines and 
factory lay-outs in Yorkshire in 1825, and may have been 
able thus to convey useful design information, but though 
competent and accompanied by explanatory notes his efforts 
fell far short of detailed technical drawings. 
94 
Models were a convenient alternative means of smuggling 
information abroad 95 or storing it for one's own use, as 
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Hattersley's 'Pattern Flyer' and 'Fluting Engine Moddles' 
referred to in 1832 demonstrate. 96 Matthew Murray himself 
used models, as in 1809 when he submitted a flax hackling 
machine to the Society of Arts, for which he was awarded a 
Gold Medal, the model being later exhibited in the Science 
Museum. 97 and in 1824, when he referred to models of 
engines. 98 Murray had given 'patterns and specimens of our 
workmanship' to representatives of Boulton and Watt, which 
enabled the Birmingham firm to copy parts of his steam 
engines, 99 for foundry patterns were another means of 
storing and possibly disseminating technical information. 100 
Before about 1830 it was unusual for machine-makers to cast 
for themselves, and as patterns in regular use would be kept 
at a local foundry, then part of a machine's specifications 
would be accessible to others outside the firmq perhaps even 
to competitors. The importance of these patterns, and a 
possible confusion in terminology between patterns and 
models, is clear from an advertisement of 1808: 
Leeds Foundry: Martin Cawood and Son, having purchased the 
whole of THE MODELS belonging to Leeds Bridge Foundry, 
late Mr Pryor's, respectfully beg leave to inform the 
Friends of Mr Pryor, that they 1 may be accommodated with Castings from-them as usual. lu 
'Model' was also used sometimes to mean prototype machinelO2 
and could be taken to mean design, as implied by 'They have 
all the models of England in France at present'. 103 
The other possible method by which details of designs and 
techniques could be conveyed was through publications, 
though there were few of these before regular specialist 
journals appeared in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Jeremy considers the publication of Rees's Cyclopaedia 
between 1802 and 1820 to have been something of a 
breakthrough. 104 In fact the specifications provided by Rees 
were in themselves inadequate as directions for constructing 
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a machine, besides which Rees was not fully up-to-date in 
the machinery he illustrated. When Rees's work was 
published, the days of the amateur machine-maker were past, 
and it is unthinkable that the textile engineering industry 
relied on such a source for its technical information. 
The difficulty with impersonal methods of technology 
transfer before 1850 was that they did not suit the way that 
textile engineering worked. In the main, skills in drawing 
and modelling were not refined enough to convey necessary 
information, and even if there had been a better developed 
representational method of passing information, a workforce 
which lacked skill in literacy and numeracy and which had 
been trained to function on a more practical level, would 
have had difficulty dealing with it. But more than that, 
technology was not inert, could not be captureds frozen and 
sold on. Technological problems were ones of making and 
working, and in the solving of them, innovation naturally 
followed. The engineering environment itself was all 
important and because innovation was generated in an 
atmosphere of personal communication where little was 
written down or otherwise recorded, then inter-personal 
means long remained the most important means of diffusing 
technology. 
PERSON TO PERSON 
Information about technology and technique circulated by 
word of mouth and by practical demonstration at several 
levels. The most basic and obvious of these was within the 
workshop environment as a matter of everyday necessity. As 
the skills of a trade could be transmitted orally, so could 
the knowledge component, even as late as the 1920s: 
It was my experience that skilled men passed [technology] 
on to ap? 6sntices by word of mouth and practical 
example. 
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Apprentices moved on, working for others or setting up for 
themselves, in the same town or in a place where they saw an 
opening. George Hattersley's younger brother Jonathan, 
displaced when his father's old firm broke up, set out to 
try his luck in Leeds, Burnley and Bradford before settling 
in Leeds in apparent direct competition with his 
brothers. 106 The technical and commercial information which 
he had picked up within the family firm helped him to 
establish his own successful company on the doorstep of his 
father's biggest customersO107 Information could also pass 
through workers who were less skilled, but whose day-to-day 
contact had made them familiar with every detail of a 
machine. John Greenwood, who set up the second cotton mill 
in Keighley in 1782 but could not make his spinning frames 
work, asked a girl who worked at the jealously guarded, 
Arkwright-system Low Mill to help. Although apparently an 
unskilled machine-minderg she immediately spotted that he 
lacked washers under the bobbins, and the fault was quickly 
rectified. 108 A number of young people were said to have 
been trained at Cromford to run the machinery at Low Mill, 
which despite the air of secrecy surrounding the whole 
enterprise was in itself a means of spreading knowledge of 
the water frame. 109 
A network of subcontractors and casual employees in textile 
engineering provided other easy channels for the circulation 
of information. Richard Hattersley was at the centre of one 
such formation in Keighley, further explored in chapter 5, 
and in turn became a subcontractor to otherst supplying 
spindles, flyers and rollers, and later complete machines, 
to Taylor and Wordsworth, Maclea and March, Lawson and 
Walker, Murray and Wood and other prominent Leeds machine- 
makers. 110 Passage of technical information on this network 
must have been a daily occurrence. Additionally Hattersley 
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had links beyond the local engineering industry. In February 
and March 1821 his eldest son, Samuel, was sent out in 
pursuit of orders and unpaid debts, visiting customers in 
Todmorden, Manchesterg Ashtonq Stalybridge, Oldham, Halifax 
and further up the Calder Valley. Later he went to Linton, 
Grassington, Gisburn, Clitheroe and Whalley. In Preston at 
'Sleddon's Place' the foreman showed him round: 
which proved a treat indeed. I saw the completest 
Machines, for their various uses, that I ever saw 
And in Burnley he noted that one manufacturer 'intends to 
make alterations to his spinning machines soon'. Just as 
much as orders and debts, such information was Hattersley's 
bread and butter, and the method of collecting it continued 
with the next generation. The notebooks of George 
Hattersley's eldest son., Richard L. Hattersley (1820-1900). 
record his excursions to the continent from 1846 until the 
closing years of the nineteenth century. Though the main 
intention was to sell looms, he also constantly sketched and 
noted technical information. 112 
The network extended beyond engineering and into other 
trades. The scribbling miller Joseph Rogerson worked in a 
trade whose technology was well-established by the early 
years of the nineteenth century, with a partner, Charles 
Lord, a millwright working independently of Rogerson, 113 
taking responsibility for technical matters. But although 
Rogerson's diaries are of little technical interest, they 
show that interchange between trades which provided a ready 
conduit for information. Rogerson's scribbling and fulling 
mill was a public one to which clothiers brought their own 
wool and cloth for processing. 114 Besides the many visits by 
clothiers, almost every week came tradesmen to nail cards, 
or millwrights to adjust the machinery. Rogerson noted 
potentially useful information: 
-163- 
I A patent steam engine of 11 Inches Cylinder will not 
carry 3 scribblers 3 Carders puller & Willy &3 Fallers & 
a Dr lys r, for so it was told me by a Slubber from Yeadon 
000 
He was also in communication with the ironworks at Low Moor, 
visiting there a number of times, and in 1808 'Mr Wetnell 
from Low Moor Foundry Din'd at our house today'. 116 If 
Rogerson's contacts were typical of those of small 
industrialists, and there is no reason to think that they 
were not, then it is easy to see how quickly any new idea 
could circulate on such a network of overlapping working and 
social relationships. 
On the other hand some gathering of information was more 
deliberate and purposeful. John Marshall sent Matthew Murray 
to Cheshire in 1790 with the express purpose of checking 
spinning techniques. 117 B. F. Lister made a number of calls on 
textile factories in 1791 while planning machinery for his 
own establishment: 
20 April Went to Addingham to see the Worsted Mill. 
11 May We Y18up to Hepton B[ridgel to see the cotton 
machines. 
Lister's journal goes on to record sizes of water wheels, 
numbers and sizes of machines and running costs, followed by 
estimates of costs and requirements for his own factory. At 
about the same time, Robert Heaton of Ponden was preparing 
to launch into cotton-spinning. His journal records 
conversations with machine-makers and millwrights, detailing 
materials needed to build machines, specifications for 
transmission equipment, and the size of building required to 
accommodate it all. 119 Joseph Rogerson could be equally 
methodical when he had a particular purpose, as in 1813 when 
considering gas lighting for his scribbling mill, he visited 
two neighbouring factories to inspect their systems before 
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going 'to get what information I could of Mr Glover 
Whitesmith respecting the erecting Gass Lights'. 120 The 
personal approach to collecting information continued long 
after this, for in 1847 George Hattersley was seeking 
details of looms in use in the linen trade from Edward 
Hattersley of Barnsley, presumably a relative. Edward 
offered to show h im 'what is doing in Barnsley as I can have 
access to any of the Power Loom factorys in the Town ..., 
121 
The system of introductions, often conducted very casually, 
was enough to gain many foreigners admission to industrial 
premises. A few firms, conscious of the ease with which 
information might be transported away in the head of a 
knowledgeable stranger, banned visitors altogether. But that 
was unusual, as contemporary comment on Boulton and Watt 
shows: 
With respect to the practice of the house of Bolton and 
Watt, they have always displayed an uncommon degree of 
mystery; and have always shut their works against any 
competent judge in England, and therefore foreigners have 
been no worse treated than every body else; but my opinion 
is decidedly, that they have nothing to show beyond what 
is well known in other places; they continue from pri 122 
that exclusion which before was dictated by interest. 
The experiences of J. C. Fischer and Zachariah Allen show the 
ease with which foreign visitors could gain access to 
factories. Fischer, a Swiss steel-maker, carried an 
introduction to James Watt in 1814, which brought lavish 
hospitality and immediate admission to the whole of Boulton 
and Watt's works. 123 On this short acquaintance Watt wrote 
an introduction to Philips and Lee, cotton-spinners in 
Salford, who in turn introduced Fischer to Benjamin Gott in 
Leeds. After seeing Gott's factories, a letter of 
introduction from Gott took him into John Marshall's flax 
mill. Though it was said that foreigners were not normally 
admitted there, Marshall himself conducted Fischer around 
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the works. 124 While staying in Leeds, Fischer was also able 
to inspect the Middleton railway, and went out to Low Moor 
ironworks where he was shown round by a partner. On a later 
visit, in 1825, Fischer met more engineers and iron and 
steel-makers, in Lancashire and South Yorkshire, some of 
them through compatriots who were working or training in 
Manchester. 125 There is nothing in his account to suggest 
that technical information was concealed from outsiders. 
Zachariah Allen's journal indicates that he had little 
difficulty obtaining access to factories, and even where 
machinery was of the most modern kind, nothing was held 
back. He records one altercation with a textile manufacturer 
into whose premises he had been escorted by a machine-maker 
who wanted to show him a new kind of carding engine, but 
this was clearly an exceptional response. 126 Allen was seen 
as a potential customer , and generally treated with 
hospitality. The same attitude was shown by William 
Jenkinson in 1841 towards some who might have been viewed as 
competitors: 
Do you give [foreign machine-makers] free access to your 
works, or is there any restraint imposed upon their 
inspection of new machinery and new inventions? - If they 
come properly introduced we never make any hesitation 
about it. 
Your object as machine-makm being to sell the articles 
which you produce? - Yes. 
Even where he had been chased from the premises, Allen 
managed to note the dimensions of the new carding engine. 
But written record was not essential where there was already 
intimate knowledge of a machine. Samuel Slater, who first 
successfully introduced Arkwright-style machinery to the 
United States, took not a single drawing or note when he 
migrated from England, and was able to replicate the 
machines from memory in 1790-1.128 
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Bruland has argued convincingly that the lifting of the 
export ban in 1843 should be recognised as a watershed which 
allowed the machine-making industry to take a central role 
in the international diffusion of technology. Before that, 
she believes, the agent of international technology transfer 
was 'the individual craftsman, artisan, engineer or 
entrepreneur'. 129 Considerable numbers of British mechanics 
certainly took advantage of foreign demand for their skills 
and knowledge. 130 At the same time foreign visitors, out of 
innocent interest or with particular purpose, collected 
information about mechanical advances in Britain, and 
British travellers for similar reasons observed continental 
techniques. 131 The crude result may have been a net outflow 
of information from Britain, but it could also be argued 
that wider benefits would flow from an exchange of 
technology, and that foreigners had a contribution to offer 
to the process, as science itself had developed on an 
international circuit. 
Zachariah Allen's journal shows that technology transfer was 
not a simple switch of information from an advanced economy 
to one which was less developed. The published account of 
his European trip132 demonstrates a range of interests going 
far beyond a narrow focus upon Allen's own trade. Much of 
what he recorded was well-established, even traditional, and 
he was as interested in techniques as in engineering 
novelties. Allen also touched on contrasts between American 
and British machinery, not always finding favour with the 
British version. 133 In fact he hints at a certain reluctance 
to adopt new methods in Britain, for example in Benjamin 
Gott's opposition to a newly improved method of steam 
milling. 134 But as Allen was taking note of British methods, 
the British manufacturers whom he met were doubtless 
absorbing some of his suggestions, suggesting the 
possibility of a two way, mutually beneficial technical and 
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commercial interchange. Some of the ideas which passed would 
be of no use, others could be useful, while many would need 
substantial adaptation, technologies often being highly 
specific to particular environments. 135 
As personal channels are confirmed as the essential route 
for technology to pass, some personal motives should be 
noted for encouraging diffusion. There is no reason to think 
that engineers were very different from scientists in taking 
a pride in sharing discoveries and recognising the value of 
pooling ideas. This could be seen as a risky strategy, 
conceding a personal economic interest in technology in 
favour of potentially enhanced benefits from a communal 
approach, but in reality most engineers may have had no 
choice, if secrecy were futile and other methods of 
protection not available to them. 
THE USE OF PATENTS 
A patent is a feeble protection against the rapacity, 
piracy and theft of too many of the manufacturing class. 
There is scarcely an instance, I believe, of a patent 
being granted for any invention of real value, against 
whi ih attempts have not been made to overthrow or evade 
it. 
Though much has been written about patents, 137 interest has 
concentrated upon the mechanics of patenting and the 
diffusion of patented innovations. Unpatented products are 
often considered only peripherally, and there is a prevalent 
assumption that such improvements, being unpatented, were 
consequently of a lower order than ones which had been 
patented. 138 Such an approach fails to address two basic yet 
highly significant questions. First, how effective and 
useful were patents for the community of innovators as a 
whole, and secondly, how extensively were they employed by 
textile inventors? To assess the value of patents, which is 
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a matter of opinion, use can be made of concrete evidence 
available on the second point, the extent to which patents 
were used. 
Many claims have been made for patents, even that they 
stimulated innovation. Cooper implied this in classing the 
patent system among 'institutional inducements for 
invention'. 139 Others have suggested that the system impeded 
the flow of technology, or that it helped the spread by 
bringing details of inventions to public notice, or that it 
failed to help dissemination because technical details were 
stored in a bureaucratic and inaccessible manner. 
140 But 
historians interested in the effects of the patent system 
have scarcely noticed that patents were used only for a 
small minority of textile innovations, even though the 
textile industry, quite rightly, features heavily in this 
debate. To put this in perspective, Sullivan has calculated 
that 1,976 patents were issued for textile inventions in 
England between 1711 and 1850. These amount to 15 per cent 
of the total patents issued over the period. 
141 But 1,, 467 of 
the textile patents were taken out after 1820. For the 
period 1760 to 1820, when inventive activity was supposedly 
at its height, textile patents totalled 471, or fewer than 
eight a year - this for all branches of the textile industry 
across the whole country. Sullivan has also shown how low 
was the rate of patenting in textiles relative to the 
numbers employed in the industry. 
142 Jeremy's regional 
breakdown of inventors suggests that the West Country 
produced almost two thirds of patents in the woollen 
industry between 1790 and 1830 - 70 compared with 
Yorkshire's 41, or about one a year. 
143 Furthermore patents 
in the woollen industry were heavily concentrated in 
finishing operations, accounting for 16 of the 19 woollen 
patents between 1790 and 1812,38 out of 43 between 1813 and 
1824, and 31 of the 46 patents issued between 1825 and 
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1830.144 These figures provide overwhelming evidence that 
the propensity to patent was much more marked in the West of 
England than in Yorkshireq and in the merchant-dominated 
finishing operations rather than in the preparation, 
spinning or weaving of wool. In the cotton industry there 
was a wider spread of patents across different processes but 
nonetheless numbers of patents were relatively small, a 
total of 168 patents over the forty years from 1790 to 1830, 
or just over four a year on average. The figures so 
obviously lack completeness as a record of innovations that 
they cannot be used as the sole basis for general 
conclusions about inventive activity in the textile 
industry, and serious doubts must be expressed about broad 
and sweeping conclusions which rely almost entirely on 
patent records for substance. 
145 
It could be argued thatq as major inventions in textiles 
were patented, consequently patents are useful as a record 
of important original ideas in the industry. The 'heroic' 
inventors, Arkwright, Cartwright and their like, all used 
the patent system. But this line of reasoning rests on the 
discredited 'heroic' view of innovation, assuming that those 
improvements which were patented were in fact the most 
important ones. It is certain that some highly significant 
technical breakthroughs were never patented, such as the 
throstle, enormously important in worsted spinning before 
1850, which developed from the work of Arkwright himself in 
a series of major adaptations which remained unpatented*146 
The act of patenting could itself give a renown and a fame 
to an innovation which perhaps its technical merits did not 
warrant. In any case it is practically impossible to 
categorise innovations as either a 'Great Invention' or some 
lesser sort of improvement. 147 For textiles at least there 
is not, perhaps cannot be, data which would enable a line to 
be drawn between the two. The exercise harks back to ideas 
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of heroic inventors, missing the point that success was 
achieved by making things work, which usually involved 
solving the engineering problems. 
If it is accepted that a dynamic innovating community of 
engineers was mainly responsible for the significant 
technical breakthroughs in textiles, then there are obvious 
practical explanations for the failure to use patents. The 
costs and red tape of patenting must have deterred 
innovators from using the system, and there were also 
suspicions that patents were insecure and that the whole 
exercise of patenting could be counterproductive. 148 In a 
fast moving technical environment, patenting, with its 
attendant risk of descent into an unfamiliar quagmire of 
paperwork and expense, must have held out few attractions. 
Those like Boulton and Watt who did well out of patents had 
the financial and social means to use the system. 
149 Most 
Yorkshire textile engineers did not. 
How, then, to explain the patenting which did take place in 
Yorkshire? John Marshall, who had the means, patented his 
early flax machines, which had required considerable 
investment of time and money to make work. The patents were 
taken out in the name of his engineer, Matthew Murray, in 
1790 and 1793. So when Murray set up his own business in 
about 1794 he was already familiar with the process of 
patenting and he registered three patents for improvements 
to steam engines between 1799 and 1802.150 However, when 
Joseph March went to work at the Round Foundry in 1814, he 
found there a planing machine, invented by Murray but 
unpatented: 
... like many inventions in those days, it was kept as 
much secret as possible, being locked up in a small room 
by itself t ? 5yhich the ordinary workmen could not obtain 
access ... 
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Murray seems to have been deterred from using patents after 
suffering an apparent injustice under the system when 
152 challenged by Boulton and Watt, patenting only one 
further invention after the consequent 1803 court case. 153 
As for the planing machine, intended only for use in 
Murray's own works, secrecy may have been more effective 
than a costly patent which could have further disseminated 
the technology. For textile machinery, which needed to be in 
open use, patenting would have been a more practical option 
than secrecy. However it was hardly considered by engineers 
with few resources, that is, the majority, perhaps because 
they had been deterred by the example of those who had tried 
the patent system and had their fingers burnt. 
There are examples in the Select Committee enquiries of 
patent use in textile engineering between 1800 and the 
1840s, but these were Lancashire engineers better off than 
most of their Yorkshire counterparts, and who had invested 
heavily in development costs, 154 A change in attitude 
towards patents is discernible during the 1840s, with the 
1852 Patent Law Amendment Act a result rather than a cause 
of the change. 155 Isaac Holden and Samuel Lister were at the 
centre of a move towards a more formal path to innovation. 
When Holden invented the Lucifer match in about 1829, he 
declined to patent what had been, he said, a fortunate 
accident. Later his employer, Townend, who objected on 
principle to patenting, refused to protect Holden's 
woolcombing improvements. Holden believed in using patents 
to protect work done over a period, and thought that Townend 
was losing by failing to patent. This difference of opinion 
was said to have been the cause of his leaving to form the 
seven-year partnership with Samuel Listere156 Holden and 
Lister set out to corner the market in France for their own 
wool, by impeding the spread of competing ideas there. 157 
This vigorous use and aggressive defence of patents, 
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initiated by Lister, was something new. 158 Though the 
introduction of simplified and much cheaper patents in 1852 
meant that the system became more accessible, few were able 
to emulate the Lister technique to the full, as it required 
enormous wealth. Lister paid E27,000 to Donisthorpe for a 
share of his woolcomb patent, E33,000 for Heilman's patent, 
and E20,000 for the 1853 patent on the Noble comb. In the 
1850s Lister's nip, an improvement on the Lister-Cartwright 
square motion comb, employed one worker to do what three had 
previously done, enjoying a complete monopoly: 
... and the trade was well satisfied to give me what 
otherwise would have appeared to be an outrageous price, 
the sum of TWELVE HUNDRED POUNDS A MACHINEO OR A THOUSAND 
POUNDS PATENT RIGHT, the machine itself costing 1ýyut two 
hundred ... and for years I sold a large number. 
It was not only the means at his disposal which made Lister 
exceptional. The perfection of the woolcomb marked a turning 
point, for it was the last major textile process to be 
mechanized. Lister was essentially a textile manufacturer 
who had taken up machine-making in order to deal with 
certain mechanical problems. He was able to set about 
systematically designing the necessary machine, at whatever 
cost, and patent protection was a essential feature of his 
method. Few shared his wealth or his commitment to such long 
term projects, but he may have brought protection into 
fashion again, especially as profitable innovations were 
becoming scarcer. If the pace of innovation was slowing, and 
the general community of engineers was no longer producing 
many new ideas, perhaps because a more professional approach 
to development work was needed by 1850 as machines became 
increasingly complex, then the time was ripe for a new 
system to be introduced. For innovation to become a 
deliberate and conscious process requiring considerable 
investment by an individual firm, then patents had to be 
used to secure a compensating return. 
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To summarise on the use, and therefore the usefulness, of 
patents, it appears that in relation to the amount of 
innovation taking place in textile engineering, patents were 
rarely applied after the failure of Arkwright's patent in 
1785, until the mid-1840s with Holden and Lister. Some of 
the claims made for patents, such as that they stimulated or 
spread new ideas, can therefore hardly be valid for the 
textile industry during its period of most vigorous 
innovation. It is equally clear that a lack of patents in an 
industry must not be equated with a failure to innovate. 
That patenting was concentrated in certain industries, or 
certain localities, indicates nothing more than a greater 
disposition there to use the patent system. In well- 
established, heavily capitalized industries there existed 
the means and the incentive to patent, while in the 
industries where patents were rare though innovation was 
obviously taking place, much is explained by the class of 
person responsible for many of the innovations. The reward 
for those humble innovators came through increased business 
rather than through monopolization of a discovery. Sokoloff 
and Khan, studying inventions in the United States between 
1790 and 1846, argue that an unprecedented expansion of 
markets produced new problems which those familiar with 
basic technology, that is, very many of the population at 
the time, were able and motivated to resolve. 
160 In the 
United States this manifested itself in a large number of 
patents. 161 In Britain, where patenting was more difficult 
and expensive, Sokoloff and Khan's 'democratization of 
invention' was presumably happening but without the 
application of patents. The idea that markets were 
stimulating new technical solutions from a range of 
relatively uneducated people finds an echo in the 
description by John James of the worsted industry after 
1815, when 'a new era' in preparing and spinning technology 
resulted from post-war high prices. 
162 
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It was in the interests of machine-makers constantly to 
improve and upgrade. In engineering, the atmosphere of 
inventiveness and dynamism could have extended as far as 
antipathy to the patent system. MacLeod has attempted to 
describe this ethos in the engineering industry, where 
'reputations were made by the successful solution of novel 
problems ... not by the monopolization of particular 
machines'. 163 The involvement of William Fairbairn, and many 
lowlier mechanics, in the movement for patent reform, may 
signal that the character of the industry in this respect 
was changing by the mid-century. 164 
CHECKS ON THE FLOW 
[Mr Watt] was without the smallest wish to appropriate 
knowledge to himself, and one of his greatest delights was 
to set others in the same road to knowledge with himself. 
No man could be mor 169is tant from the Jealous concealment 
of a Tradesman ... 
In theory at least, the desire to profit from a technical 
advantage could provide a strong motive to protect 
innovations. If the use of patents was not a practical 
option, then 'jealous concealment' may have been an 
alternative. A belief that secrecy was widely employed has 
persisted as part of a romanticised view of innovation, even 
surviving after the generally accepted demise of the 
'heroic' inventor. 
Attempts to use secrecy in the Yorkshire textile industry 
occurred only in the earliest period of mechanization and 
were mainly associated with Arkwright's spinning system and 
similar cotton factories in Keighley, where indentures and 
employment contracts with secrecy clauses were tried. James 
Greenwood, a mechanic involved in setting up West Greengate 
Mill, Keighley, in 1784, signed one such agreement. It was 
intended that Greenwood become a partner in the mill but in 
-175- 
the 'event this did not happen, and by 1791 he had moved on 
to help Robert Heaton equip his new cotton factory at 
Ponden. 166 Thomas Robinsont a joiner, and Joseph Tempest, a 
millwright, bound themselves to a firm of cotton-spinners at 
Walk Mill, Keighley, in 1783, on condition they would 
'forfeit 9100 if [they] reveal or make known any secret 
respecting the construction or movements of any of the 
machines or works'. 
167 Although Robinson subsequently turned 
to shop-keeping. 168 Tempest continued in engineering after 
leaving Walk Mill. He was a millwright and machine-maker, 
working for Heaton in 1790 and later a regular customer of 
Richard Hattersley, from whom he bought parts for spinning 
frames. 169 It has been suggested that secrecy clauses in 
contracts may have been designed to foil Arkwright's agents 
rather than keep details from competitors. 170 If correct, it 
may explain why such contracts are not found after the 
collapse of Arkwright's patents in 1785. Or perhaps 
employers came to realise that secrecy agreements could be 
at best only temporary impediments to the movement of 
technology, and that little could be done to prevent a 
knowledgeable employee moving on to work for a competitor or 
for himself. 
As Baumber suggests, there can be other explanations for 
secrecy besides the obvious one of containing technology. 
For example, the security surrounding Benjamin Gott's 
factory in Leeds meant that its workings remained a mystery 
to others in the trade, 
171 and this has been seen as 
deliberate secretiveness. But the radical feature of Gott's 
establishment was in its organization, not in the technology 
used, with close security part of a system to protect goods 
in the factory from theft or damage. Smaller textile 
workshops, whose activities were open to public view, were 
using technology as modern as anything of Gott's. Crump 
points out that 'the industry at Bramley and in the 
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neighbouring villages had adopted and assimilated all the 
current inventions' in the first years of the nineteenth 
century*172 Openness was the order of the day, as in the 
case of Pudsey clothiers in the 1820s who 'have no secret in 
the manufacturing, are not afraid of others getting their 
styles and patterns, all is fair and above board, as they 
are nearly all making similar goods'. 173 Recalling the case 
of Rogerson and his wide circle of contacts, any attempts to 
curtail the flow of technology through secrecy in such 
communities were doomed to fail, were generally viewed as 
anti-social, and seem to have been abandoned early, if tried 
at all. 
Warnings against spies in the Leeds newspapers refer 
specifically to sharing information with foreigners, 
implying that information was allowed to pass more freely 
within the domestic industry: 
We hope all persons concerned in managing these machines 
will, for the future, take care how they suffer unknown 
persons to make observations on thij, as the consequences 
to this country may be very fatal. 
But secrecy between countries was as unworkable as that 
between factories, for even when the export of machinery was 
banned and France and Britain were at war, technology was 
passing across the Channel without apparent hindrance. 
Secrecy may have been appropriate for a one-off specialized 
machine tool, as with Matthew Murray's planing machine 
(above), but could not be effective for a textile machine, 
the value of which lay in multiple and continuous operation 
in a factory. The 1824 Select Committee was told of a case 
in 1819 when a flax-dressing machine had deliberately not 
been patented 'thereby keeping it as secret as it was 
possible to be'. Within six months identical machines were 
on sale in France. 175 James G. Marshall in 1841 showed a 
certain reticence in sharing information with foreigners, 
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though it was only those engaged in the same branch of 
manufacture whom he attempted to exclude from his Leeds 
factory, and his intention was rather to prevent the 
poaching of key workers and avoid general inconvenience, as 
well as a vague hope of retaining information about 
techniques as much as details of machinery. He did not 
object to the same foreigners having access to the machine 
shops which supplied him. Significantly, his stated view was 
that 'reciprocity of advantages is, I believe, on the whole, 
the most advantageous policy', and when asked about French 
attempts to maintain secrecy, replied that he 'should rather 
doubt the practicability of that being maintained'. 
176 
So practicability may not be the only, or even the main, 
explanation for why patents and secrecy were so little used. 
It should rather be asked whether the interests of most 
textile manufacturers or engineers lay in regulating the 
spread of technology. In general, a technically competent 
machine-maker was likely to benefit from the free 
circulation of any invention which could make existing types 
of machines obsoletes providing it had not been developed at 
his expense. Similarly many textile manufacturers would 
welcome technological advance which increased efficiency and 
productivity. Those active in developing innovations, 
whether engineers or textile manufacturers, would probably 
resist the free spread of any resulting new technology. But 
those who could afford to engage in major development work 
also had the means to use the patent system, which was 
supposed to offer such men a chance to recoup some, or all, 
or many times, their investment in new products. If the 
patented machine were offered at too high a price, or with 
too stringent conditions attached, there arose a strong 
incentive to pirate the technology by straight copying, or 
to produce a parallel invention. Remembering the example of 
Arkwright and others, many innovators may have concluded 
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that legal protection was simply not worth the time and 
expense involved. They may also have remembered that after 
Arkwright had failed in his costly attempts to keep secrets 
and protect patents, he went on to make a vast fortune, by 
actually using the machines to spin cotton. Profits were 
made by using the machines for their intended purpose, and 
not by engaging in futile attempts at concealment and 
patenting. 
THE REALIZATION OF'IDEAS 
... most mechanical inventions are of a very composite 
character, and are led up to by the labour and the study 
of a long succession of workers ... But the making of the invention is not the sole difficulty. It is one thing to 
invent, said Sir Ma f57 Brunel, and another thing to make 
the invention work. 
It may be that a failure to make things work in practice 
formed the greatest barrier to technological diffusion. If 
diffusion were delayed, the explanation may be found not in 
secrecy or patents or social resistance, but rather in the 
fact that few products can be applied immediately and 
perfectly in practice. 
178 Success depended upon an ability 
to be receptive and open-minded, and it was essential to 
adapt before one could adopt. 
179 Great 'inventors' like 
Holden and Lister may be more accurately described as 
adaptors, their strength coming from an ability to fill a 
gap in the market, responding to a commercial impetus with a 
technical solution. The bottleneck which Holden and Lister 
broke was well-known within the worsted industry long before 
they became interested in it, but it required considerable 
engineering flair to achieve a satisfactory solution, along 
with enough commercial judgement to recognise that the game 
was worth the candle. In the same way it had been possible 
for Richard Roberts, who claimed to know nothing about 
cotton-spinning, to perfect the self-acting mule in response 
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to a direct appeal by cotton-spinners who wanted to 
undermine striking employees. The idea of a self-actor was 
not original, but Roberts was the first to 'work it out into 
a practicable process'. 
180 Peter Fairbairn, credited with 
some of the greatest breakthroughs of the nineteenth century 
in worsted- and flax- spinning and preparing, and in machine 
tools, was described in an early biography as 'an inventor 
and improver of machinery'. 
181 Many of his most successful 
machines built upon the work of others, but he brought to 
the task considerable engineering skill and commercial 
knowledge, as well as a background in cotton machine-making 
in Manchester and Glasgow. 
This movement of ideas from one branch of textiles to 
another, often from cotton into woollens or flax, was 
significant. In the way that machines, once patented, were 
rendered unusable by competitors but could stimulate 
parallel innovation, similarly machines working in one 
branch of textiles could act as models for parallel 
applications to other fibres. Widespread use of precedent 
suggests that adaptation was generally a more satisfactory 
option than starting from scratch. In the case of 
engineering in West Yorkshire, there is much evidence that 
early machines were supplied from the west, from the cotton 
districts of Lancashirel82: Manchester machine-makers 
opening a warehouse and workshop in Leeds in 1792, Benjamin 
Gott buying machines from Lancashire in the 1790s, the 
purchase of Manchester machinery by Pildacre Mill, Ossett, 
in 1792 and 1793, John Marshall collecting names of 
engineers in the Manchester area at about the same time. 183 
Further north, the Keighley machine-makers were drawing upon 
experience from across the Pennines. William Carr, reputedly 
the 'cleverest mechanist' in Keighley at the turn of the 
century, had arrived from Preston in 1790 to establish a 
business servicing cotton-spinners, later becoming an 
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becoming an influential maker of worsted spinning 
frames. 184 Robert Heaton's investigations between c. 1786 
and 1791 led him to machine makers in Bolton, Manchester, 
Burnley and Blackburn. 
185 
Machines from Lancashire were not directly applicable to 
the Yorkshire industry, for they were themselves far from 
perfect, and in any case needed adaptation to worsted and 
woollen fibres. Mathias has emphasised that the commercial 
and technical context needs to be ripe for paper ideas to 
be brought to fruition, the classic example being 
Leonardo's designs which could not be realized in his own 
time. 186 Engineering problems were still acute three 
hundred years later, when they severely hampered James 
Watt's attempts to build an efficient steam engine, 
However, greater accuracy in manufacturing components was 
only part of the solution. There were also inevitably 
operational difficulties to overcome, by those who adapted 
the machines of others, or who merely set out to make them 
work: Marshall with the Darlington machinery, Gott with his 
Bramah press, James Ackroyd of Halifax with a French 
Jacquard. 187 Wyatt and Paul, credited with the invention of 
spinning by roller in 1738, were not able to work the 
system, and it was left to Arkwright to bring it into 
operation in the cotton industry. 
188 The subsequent 
application of roller spinning to the worsted industry 
needed much experiment and adjustment to Arkwright's water 
frame. 189 Cartwright's powerloom, though based on sound 
theory, was not commercially or technically successful. 
Cartwright himself started the process of modification 
immediately after his first patent was granted, engaging 
the most skilled machine-makers Manchester could offer, who 
nevertheless 'despaired of ever making it answer the 
purpose it was intended for'. 
190 By the time Strickland 
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wrote her memoir in, 1843, the loom had been radically 
altered: 
The patent *00 has doubtless been receiving continual 
additions from various hands during the last fifty years; 
and the beautiful machine ... differs considerably in detail, even from the m TYI improved form of Mr 
Cartwright's invention. 
It had taken forty years for Cartwright's idea to be 
effectively applied to worsted weaving. 
192 That was not the 
end of its evolution, for the worsted powerloom continued 
to be refined in order to speed and improve its 
performance, and to adapt it to different products. Richard 
L. Hattersley and his foreman John Wilkinson produced an 
impressive list of improvements and new applications for 
that loom during the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century. 193 
The persistence of mechanical and operational difficulties 
was recognised by the use of a package system, where 
attempts were made to satisfy customers by sending skilled 
fitters to install machines, and even personnel to work 
them for a period. Skilled erectors accompanied Matthew 
Murray's engines. 194 Later exporters to Norway went much 
further, including technical information, machinery, 
ancillary equipment, construction expertise and skilled 
British operative and managerial labour in the package. 195 
These arrangements were not a sales gimmick, as it was 
essential for machine-users to be trained in operating and 
maintaining the machinery to run at maximum efficiency. 
Even the most modern textile machines need constant 
attention if they are to run efficiently, with powerlooms 
shaken out of adjustment so quickly by vibration that 
modern weaving shops employ almost as many tuners as 
weavers. 196 
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One who apparently specialized in bringing imperfect 
machinery into use was a cloth finisher called William 
Hirst. In 1816: 
Fenton Murray & Co ... told me that if I would use the hydraulic presses, they would let me have them at almost 
any price, as they wanted to get them into the hands of 
some party who could bring týp into operation, so as to 
give them a fair chance ... 
By Hirst's account (the purpose of which was self 
promotion), he was praised by Murray for persistence in 
making the machine work. 
198 Hirst was also credited with 
finding a solution to using gig mills on Yorkshire cloths, 
which needed a change to the prior process, fulling. 
199 
There are other instances of the successful mechanization 
of one textile process requiring a review of preceding or 
following operations. For powerloom weaving to work well, 
said William Fairbairnj automatic dressing machines were 
essential. 200 Cartwright's loom had become easier to 
operate as machine-spun yarn improved in quality, and after 
Radcliffe devised a system of dressing the warp before it 
was placed upon the loom. 
201 It has been suggested that all 
those successful in spinning innovations were 'compelled' 
to turn their attention to improving preparatory 
machinery. 202 Whether such pressure to change adjacent 
processes arose primarily from technical needs or from 
commercial considerations is not always clear, but it is of 
the greatest significance that the environment itself 
stimulated innovation. Useful invention could not take 
place in a vacuum. The innovators needed an understanding 
of textile production and a grasp of those mechanical 
processes already in operation, a kind of specialized 
knowledge which was widespread in textile communities. 
Even self-conscious work directed towards producing a 
specific new major mechanical breakthrough, which might 
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once have been styled an heroic invention, owed much to the 
stimulating local environment. Innovators did not start 
with a blank slate, but built upon what had gone before, 
informed by an awareness of the needs of local industry. 
Marshall and Murray made improvements to flax-spinning and 
weaving, starting from an imperfect spinning machine by 
Kendrew and Porthouse, and using looms from John Jubb and 
others based on Cartwright's designs. 203 Lister's woolcomb 
built upon the work of Cartwright and Donisthorpe and 
others, while Lister's one-time partner, Isaac Holden, 
started an illustrious career in textiles by 'exercising 
his ingenuity' upon some imperfect combing machines which 
he had persuaded his employer to buy in 1833.204 The later 
acrimonious dispute between Lister and Holden, concerning 
who was the true inventor of the woolcomb, stemmed from the 
fact that their work derived from that of others. They 
produced solutions which worked, but they had not started 
from scratch, and their answers came in response to 
specific practical difficulties which the industry was 
experiencing. Evidence that all innovation was incremental, 
growing out of the work of others, is overwhelming. 
By accepting that innovation can in reality be nothing 
other than a cumulative process9 then two further issues 
can be resolved. The first question is whether innovation 
was mainly the province of machine-makers or machine-users. 
MacLeod brought this issue to prominence by floating as 
hypothesis a polarized model where machine-users were 
responsible for 'radical inventions' and machine-makers 
devised lesser, incremental innovations. 205 The evidence 
for this assertion is thin, coming mainly from patents 
which, as has been shown above, are inadequate as a record 
of innovation in this industry. The sterility and 
simplicity of this model ignore the dynamism which was such 
a feature of textile engineering. MacLeod's theory, besides 
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over-emphasising heroic-type inventions, also fails to 
recognise the difficulties in distinguishing between makers 
and users, particularly as some of the same people were 
involved in both activities. Many engineers also engaged in 
textile manufacture, mainly as a sideline but sometimes to 
the extent that eventually they ceased their engineering 
activities. Examples of those who switched over completely 
include MIConnel and Kennedy of Manchester, who had given 
up engineering in favour of cotton spinning by the early 
years of the nineteenth century. 
206 and Berry Smith, a 
successful machine-maker in business in Keighley from 1801, 
who had become solely a commission worsted spinner by about 
1830.207 Machine-makers with interests in textile 
manufacture are found in all branches of the industry and 
throughout the period. John Jubb was a partner in Churwell 
cotton mill during the 1780s. 208 Joshua Wordsworth owned a 
business in Barnsley, spinning and manufacturing linen and 
mixed fabrics, in 1846.209 Samuel Lawson, who had been in 
partnership with a flax-spinner called Mark Walker from 
about 1817 until 1832, continued to run a flax-dressing and 
spinning concern, which employed 66 people in 1834.210 
Richard Hattersley's eldest son, Samuel, was put in charge 
of their small worsted spinning business in Keighley 
between about 1817 and 1822, before being sent to manage a 
new machine-making branch in Bradford in 1824.211 The next 
generation of Hattersleys employed a similar arrangement, 
with George's third son, Edwin, managing their four worsted 
spinning factories in the Worth Valley between c. 1850 and 
c. 1890 while the more technical Richard Longden Hattersley 
took over the machine-making business. 212 
There are a number of commercial reasons why machine-makers 
should have engaged in textile production. Most obviouslyl 
being so close to textiles they could identify profitable 
opportunities. The prospect of steady, rather than 
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spectacular, earnings from commission spinning may have 
attracted those who wished to have a more evenly spread 
income than the fluctuating capital goods market offered. 
MIConnel is said to have taken up cotton spinning when left 
with two mules which customers had ordered but could not 
pay for. 213 A sideline in textiles also provided a chance 
to demonstrate the latest technology in action, persuading 
or pushing other textile manufacturers to follow suit. 
Furthermore, family members who did not fit into the main 
engineering business could be found a managerial role, 
perhaps suitable for a less technically able son, in the 
subsidiary firm. This probably partly explains the 
involvement in textiles of Richard Hattersley and his son 
George, both of whom had large numbers of sons, not all of 
them cut out for a career in engineering. 
But there were also technological reasons for the vertical 
expansion into textiles. As practical experimentation was 
so important to technological development, a textile 
factory could be a laboratory in which to try and perfect 
new machinery. Additionally, in working the processes 
solutions to technical bottlenecks may have suggested 
themselves. The examples quoted above of textile engineers 
who were also involved in textile manufacture - Jubb, 
Wordsworth, Lawson, Hattersley - are all men who were 
leaders in the industry, at the forefront of technical 
development in their time. Others, notably Matthew Murray 
and Peter Fairbairn, retained exceptionally close links 
with one textile manufacturer and so were able to conduct 
trials and observations on the factory floor. Relationships 
between makers and users were altogether more complex and 
positive than MacLeod's static model suggests. The 
engineers cannot be denied an early and a central role in 
technological innovation. Some of their dynamism and 
motivation to solve problems is conveyed in the evidence of 
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Peter Ewart, a cotton-spinner and himself a former machine- 
maker: 
*99 it is only within three years there have been any 
silk mills in Manchester; since those have been 
introduced, there has been a great deal of excitement 
among the machine makers to improve the silk machinery. I 
have been told ... that considerable improvements have been made in silk machinery, even in Jý4 short time that 
it has been introduced in Manchester, 
The element of co-operation, or productive association, in 
the dynamics of technical progress was emphasised by Peter 
Fairbairn to the 1841 enquiry: 
From your observation what is your opinion as to the 
persons who suggest improvements in machinery; do the 
improvements proceed generally from those who are 
connected with the working of the machines, or from those 
who make the machines? 
- From both. As a machine-maker, I am very much indebted 
to the spinners; if they have any improvement to bring 
into operation they suEjgst it to me, and I carry out the 
mechanical department. 
This insight into the working of the Yorkshire textile and 
engineering industries need not necessarily conflict with 
Henry Holdsworth's view: 
oeo the cotton spinners make all the improvements; it 
would not pay a machine maker to adopt 
i 
new 2fians till their merits were established by pract ce. 
For Holdsworth worked in Glasgow, where machine-making, as 
an off-shoot of Manchester textile engineering, apparently 
lacked that initiative which was such a feature of the more 
vigorous Lancashire and Yorkshire industries. 
The second issue which is enlightened by an appreciation of 
the significance of cumulative innovation, is the role of 
the workforce in technical progress. While Richard 
L. Hattersley acknowledged the contribution of his foreman 
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over 35 years, 217 many employees who came forward with 
suggestions for improvements remained as unrecorded as were 
their ideas. That is not to say that their schemes were 
insignificant. 
Are not many of the improvements in your machines, 
actually suggested by the worýTgn themselves? 
(Mr Taylor) Many, constantly. 
They were also encouraged by the prospect of a bonus 
payment: 
Did you ever know the operative mechanic ... suggest any important improvement? - Yes, very often. 
And the probability would be, that the more practice he 
had the more improvements he would suggest? - Yes; and 
the English mechanic is noted for that which you now 
speak of; because there is an inducement for him to do 
so; he often gets very liberally rewarded for it. 
How does he produce his improvement; is it upon paper or 
in the process of hand-labour? - It is very seldom on 
paper, but by hand, showly§ you what he can do, and what 
would be an improvement. 
Employees made frequent and valuable contributions to 
product development and it was recognized that the firm's 
principal, however talented, could not hold a monopoly on 
ideas. The best engineering firms were constantly 
innovating, and introduced formal systems to work out 
improvements. The son of the chief draughtsman at 
Wellington Foundry in the mid-nineteenth century, whose 
father had reported directly to Peter Fairbairn, described 
how there had been: 
a great many new ideas and improvements in machinery at 
that time ... it is clear that the 296 awing Office had its thinking cap on a good many times. 
This was the main function of draughtsmen, who made only 
general drawings and rough sketches which were then tested 
out in the works. 
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Ideas, then, were realized by practical operatives of all 
classes and in both textile and engineering industries, 
responding to constant stimuli from the environment in which 
they worked. 
CONCLUSION 
The features of technological advance in textile engineering 
identified in this chapter are consistent with a 
predominantly small-scale industry run by former artisans. 
Innovation was a localized, grass-roots phenomenon, in which 
formal science and written sources played little or no 
discernible part. Because the main channels for information 
and skills were interpersonal, it was near impossible to 
maintain secrecy or protect technology, and the few early 
efforts to do so were quickly abandoned. Patents were hardly 
used, being expensive and providing no certainty of 
protection, but in any case they did not fit the modus 
operandi of the industry. Success was achieved not through 
protectionism, nor by any theoretical means, but by making 
things work. That machines were successfully applied to 
dozens of separate processes in the different textile 
branches, and continued to be developed and improved 
thereafter, shows how dynamic was the new industry. 
Innovation was a cumulative process, with ideas springing 
from both textiles and engineering but generally worked out 
to practicability by engineers. There was little in the way 
of strategic overview, groups of engineers responding 
practically to immediate problems. 
Collective needs could indeed beget collective solutions. A 
community of artisans with varying skills was vital to 
successful machine-making, a point which Mathias illustrates 
by examining the converse, the difficulty of trying to 
transplant and lindigenizel innovations to different 
cultures. 221 Thus imported machines could have appeared much 
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more radical than local products, but only because they had 
been developed to suit a different environment. The means by 
which they were designed would have been the sameq gradual 
adaptation to suit local needs. The 'innovating community', 
a combination of makers and users, also offered the 
advantage of being able to readily assess the economic 
feasibility of new technology. For as Rosenberg has argued, 
even if a product is technically possible, it is another 
matter to decide whether it is economically superior. 
Commercial success rests upon recognizing the value of 
continuity as well as discontinuity. 222 
If technology were indeed subjected to appraisal by a whole 
community, it is then only a short step to accepting that 
new ideas were not considered the property of a single firm, 
but could be shared. The idea that collaboration can occur 
in circumstances where one would rather expect intense 
competition is not original. Saxonhouse, for example, showed 
that Japanese cotton-spinners engaged in 'firm-to-firm 
technical assistance' during the nineteenth century. 223 It 
is possible that a measure of co-operation could co-exist 
with competition. Engineers and textile manufacturers may 
have recognized that technological progress could deliver 
advantages across the whole community, and that sharing 
ideas would generate new ideas. The fact that most 
engineering happened within a network of interdependent 
subcontractors means that an apparently paradoxical state of 
'co-operative competition' could exist. 224 
The concept of 'heroic' breakthroughs, in textile 
engineering at least, is unsustainable. Innovation was a 
gradual building of knowledge, in which even the most famous 
participants started from the work of others. Most 
significant technical progress occurred within the 
workmanlike atmosphere of the engineering industry. This 
-190- 
bears out the idea that innovations could, in a sense, be 
produced to order. The form of such an order may not have 
been explicit, the process perhaps required minor flashes of 
'genius' by individuals, but nonetheless innovation came in 
response to needs brought forward by local textile 
manufacturers or their engineers. The argument that demand 
could have stimulated technical progress is to be further 
developed in chapter 6. 
With the organizational base of textile engineering shifting 
in favour of fewer, larger and more specialized firms from 
about 1830, it appears that views on the protection of 
technology were hardening as opportunities to produce major 
innovations lessened. By the mid-century, machine-makers 
were more likely to protect innovations from competitors, 
and collaborative ventures had had their day. How far the 
industry had moved from being 'community' centred to become 
'firm' centred will be examined in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ESTABLISHMENTS AND NETWORKS 
The idea of an innovating community in the early engineering 
industry echoes Sokoloff's 'democracy of invention'. and 
raises the question of whether some form of 'democracy' 
could also have infiltrated the process of production. The 
notion of the community as a strategic institution in 
shaping an emerging industry is not unduly idealistic. Sabel 
and Zeitlin build upon Proudhon's idea to show that 
competition and productive association could be 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive forms of 
economic behaviour. 
1 Smail identifies entrepreneurship as 'a 
quality possessed by a whole host of petty producers' during 
early industrializationg stressing that their economic 
2 behaviour should be explained in a cultural context, 
Randall emphasises the importance of 'a community character 
which ... was both dynamic and conservative' among West 
Riding woollen workers, concluding that we should Irecognise 
how deeply the social 'context of manufacturing production 
3 influences its potential for transformation'. Unlike the 
woollen industry, machine-making was not entrenched in 
custom, so that change was presumably less painful and more 
readily accepted, yet Randall's ideas are as applicable to 
textile engineering as they are to the longer established 
industry which it served. 
The 'social context' of textile engineering is the focus of 
this chapter. Berg, in recent work on networks in the 
Birmingham metal trades, points out the limitations of 
concentrating upon a few large and successful firms in any 
industrial studyl with the concomitant danger of overlooking 
what was potentially the largest and most dynamic sector 04 
This tendency to dissect only the biggest and most lasting 
firms she attributes in part to a bias stemming from an 
overemphasis upon traditional kinds of historical record, 
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such as business and official papers which tend not to shed 
light upon the unknown small-scale producer, the artisan or 
the unenduring. But Berg also cautions against an assumption 
that eighteenth century industry was polarized between large 
5 
and small producers, while identifying that such a 
polarization in the Birmingham metal trades had in fact 
taken place by 1840. To an extent this pattern is consistent 
with developments in engineering in West Yorkshire. 
But although superficially there are similarities between 
the workshop-based organization of the metal trades in West 
Yorkshire and Birmingham, and Sheffield, whose industry Berg 
also discusses, significant differences are apparent, There 
were many more firms in the Birmingham metal trades, some of 
them employing hundreds by the mid eighteenth century. Fifty 
smaller firms in existence in 1780 each employed twenty to 
forty workers. 
6 Such a firm in West Yorkshire at the time 
would have been considered exceptionally large. Sheffield 
may have provided a model for the West Yorkshire engineers, 
as its industry was characterized by small masters and 
flexible patterns of subcontracting. There were so many of 
these that cut-price competition seriously threatened their 
7 livelihoods, which may explainýthe migration north into the 
textile districts of some of those entrepreneurs discussed 
in chapter 2. The key difference, though, between Birmingham 
and Sheffield on the one hand, and Keighley, Leeds and other 
West Yorkshire engineering centres on the other, was that 
the West Yorkshire industry was not controlled by a network 
of merchants, but was rather distinguished by the 
relationship with its customer industry, textiles. As a 
newly established industry, textile engineering was free of 
any pre-existing institutional constraints, such as guilds 
or mercantile structures. Furthermore, because its products 
were capital goods with a clearly defined market, textile 
engineering had no need for the kind of separate 
distribution network which consumer goods manufacturers 
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used, and which would perhaps have allowed merchants a role 
in the trade. This had implications for the way in which 
work itself was organized. Before precision machine tools 
were available, accuracy was achieved by fine division of 
labour in the Birmingham and Sheffield metal trades. 
Outworkers who performed these repetitive tasks were 
dependant upon the merchants who supplied work and bought 
their produce. Such mass production was not required in West 
Yorkshire machine-making, in the early period at least, and 
although some parts were manufactured in quantities, 
subcontractors maintained a greater independence from the 
machine-makers they served. 
The relationship between firms within the textile 
engineering industry needs to be further explored. Should 
the industry be thought of as a dispersed factory, with 
components supplied by different firms and brought together 
for assembly? Few integrated engineering factories existed 
before 1820. Matthew Murray, whose establishment was 
referred to as a manufactory as early as 1799, was 
exceptional. 8 Most machine-makers inhabited works, 
workshops, machine-makers' shops, or foundries. At what 
stage these developed to become factories is a point at 
issue. A simple yardstick of this development is evidence 
that production was becoming integrated, often signalled by 
the acquisition of a foundry. 
Engineering does not neatly fit general models of factory 
development. Early machine-making, characterized by small 
batch production, does not match those industries where mass 
production was a feature. However, recent debate on routes 
to the factory has emphasised the range of organizational 
possibilities in different industries and locations over a 
period of more than half a century. 9 This debate has 
advanced three main theories for the growth of factories, 
all of which are worth considering in the context of textile 
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engineering changing to a largely factory-based industry by 
the mid nineteenth century. Was Landes's 'logic of 
technology' inescapable? 1O Did engineers see a route to 
greater efficiency and cost effectiveness in centralizing 
operations on one site? Or was the main aim, as Marglin 
would have it, to gain control of the workforce? 11 These 
last two questions overlap, with a key issue in engineering 
that of quality control. In fact the explanation of why 
engineering became a factory industry combines elements of 
all three ideas. 
SCALE AND SPECIALIZATION 
While it is obvious that any study which considers only 
large and successful businesses will produce a distorted 
view of industry, 12 many of the early machine-making firms 
were so small and transient that there are considerable 
difficulties in achieving a comprehensive and detailed 
survey of their activities. By the standards of other 
industries even the largest engineering establishments were 
modest in size, especially during their formative years. 
Mostly uninsured and intestate, early textile engineers 
frustrate attempts at systematic analysis. There is some 
evidence of size and financial standing, but it is piecemeal 
and not suited to methodical treatment. The few recorded 
insurance policies relate only to larger firms, quote 
figures which are approximations, and in some cases are only 
for buildings, giving no valuation of stock or equipment 
(see Table 5.1). Probate records are also unsatisfactory as 
a measure of general worth in the industry, applying only to 
the better off, and citing the value only of movable estate 
while excluding real estate and business property (Table 
5.2). 13 Hattersley's abundant and atypical records have 
supplied a series of valuations which indicate the amount of 
capital required to service such a business over the period, 
though these figures are incomplete for tools and equipment 
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(Table 5.4). Even so, the most illuminating insight may be 
George Hattersley's aside, in a letter of the 1860s, 
indicating that it had been possible to go back into 
business with a modest 1500 borowed money' in 1832 after the 
firm's bankruptcy. 14 
1798: Hargreaves, Cave and Longley, Builders. 
Tenants: Murray and Co. 
Buildings E700; Steam engine E100; Contents 9200 
Total 91000 
1800: Hargreaves, Cave and Longley, Builders. 
Tenants: Fentonj Murray and Wood 
Buildings E1400 
Owned by Fenton, Murray and Wood: Steam engine E150; 
Utensils and stock in trade 9600 
1804: Fenton, Murray and Wood (Hargreaves and Cave 
mortgagees) 
Buildings, steam engine, utensils, stock in trade: 
Total C6050 
1817: James Maud. 
Tenant: Wadsworth and Co [Taylor and Wordsworth] 
Mechanics workshop and engine house E650; going gear 
Z50; steam engine E100. Total (without contents) 
E800 
1824: Zebulon Stirk and William Horsfield 
Buildings E1500; steam engine E400; Stock Z1000. 
Total: E2900 
SOURCE: Guildhall Library, RE 164622; RE 37 172611-2; RE 50 
210457; Sun 116/920393; Sun 11937/145 1018179. 
TABLE 5.1 
Insurance Valuations: Leeds Machine-Makers 
1808 John Jubb (I) Z3,000 
1816 John Jubb (II) L5,000 
1819 Michael Merrall 000 
1820 David Wood E14,000 
1826 Matthew Murray E8,000 
1846 Joshua Wordsworth E25,000 
1848 Joseph Taylor C129000 
1851 William Smith C4,000 
SOURCE: Borthwick Institute 
TABLE 5.2 
Probate Valuations: Leeds and Keighley Machine-Makers 
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George Hattersley 
George Bland 
Briggs. and Banks 
Thomas Mills (also foundry) 
Charles and Allan Smith 
John. and Samuel Smith 
Samuel Lawson 
Jonathan Hattersley (Leeds) 
Zebulon Stirk 
Maclea and March 
Peter Fairbairn 
partners, 
C. 100 
12 
31 employees 
22 
6 
80 
400 
134 
6 
211 
850 
SOURCE: Census Return of 1851. Information for Fairbairn is 
in the entry for his partner Greenwood at 2321/200; for 
Lawson in the entry of his son John at 2319/670. 
TABLE 5.3 
Numbers of employees: Leeds and Keighley Machine-Makers, 
1851 
As a potential yardstick, labour force figures also present 
problems of interpretation in an industry where work was put 
out to subcontract or supplied in a semi-finished state, and 
where firms engaged in a range of activities beyond machine- 
making. It was common for larger businesses also to make 
castings, steam engines or even have a textile branch which, 
though apparently separate, may have included its employees 
in total labour force figures. J5 On the whole, though, 
numbers of employees provide a comprehensible statistic 
giving a ready indication of the scale of an operation. 
Though information about numbers of employees is patchy in 
the 1851 census, enough has been recorded to show that some 
of the Leeds (mainly flax) machine-makers, notably Lawson 
and Fairbairn, were already of immense size (Table 5.3). Of 
the 7,415 engineering workers then in Leeds16 400 were with 
Lawson, 850 at Fairbairn's and 211 at Maclea and March, with 
Taylor and Wordsworth accounting for several hundred more. 
At the other extreme, hundreds were still employed in small 
workshops on the traditional pattern, with a master and 
handful of journeymen. Not all mobility was upward, for 
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22 April 1793: Partnership established between Richard 
Hattersley and Thomas Binns., Transferred from their previous 
firms: 
(Binns) iron, brassp scrap, tools and equipment including 
anvil, bellows and hearth and vice benches E28 8s 5hd 
(Hattersley) Stocks, dies and taps, vice, cutting engine, 
brace and bits, files and hammer etc. E10 10s 10d 
10 June 1816: Stock in trade 
Book debts 
Fluting engine 
Iron chest 
6 horse engine 
with apparatus 
TOTAL 
Debts owing 
Net difference 
C1311 11 Ok 
E1744 8 7 
E30 0 0 
E4 4 0 
E508 15 6 
E3598 19 lk 
E643 10 3 
E2955 8 llk 
E1125 44 1 Jan. 1820: Debts owing by firm 
Stock in trade X2477 15 7k 
Book debts 93869 4 4k 
Balance in cash book E200 18 6 
Steam engine E508 15 6 
New Mill E604 10 0 
Various houses E1018 0 0 
July 1829: noted after the death of Richard Hattersley that 
the firm had book debts of 92044 and stock in trade of 
E2117 10s Od 
The three surviving partnersq Richard's three eldest sons, 
were bankrupted in 1832. George Hattersley took over the 
firm's premises in Keighley and re-started, as he later 
noted, 'with 500 borowed money ,,, I used to reel up every 
week to see whether I lost or gained ... I When George took 
two of his own sons into partnership in 1860, the business 
was conservatively estimated to have had a net worth of 
X16,840. Hattersley's was incorporated in 1888 with a 
valuation of 9100,000 in 10,000 shares of E10. 
SOURCE: WAS Bradford, 32D83/5/1; 32D83/2/2; 32D83/2/2 and 
2/4; 32D83/2/5; 32D83/33/8; 32D83/42; 32D83/41. ý 
TABLE 5.4 
Hattersleys of Keighley: Capital employed 
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Zebulon Stirk, once a renowned steam engine builder as well 
as textile engineer, had descended in his old age to 
employing a mere half dozen. There was also a middling 
sector, of engineers whose businesses were smaller or 
slightly peripheral to the mainstream, like Jonathan 
Hattersley's roller and spindle-making factory with 134 
employees, and millwrights Stephen and John Whitham who 
employed 270 making fulling and washing machinery at their 
Kirkstall Road foundry in 1854.17 The major Lancashire 
engineering centres showed a similar spread, with 115 firms 
in 1841 averaging 91 workers, a figure which included 
Hibbert and Platt's with 900 and Nasmyth with 500.18 It has 
been suggested that the average size of establishment in 
Lancashire had fallen to 85 workers by 1871.19 
Keighley showed a spread of large, medium and small shops 
similar to that in Leeds at the mid-century, though on a 
different scale. To illustrate this, George Hattersley, at 
the apex of textile engineering in Keighley, had fewer 
engineering employees than the medium sized firm of his 
lesser known younger brother Jonathan in Leeds. 
Figures for an earlier period are harder to come by, except 
for the very largest and least typical, like Matthew Murray 
who employed 160 workers in 1802, and 200 in 1826.20 For 
smaller enterprises, Richard Hattersley's records show the 
futility of trying to find precise numbers of employees 
where heavy use was made of casual and subcontract labour. 
After nearly twenty years in business, in 1808 Hattersley 
himself was the only employee on the firm's books who 
consistently received a full-time wage, even though at times 
as many as a dozen men were employed. 
21 
Pollard identifies subcontract, not as itself a stage in 
industrialization, but as a system compatible with 
capitalist development which served technical and commercial 
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requirements and management needs in many different 
industries. 22 Pollard's interest is particularly in the 
application of subcontract to management issues, but in 
textile engineering technical and commercial aspects were 
more important. Subcontract was a means of producing 
components with a maximum of precision and a minimum level 
of workforce for the main contractor, to whom permanent or 
full-time employees were potentially a heavy commitment. It 
could therefore be expected that a decline in subcontract 
and casual labour, as a proportion of total activity, would 
coincide with changing technical and commercial 
circumstances. These might include skill shortages and a 
need to secure the services of key workers, the availability 
of precision machine tools, and a desire to control quality 
and, perhaps, the workforce. This assumes that entrepreneurs 
came to possess the means to invest in machinery and in 
employing skilled labour I for the system of subcontract had 
been a way of spreading production costs, 
Subcontract was never completely superseded but remained 
central to the workings of engineering. Whole sections of 
the industry, like roller- and spindle-makers and founders, 
were essentially subcontractors, while others concentrated 
upon assembling and fitting components. Though small 
workshops retained an important role, the trend was towards 
gathering a workforce and integrating processes within one 
establishment, for roller- and spindle-makers as well as for 
machine-builders. In Keighley, William Smith made constant 
improvements to his premises from 1829, building a foundry 
before 1835, but his notable achievement, according to a 
later commentator, was in re-organizing the works. He was 
said to have been the first to apply planing machines and 
similar tools to the manufacture of worsted spinning frames 
in about 1830, 'giving a completeness, finish and beauty to 
the various parts of their machinery which hitherto had not 
been realised'. 
23 Hattersley too was developing a greater 
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formality in his organization, for example by starting in 
1818 to indenture key workers for terms of years. 24 In 
Leeds, Peter Fairbairn had already gathered 550 employees at 
the Wellington Foundry by 1841,25 when a highly methodical 
approach was apparent to a visitor: 
. *. the bulk of the operatives are involved in turning 
small pieces of iron, adjusting them with files, or boring 
them for the admission of axles - all, as far as possible, 
aided by steam power, which is distributed by shafts with 
hundreds of belts throughout the various floors. Much is 
also done by a corps of blacksmiths, whom .. i I found hammering away in first-rate style in a long apartment on 
the ground floor ... here all is cleanliness and order ... there are no visible bellows, each forge being blown when 
required by admitting air from a great bellows in another 
part of the house, and wrought by the steam engine. This 
... must effect a considerable saving of time ... and is 
another instance of that remarkable economisation of 19 ans 
which distinguishes all branches of our manufactures. 
Fairbairn's establishment, founded only in 1826, was 
remarkable for the size of its labour force, which had grown 
to 1,400 in 1861 and 2,400 by 1876927 a scale which in turn 
dictated a high degree of organization. An establishment of 
over 500 artisans needed systematic planning in order to 
function efficiently, with work finely subdivided to achieve 
any possible economies of scale and maximize precision, 
especially in the era before machine tools. Peter Fairbairn 
was quite deliberate in his intention: 
In my works a subdivision of labour takes place; I require 
a good many very superior men, but I can d2a by sub- 
dividing the work, with some inferior men. 
The economic and technical advantages of a fine sub-division 
of labour had been pointed out by Babbage in the early 
29 1830s, though Fairbairn and his peers would have been well 
able to draw the conclusion for themselves. The obverse of 
economies of scale possible in large factories was that 
small workshops, lacking a range of specialists and grades 
of skill, were forced to allocate relatively easy tasks to 
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skilled workers as it was not economic for them to retain 
30 
specialized semi-skilled employees. 
As products changed and specialisms grew, so the degree of 
division of labour was refined. Thomas Ashton considered 
that sub-division of labour gave Britain a major advantage 
over foreign machine-makers. 
31 William Fairbairn thought 
that the French engineering establishments he had visited 
$appeared very deficient in arrangements and method ... they 
appeared much more confused in their operations' than their 
English equivalents. 32 Peter Ewart attributed the 
superiority of British machinery to 'the high state of the 
subdivision of labourl and emphasised that the size of 
organization was vital to this process: 
We never had any subdivision of labour till it was carried 
on to a great extent, and it is impossible to have a great 
subdivisin of labour, but in proportion to the extent of 
business. 
The scale of establishments was therefore closely linked to 
an ability to specialize, and hence to improve quality and 
efficiency. 
aa 
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THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK 
The period after 1830 can be described as one of 
consolidation in machine-making, though the leading 
establishments did not cease to be technically and 
commercially progressive. There is an impression that the 
post-1830 industry was less dynamic than during its 
formative phase, when the idea of 'flexible specialization' 
dealing with an 'ever changing assortment of semi-customized 
products' had been a reality. 34 Berg, drawing attention to 
diverse ways in which work could be organized during early 
industrialization, has pointed to a middle way between those 
large-scale/ small-scale polarities which are commonly 
assumed. 35 Her notion of 'new departures in the workshop 
economy deploying extensive division of labour and multi- 
plant production processes' fits well with the development 
of machine-making, though the West Yorkshire equivalent of 
Birmingham's 'division of labour ... spread out between 
several separate units' would be neighbouring small 
workshops in separate ownership producing batches generally 
smaller than in the metal trades of Sheffield or the West 
Midlands. 36 
Berg's idea that some 'modern' features of industrial 
organization pre-dated the factory is convincing. It is 
certain, for example, that division of labour existed in 
late eighteenth century engineering workshops. How far those 
other innovations which are commonly associated with new 
forms of industrial organization, features such as mass 
production, specialization, standardization and 
interchangeability, were adopted in pre-factory workshops, 
is more difficult to prove. Were such 'modern' features 
compatible with a machine-maker's workshop of the late 
eighteenth century, where typically a master with a few 
journeymen or apprentices and little or nothing in the way 
of machine tools produced 'one-off' orders, alongside 
general engineering work, while specialist parts and 
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castings were bought in from subcontractors? Even in 1850 
when a few vast firms each employed hundreds of men on 
specialized tasks using sophisticated machine tools for 
large batch production, alongside them continued many small 
establishments where 'modern' systems would have been 
incorporated gradually, or not at all. There is a striking 
resemblance to the change which had come to Berg's 
Birmingham industry, which by the 1830s was starkly 
polarized into large and small. However, just as old methods 
of organization do not automatically preclude modern 
techniques, nor does industrial concentration necessarily 
imply a loss of flexibility, or even the end of flexible 
specialization. Collecting together the most modern machine 
tools under one roof gave tremendous scope for versatility. 
Engineers of the late nineteenth century have actually been 
criticised for over-flexibility, for their willingness to 
offer a product range too extensive to have made the best 
economic sense. 37 It is therefore feasible that a desire to 
be as versatile as possible was a driving force behind the 
establishment of factories. 
There were, though, other more pressing technical and 
economic reasons for operations to be brought into 
factories. As a 'putting out' system had not operated in 
engineering, it was not problems of labour discipline or 
embezzlement which forced machine-makers to centralize their 
workforces. 38 On the contrary, the old system had offered 
great advantages to employers in optimizing the use of 
labour. Subcontractors and casual labourers worked 
intensively for short periods to deal with bulges in the 
workload, falling back on other local industries when 
textile engineering work was short. But such a system lost 
attraction as a mass market for machines developed, and 
skill and consistency in the labour-force assumed a premium. 
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Generally speaking, the rise of the engineering factory 
slightly postdated a series of breakthroughs in machine tool 
technology between 1815 and 1830.39 This is not necessarily 
explicable as direct cause and effect, Integration and 
centralization need not have followed from process 
mechanization. In theory any specialist subcontractor could 
have acquired a small range of machines to improve speed and 
precision in his workshop. It is difficult to know how far 
this actually occurred. Much of the work carried out by 
small subcontractors seems to have been gradually absorbed 
into the factories of machine-makers and main 
subcontractors. By 1850 most textile machines and the 
components which went into them were made in such large 
establishments. Although small workshops continued to employ 
large numbers of mechanics, many of them apparently 
concentrated upon jobbing and repair work, or activities 
slightly removed from the mainstream of machine-making. 
There is enough evidence of quality problems to suggest that 
efficient monitoring of production was one reason to bring 
processes into a factory. Process mechanization alone did 
not produce a complete solution to problems of quality. 
Factory organization was another means of improving 
standards, enabling work to be closely supervised, and also 
allowing a growing expertise built upon narrow 
specialization. John Lee Bradbury, a Manchester calico 
printer, attributed the superiority of his local engineering 
industry over that in London to the method of organizing 
work, for in Manchester 'a workman is frequently kept in a 
manufactory at one article, all his life, and consequently 
attains great skill in the production of such article'. 40 
The result of this intensifying specialization was that by 
1841 it had become unthinkable that one man could make an 
entire machine. 'There is not one man that could do the 
blacksmith's work and casting; a man could not make a 
spindle and a roller, but perhaps half a dozen men could do 
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the whole'. 41 This was academic thoughs as half a dozen men 
could not produce a machine economically. 
Another aspect of specialization was that firms narrowed 
their range of products: 'One machine-maker often makes one 
kind of machine his principal study, and another, another; 
by that means each is able to make cheaper and better than 
they otherwise could'. This was not merely driven by a 
desire for economy, but in an operation such as spindle- 
making which was still mainly a manual operation, was 
dictated by necessity. 
42 Such specialization also offered 
greater potential to stimulate constant improvements to 
machinery. 
43 
These new methods of organizing work were by no means 
revolutionary, for most had existed before process 
mechanization. 
44 While division of labour is associated with 
efficiency, it need not involve the use of machines. 
45 By 
sub-dividing tasks, increased speed of production or 
improved quality should be possible. Though often identified 
46 
with factory organization, division of labour is not 
confined to factories. Nor should it be assumed that it led 
to de-skilling of the workforce, though skills may have 
changed as a result. 
47 As Berg has pointed out, division of 
labour can be spread between several separate units, 
48 
a 
pattern adopted by many of the early machine-makers and 
their specialist subcontractors. Before the 1820s, machine 
tools were rudimentary and subcontractors generally very 
small concerns, so it is likely that specialization then was 
intended to maximize precision when jobs were still done by 
hand. The move to factories and machine tools may have 
followed from the failure of this system to deliver goods of 
a quality and quantity required. Hattersley's files contain 
numerous complaints about late delivery and poor quality, 
such as this from Taylor and Wordsworth in 1824: 
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We cannot think of sending such rubbish out of our Shop 
... the man that made them must have been drunk ... instead of improving you are getting worse you formerly 
made a good Spindle how it is you are fallen off so much 
we cannot tell. We are not the only persons that find 
fault there p6e many worsted spinners that have made the 
same remark. " 
But Richard Hattersley retained his customers, who continued 
to clamour for deliveries, which suggests that the products 
were no worse than anyone elsels. 
In itself, a factory could not solve the problems of 
precision, improve the 'clumsiness in all kinds of millwork 
before the introduction of machine tools' which Smiles 
described. James Watt had not been able to achieve 
sufficient accuracy with the best of Birmingham artisans. 
Yet better work could not be had. First rate workmen in 
machinery did not as yet exist; they were only in process 
of education. Nearly everything had to 
t 
be 
i 
don 30 by hand. 
The tools used were of a very imperfec k nd. 
Watt had attempted to overcome this by encouraging a high 
degree of specialization among his workmen, but results 
remained unsatisfactory. The casting and machining of 
components was so inaccurate that: 
Not fifty years since it was a matter of the utmost 
difficulty to set an engine to work, and sometimes of 
equal difficulty to keep it going. Though fitted by 
competent workmeng it often would not go at all. Then the 
foreman of the factory at which it was made was sent for, 
and he would almost live beside the engine for a month or 
more; and after easing her here and screwing her up there, 
putting in a new part and altering an old one, packing the 
piston and tightening ýýe valves, the machine would at 
length be got to work. 
William Fairbairn said that when he arrived in Manchester in 
1814: 
The whole of the machinery was executed by hand. There 
were neither planing, slotting nor shaping machines; and, 
with the exception of very imperfect lathes and a few 
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drills, the preparatory operations of construc on were 
effected entirely by the hands of the workman. 
ýI 
Though Fairbairn was prone to exaggerate in order to make 
his own work look the more impressive, 53 similar points were 
made by others such as Nasmyth: 
Up to within the last thirty years nearly every part of a 
machine had to be made and finished ... by mere manual labour; that is on the dexterity of the hand of the 
workman, and the correctness of his e e, =a we entirely 
to depend for accuracy and precision 
+n 
t ýz execution of 
such machinery, as was then required ... 
It has been suggested that credit for developments in 
machine tools, including improved lathes and a rudimentary 
slide-rest, belongs to eighteenth century clock- and watch- 
makers. 55 Though machine tools were improving at that time, 
the real breakthroughs came after 1800. Jefferys believes 
that the years between 1800 and 1840 saw a transformation of 
machine-making from a trade relying upon manual dexterity to 
one where machines made machines. 56 Others pinpoint the 
1820s as the period of most significant change, and which 
brought about a revolution in production methods for 
machinery. 57 The crucial changes were to the lathe and the 
planer, and William Fairbairn singled out the work of 
Roberts and Whitworth, who had made 'new and more perfect 
tool machinery, which has given not only mathematical 
precision, but almost a creative power - as one machine 
creates another'. 58 New machine tools appear to have been 
adopted by the textile engineering industry as soon as they 
became available. 
Specialization was a feature of the division of labour, as 
workers concentrated on a limited range of tasks. It 
continued alongside, as well as within, the factory system, 
demonstrated by Hattersley's continuing to supply spindles 
in the 1820s to Taylor and Wordsworth, Fairbairn, Maclea and 
March, Lawson and Walker and other factory-based Leeds 
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machine-makers. 59 Another aspect of specialization was the 
way in which machine-makers found a niche within the market. 
There was nothing new about specialized products, as local 
buyers required only a narrow range of machinery from the 
first machine-builders, but with expanding markets came the 
potential to concentrate and build a reputation in a chosen 
field. Whether intended or not, this was a means of avoiding 
head-on competition with neighbouring engineers, as shown by 
the two major firms in Keighley during the 1840s. George 
Hattersley made looms, William Smith spinning frames. This 
process of specialization may have gone further and occurred 
earlier than engineering historians have hitherto 
recognised. 60 
It is now acknowledged that some of the new techniques in 
engineering antedate by several decades the 1850s, where 
conventional wisdom had placed them. 
61 The so-called 
American system of manufacture has been exposed as something 
62 
of a misunderstanding, perhaps even a myth, and was 
certainly not a novelty in the 1850s. 
63 Henry Maudsley is 
now recognised as a pioneer of precision engineering and 
mass-production alongside his development of machine tools 
in the late eighteenth century. 
64 and Musson believes that 
textile machines had been mass-produced for some years 
before 1845.65 Nasmyth has been identified as the instigator 
of assembly-line production after 1836.66 This debate is 
hedged with problems of definition and shortages of 
evidence. In particular, the concept of interchangeability 
is fraught with difficulty. A modern engineer would expect 
to work to tolerances of less than one thousandth of an 
inch, which was not possible in 1800. But rollers and 
spindles were produced to fine tolerances and seem to have 
been interchangeable with others made to the same 
specification, though not between different models of 
machine. 67 Some accounts of how machines were built abroad 
suggest that, to a point, parts were interchangeable, though 
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considerable skill was needed in assembly. 68 It is not even 
necessary to have sophisticated machine tools and measuring 
devices to produce interchangeable parts, for Saul has shown 
that it could be achieved using handworking with emery 
cloths and 'go, no go' gauges. Saul concedes that there is 
doubt about the degree of hand fitting required in 
assembly. 69 Professor Farish had apparently achieved a 
system of interchangeability which enabled him to construct 
models of 'all the more important machines which are in use 
in the manufactures of Britain' during the early 1820s, for 
the purpose of demonstration during lectures in the 
University of Cambridge: 
I procured .. an apparatus, consisting of what may be 
called a system of the first principles of machinery; that 
is, the separate parts, of which machines consist. These 
are made chiefly of metal ... and so adapted to each 
other, that they may be put together at pleasu 6 e, in every 
form, which the particular occasion requires. ' 
Such a system may not have transferred to industrial use. 
The issue of the degree to which interchangeability was 
pursued before 1850 remains uncertain and may be a question 
incapable of solution by historians alone. 
While it is clear that specialization and other 'modern' 
features of engineering had existed in some form during the 
industry's formative years, still the mass-production of 
identical products was far from the universal experience of 
machine-makers in 1850.71 But one is left with an impression 
of the mid-nineteenth century as a time when smaller 
producers were becoming secondary, if not downright 
subordinated, to larger factory-based engineers. The issue 
of relationships between the large and the small in 
engineering needs further examination. Whether engineering 
could have taken an alternative organizational route is a 
question beyond the scope of this study, but it is essential 
to stress a continuing diversity within engineering, and 
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consequent dangers in generalization. Even acknowledging 
that large firms possessed great advantages at the mid- 
century, in every aspect of their activities, it was still 
possible for a small machine-maker to enter the field and 
achieve great success. George Hodgson, who started in 
business in 1849 with an idea for a new loom, capital of 
Z500, a workforce of two, and no foundry, is a case in 
point. 72 The overlap, between 'traditional' and 'modern' was 
enduring, for just as 'modern' features are detected in the 
early industry, so flexible specialists and industrial 
swarms survived far into the nineteenth century, 
ENTERING AND LEAVING 
Choosing inferior or obsolete technology was not a realistic 
option for any machine-maker who wished to thrive in the 
mainstream industry. 73 It was essential to keep abreast of 
developments, as demonstrated by the rapid exit from the 
trade of all non-engineers soon after 1800. Technical 
competence was the primary requirement, and increasingly so 
from the 1820s, but the intending entrepreneur also needed 
finance, and connections into the local information network. 
Saul has suggested that entry to entrepreneurial status in 
many engineering trades was relatively easy, and that one 
benefit of this was a constant rejuvenation of the 
industry. 74 Certainly initial capital requirements were 
modest. A figure of E500 has often been quoted: for George 
Hodgson in 1849, George Hattersley in 1832, Peter Fairbairn 
in 1826.75 Hattersley, who took over the family's rented 
factory after the old firm's bankruptcy, had other assets: 
relevant skills, a knowledge of products and of the market, 
his contacts and credit. He rapidly made good. Others 
started with less finance, though as trained machine-makers 
they would have been familiar with the local market. There 
are instances of promising young men being sponsored by 
those who were better established. The Leeds flax-spinner 
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John Marshall helped Murray and Wood in this way in about 
1794, may have assisted Taylor and Wordsworth in 1816, and 
financed Peter Fairbairn's expansion in 1828.76 In each case 
the direct assistance was of short duration, perhaps only 
for a few weeks. But Marshall's purpose was to ensure his 
own supply of machinery, and his interest assured his 
proteges that orders were likely to follow on from the 
capital he had lent. 
Many of the first entrepreneurs in machine-making were from 
humble backgrounds where family capital would not have been 
available. Joshua Wordsworth's relatives in Thurgoland were 
poor. 77 David Wood was the son of a rural blacksmith. In 
Keighley, Hodgson described Berry Smith as 'a poor lad 
without means'l and told how John and Samuel Smith, sons of 
an overlooker, 'husbanded their means so as to be able to go 
into business on their own account' in 1818.78 Not all 
claims of poverty should be taken at face value: Murray's 
son-in-law Charles Gascoigne Maclea, grandson of a Church of 
Scotland minister, was said to have been a 'self-made' man, 
but this was in the heyday of rags-to-riches mythology and 
is questionable. 79 
Hodgson's suggestions of modest beginnings are substantiated 
by information about the premises and equipment of the first 
machine-makers. William Smith started in 1795 in two rented 
cottages, which were extended enormously over the next 
80 seventy years to match the growth in his business. William 
Carr rented a house with smithy and mechanics' shop in 1790, 
and in 1798 was able to have a house built for him, with a 
workshop on the top storey and a smithy behind, though he 
still relied upon human power to turn his lathes. 81 Berry 
Smith set up benches and lathes in his own chamber in a 
small cottage, employing boys to turn the machines. 
82 
Commonly engineers started in premises without steam or 
water-power. The Smith brothers used 'a half-witted fellow' 
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and a blind man to provide power for their shop, though they 
had soon moved into the basement of a cotton mill where they 
could make use of the steam engine. 83 Thomas Smith also 
converted from human power to room and power, in 1820, while 
Titus Longbottom was able to start in 1809 with rented room 
and p9wer. 84 In Leeds, Peter Fairbairn started out in a 
small room in Lady Lane in 1826, where a 'stalwart Irishman' 
powered the lathe. 85 At about the same time Thomas Armitage, 
a Cleckheaton machine-maker, used power 'supplied by a man 
who turned a large wheell. 
86 
The system of subcontracting helped reduce both fixed and 
working capital requirements to a minimum. By buying in 
castings and precision parts from suppliers like Hattersley, 
perhaps on extended credit, a textile engineer could manage 
without a foundry or much equipment. Entry to the trade was 
consequently eased for those with few financial resources 
but who nevertheless possessed essential skills and 
knowledge. Suppliers who were, better established extended 
support through credit and through a flexible approach to 
the settlement of accounts. Richard Hattersley's earliest 
sales ledger shows that payments from many customers were 
spasmodic, with some years late in meeting their bills. 
87 
Others settled accounts with quantities of iron or 
engineering tools, wood, and even household items such as 
blankets, wool, a clock, bacon and butter. Hattersley was 
able to stand this by spreading the risk, retaining a large 
number of customers. Those who thrived, like Berry Smith, 
adopted more businesslike methods and paid promptly in cash. 
As for the rest, some goods were never paid for, and other 
debts were settled years late or in kind. Hattersley's 
acquiescence in granting credit and taking goods in lieu of 
cash, however reluctant he may have been in this, certainly 
helped young and struggling businesses, some of whom grew to 
become important customers* 
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The earliest of these small engineers were also helped by 
their versatility. When first in business Richard Hattersley 
was not above mending spades, clog irons or the church 
gates, at the same time that he was building expertise in 
repairing rollers, spindles and flyers. 
88 William Carr also 
started in Keighley as 'a Jobbing blacksmith and 
whitesmithl, following the same route as Hattersley into 
machine-making via the repair of flyers and guides for 
cotton mills. 89 This 'dual economy' of general and more 
specialized work was a strategy for weathering fluctuations 
in the textile trade. As the market for machines grew, this 
was no longer necessary and general work fell away. 
Many of the first machine-makers did not last long in the 
industry, though not all who gave up did so because they 
were unsuccessful. The new technical demands partly account 
for a high drop-out rate before 1810, but some pioneering 
machine-builders simply saw more profitable opportunities 
elsewhere, perhaps in their original trade. From the first 
fifty years of textile engineering in Keighley, only the 
eighteen firms listed in Table 2.1 have been identified, and 
it is unlikely that there were many more. Twelve of those 
firms had given up machine-making by 1805, including all 
five of the woodworkers. Only one is known to have been 
insolvent. Others returned to their own trade, though one, 
Lodge Calvert, made a very profitable career in textile 
manufacture. The six remaining Keighley firms, all operating 
in the second decade of the nineteenth century, were led by 
entrepreneurs with appropriate technical skills. Four of 
these were out of business by 1840, in each case because the 
entrepreneur was unable to continue and had failed to make 
adequate plans for the succession. Michael Merrall's 
children were too young to continue the business when he met 
an unexpected death in 1819. Though his widow persevered for 
a time, she was unable to carry the firm. 
90 In other cases 
there may have been no need for the business to survive. 
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Titus Longbottom, who had experienced commercial problems in 
the 1820s, nonetheless pulled his business around but it 
died with him in 1831 as he had no heir. 91 Berry Smith, who 
also seems to have lacked an heir, increasingly turned to 
commission worsted spinning from about 1810 and had given up 
machine-making altogether by about 1830, but his business 
did not survive his death in 1835.92 On the other hand, 
William Carr, who had long appeared the foremost engineer in 
the town, passed his business down to his sons when he 
retired in about 1817, but they failed to sustain it and it 
eventually fizzled out in about 1840.93 One of these sons, 
Edward Carr, was still working in the trade as a Journeyman 
at the time of the 1851 census'.. so perhaps his failings were 
entrepreneurial rather than technical. 
The only two firms in Keighley which survived through the 
period, and with great success, were those of Hattersley and 
William Smith, both of whom had many sons and grandsons, 
from whom successors were chosen on merit. Both firms 
experienced problems with family members who were 
incompetent, extravagant or simply disagreeable, but the 
situation was managed so that these brothers were eased out 
and a degree of meritocracy prevailed. 
The same trends are discernible in the Leeds industry, 
though less is known about the total size of the industry 
before 1810. Seven major firms were established in Leeds 
before 1830, of which three apparently failed for lack of 
suitable heir. Technical demands were too pressing to allow 
widows or executors to take temporary control, as was 
possible in other industries. John Jubb II had tried to 
arrange for his business to be carried on by trustees until 
his three young sons could take over, but the firm soon 
closed after Jubb's death at the age of 41 in 1816.94 
Zebulon Stirk, who had been a successful maker of steam 
engines as well as textile machines in the 1820s and 1830s, 
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and a considerable exporter of spinning and preparing 
machinery to the continent in the early 1840s, was reduced 
to employing half a dozen men by 1851, when he was 69 years 
old. 95 This firm too died with its founder. The third firm 
which did not survive was, perhaps surprisingly, that of 
Matthew Murray. Because Fenton, Murray and Wood had enjoyed 
such early success, 'making a great deal of Money' as James 
Watt junior had noted in 1802,96 David Wood's surviving sons 
were able to follow leisurely pursuits, and seem never to 
have become involved in engineering. The younger David Wood 
was described as a gentleman at the time of his father's 
death in 1820.97 Murray's own son, Matthew, unable or 
unwilling to carry on the firm, spent most of his working 
life as an engineer in Russia, where he died in obscurity. 98 
Control of Murray's firm passed to a son-in-laws Richard 
Jackson, but once the momentum of Murray's 'creative 
impulse' had exhausted itself, the business ceased to 
exist. 99 
A notable feature of the surviving Leeds firms is that they 
were partnerships. In the cases of Samuel Lawson and Peter 
Fairbairn, partners seem to have played a minor role in the 
firm's development, yet they provided some stability and 
continuity in management until the entrepreneur's only son 
had proved his worth. Maclea and March and Taylor and 
Wordsworth were both partnerships of brothers-in-law, in 
each case with a childless partner leaving some assets to 
the children of the other, who continued the business. 
Though the number of firms is small, common patterns are 
discernible. The industry had moved beyond the model of 
flexible specialization, where 'firms were not enduring 
units of production but rather temporary combinations of 
machines and skills directed to the achievement of 
particular tasks'100 to a situation where, generally, 
efforts were made to ensure the continuation of successful 
firms. 
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Crucial to the long-term survival of these firms was 
conscious planning of the succession. The general pattern 
was that sons were apprenticed in the firm, and if they made 
the grade as tradesmen they would gradually be introduced to 
commercial aspects of the business. If there were no 
suitable son, then there was a problem in arranging the 
firm's survival, as illustrated above by the various firms 
which wound down or finished upon their principal's death or 
retirement, On the other hand, an engineer who lacked heirs 
altogether would not necessarily have seen any reason to 
keep his business alive, and may have chosen to wind down as 
he entered old age, in the way that Zebulon Stirk seems to 
have done. If an engineering entrepreneur had more sons than 
could be accommodated in the family firm, then other plans 
had to be made to ensure the survival of the main branch of 
the business. Richard Hattersley had five adult sons, only 
three of whom were designated to take over the family firm. 
The business came to grief within three years of Richard's 
death in 1829, as the sons could not agree. Bankruptcy in 
1832 and a consequent relaunch as two separate branches, 
under George in Keighley and Samuel in Bradford, seem to 
have been used as an opportunity to elbow out the 
troublesome Levi, with whom George would not work. Levi 
never recovered his equilibrium, and eventually died in the 
workhouse. On the other hand, a younger brother, Jonathan, 
who had not been included in the original plan for the 
family firm but who possessed more skill and application 
than Levi, made his own way, settling in Leeds and building 
his own successful business with no help from his brothers. 
The fifth brother, John, worked in the family business for a 
time before eventually departing for Australia. The family 
problems of the 1830s were still weighing on George 
Hattersley's mind in 1858, when he urged his eldest sont 
Richard Longdens to tackle a spendthrift brother, William 
Henry, and save the firm from disaster: 
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ese it appears he will get thro all we have been hard 
working for, for upwards of years in two or three years 
more and we are ruined ... 
The threat does seem to have been a real one. William was 
quickly removed from the firm, going on to work as a 
salesman in the Bradford textile industry. 102 Richard and 
Edwin, who was the third son, formed a partnership with 
their father in 1860, though it was Richard who took control 
of the engineering side of the business while Edwin 
concentrated upon the family's growing worsted spinning 
interests in the Worth Valley. The second son, John, 
apparently had no aptitude for business, and was never 
included. A much younger half-brother, James Midgley 
Hattersley, whom George had been keen to bring into the 
family firm, was pushed out by Richard after George's death. 
Though ruthless., Richard's policy of concentrating power 
upon himself paid off for the family business. His major 
failure was in not himself producing a son to whom he could 
hand on the business, and eventually he had to groom one of 
his sons-in-law for that role. 
The other major Keighley firm, that of William Smith, also 
suffered from an excess of heirs. The original firm survived 
its founder's death in 1850, continuing until some of his 
sons decided to retire during the 1860s. It then formally 
dissolved, with the largest section continuing under the 
direction of William's fourth son, Prince, and his own son, 
also Prince Smith. 
103 Like the Hattersleys, William Smith's 
sons seem to have had conflicting aspirations, and only full 
control of their own firm was enough to satisfy the more 
enterprising of them. Although William Smith had no need to 
plan the succession, those of his seven sons and numerous 
grandsons who wished to continue machine-making had been 
forced to re-group. 
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NETWORKS 
While the individual machine-making firm was the basic unit 
in the industry, there also existed a further, informal, 
level of organization. The networks which connected firms 
can be summarized as the training network which has been 
described in chapter 2; a trading network of subcontractors 
and customers; and more personal connections between the 
families of engineers. If an 'innovating community' could 
play its part in technical development, 
104 so in the sphere 
of production it is logical that firms would seek mutual 
advantage in a degree of co-operation. 
The training network, through which much was known about the 
work of different firms and the capabilities of individuals, 
served as backdrop'to a trading network, which has also been 
extensively discussed. The case of Hattersley has shown how 
one firm with specialist skills could supply a local 
machine-making industry with precision parts, single- 
handedly and perhaps to the extent of supporting technically 
firms which otherwise could not have survived. Richard 
Hattersley both used subcontractors, and was himself a 
subcontractor, tapping into a wider trading network which 
included the main Leeds machine-makers, who though highly 
competent and specialized, continued to buy his rollers, 
spindles and flyers. It suited both the supplier, who could 
have made his own machines, and the customers, who could 
have produced their own parts, to continue in this position 
of mutual dependence. Later, Hattersley's knowledge of the 
industry and its markets enabled his firm to survive 
mechanization and a consequent loss of profitability in his 
own specialist field of component making, for the decision 
to move into making worsted powerlooms took Hattersley into 
a commanding position in a new division of textile 
engineering. 
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Training and trading networks are relatively obvious and 
easy to prove. The personal connections are not so 
straightforward, yet there is much evidence that machine- 
makers were linked through friendship and that their 
relationships extended beyond simple commerce. In Keighley 
the early industry consisted mainly of sole traders 
operating within a well-defined local community, and as they 
achieved success some of them assumed a role in town affairs 
- Richard Hattersley was a member of the Select Vestry by 
about 1815, Berry Smith on the Company of Keighley 
Waterworks which formed in 1816, and the two of them, along 
with Thomas Smith and many up-and-coming textile 
manufacturers, members of a new Keighley Improvement 
Commission in 1824, for which appointment they were required 
to show assets of C1000.105 These groups, primarily charged 
with providing infrastructure and order, also acted as a 
forum for local industrialists. Outside this network of the 
most successful in the town, help was offered to those lower 
down the entrepreneurial ladder, as with Titus Longbottom, 
who received a loan in 1820 from Richard Hattersley and 
Thomas Mills, an ironfounder, using his new workshop as 
security. 106 This should not be seen as in any way 
altruistic, for Hattersley and Mills would receive a 
commercial rate of return on their investment, and in any 
case Longbottom was a customer of Hattersley, But such a 
transaction shows the interdependence of engineers, and that 
mutual advantages were recognised in the support of smaller 
firms. 
The social life of Leeds engineers was markedly different. 
Leeds was a much larger town run by an established oligarchy 
to which even the wealthiest machine-makers, because of 
their lowly origins, could not gain admission until after 
municipal reform in 1835. Exclusion from the establishment 
was only one reason for engineers to form their own network. 
They had similar interests and backgrounds, and tended to 
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cluster in, the districts of Hunslet and Holbeck, south of 
the town centre, in the same way that Berg's Birmingham 
metalworkers had concentrated in certain areas of that town. 
The reasons for choosing Hunslet and Holbeck were practical 
ones: property was cheaper, coal supplies-and the canal were 
close, there were several established foundries there, and 
some large customers, flax-spinners, were also in those 
districts. But additionally the earliest engineersq mainly 
newcomers to the town, may have chosen to be near other 
machine-makers so that they could feel in touch with 
commerce and technical. progress. From such proximity and 
business dealings came closer relationships. 
The family links between Leeds machine-makers were not 
dynastic, alliances between firms, but rather marriages of 
female relatives of established businesses to young 
engineers who subsequently became entrepreneurs. So Murray, 
needing an heir in place of his reluctant song married off 
all three daughters to engineers, of whom at least two, and 
perhaps three, had been his apprentice. Looked at another 
way, three ambitious young men married daughters of the 
great engineer and were helped, directly or otherwise, into 
entrepreneurship. Jackson took over Murray's firm, and the 
others, Maclea and March, set up as partners in 1825, their 
connection with Murray presumably helping them on their way. 
Taylor and Wordsworth also married sisters, through whom 
they came into relationship with an early firm of machine- 
makers called Drabble. They may even have taken over the 
firm of Drabble, which disappeared from records at about the 
same time that Taylor and Wordsworth appeared as a 
partnership. 
107 Through their relationship with the 
Drabbles, Taylor and Wordsworth were also uncles to a later 
firm of textile engineers in Leeds, the Pollards, to whom 
they left property and of whom one was a trustee of 
Wordsworth's estate. 108 
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Because many machine-makers started in rented premises, they 
were unable to finance business expansion through mortgaging 
property. Consequently we are denied information about 
industrial finance which would, in the case of a mortgage, 
have been formally recorded in the Registry of Deeds, and it 
cannot be shown to what extent engineers helped each other 
financially. But there are small pieces of evidence which 
show something of a network involving machine-makers and 
related tradesmen, and indicate a degree of mutual trust in 
these circles. This is striking where executors and trustees 
have been chosen from competitor firms. The elder John Jubb 
named William Varley, wire-drawer and one-time machine- 
maker, as his executor, with the power to dispose of all his 
real estate. 109 John Jubb (II) left his whole estate and the 
guardianship of his children in the hands of trustees, one 
of whom was John Raper of Holbeck, a carpenter. In 1820 
Raper also became executor, trustee and guardian of the 
younger children of David Wood. 
110 When Raper sold some of 
an estate in Holbeck in 1825 to Benjamin Jubb, who was a 
machine-maker and probably the younger son of John Jubb (I), 
one of Jubb's trustees was Joshua Wordsworth. 111 Wordsworth 
was also named as a trustee of Samuel Lawson in the purchase 
of property in 1835, at a time when these leading figures in 
Leeds engineering might rather have been expected to have 
been in keen competition. 112 
CONCLUSION 
For the first forty years of its existence, machine-making 
was essentially an industry which produced high-tech 
products by handicraft methods. While processes remained 
unmechanized, the industry relied upon specialization to 
optimize the accurate and efficient production of 
components. There was necessarily a long overlap between 
traditional and modern systems of working. If, like 
Randall's woollen workers, textile engineers combined 
dynamism and conservatism, then it was for pragmatic and 
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positive reasons'.. and not because any institutional 
constraints were being applied. It was an attempt to make 
the best of processes and systems which were not fully 
adequate to their purpose* 
Productive association, perhaps a more useful term than 'co- 
operation' to explain the character of early machine-making, 
was a response by the industry which was intended to 
minimize some of these difficulties. There was nothing 
artificial about such a culture, for it descended from 
traditions of skilled workers whose instincts were to 
respect and assist others in their trade. Alongside the 
energy and ambition of entrepreneurs building a new industry 
ran a current of mutual support, bolstered in some cases by 
family links and training connections. 
In the 1830s the network ceased to be adequate, and 
processes came to be integrated within factories. As with 
technological innovation, organizational change drew upon 
proven and established features, adapting them to suit new 
circumstances. The factory system emerged through an 
evolutionary process, and, proving Pollard's point that it 
was not in itself a stage of development, subcontract 
continued alongside as part of that system. There is an 
apparent paradox in the role of improved machine tools, 
which while making possible the continuance of a flourishing 
small-scale sector alongside the large, also offered 
economies of scale which could be fully realized only in a 
factory. The explanation of this seeming contradiction lies 
in the fact that smaller shops were not making complete 
machines, but concentrated upon specialist component 
manufacture, repair and maintenance work, or other 
peripheral activities. The mainstream industry had moved 
into factories to take advantage of the extra flexibility 
and economies of scale they offered. These benefits were 
achieved by re-ordering production to make best use, not 
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only of specialist toolsq but also of mechanized lifting 
equipment and other organizational improvements. 
So to an extent the move to factories was driven by 
technology, and influenced by supplementary technologies 
relating to the handling of goods as well as by the primary 
production technology. A few exceptional firms had realized 
at an early date the significance of re-ordering production 
to achieve economies of scale and improved quality, but most 
of the industry was too small-scale to afford the necessary 
capital investment. Only after the 1820s, a highly 
successful decade for the industry both commercially and in 
process technology, did it become possible for other textile 
engineers to follow the lead of pioneers such as Murray. 
There is a sense during the 1830s that machine-makers left 
behind an artisan mind-set and started to consider immediate 
organisational needs as well as engaging for the first time 
in forward planning. The family firm was no longer 
personified in the tradesman who hoped to pass on his 
business to his sons, but emerged with a separate corporate 
identity. Emphasis shifted from a network of subcontractors 
on to the firm itself, and the sustenance of the firm became 
a central issue for its principals. 
This does not explain the move to factories, as the 
emergence of the new family firm could have been an effect, 
rather than the cause, of change. The risk, the size of 
investment in factories, the potential profits to be made, 
would affect a family's view of their business. In other 
words, a decision to upgrade would force a more businesslike 
attitude towards raising capital and protecting the family's 
investment. An unsentimental approach to the future 
management of the firm, a realistic plan for the succession, 
was an important part of this. Such policies often paid off, 
and those firms which had taken decisions to integrate and 
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expand around 1830 were the ones which dominated the 
industry by the mid-century. 
Nor does Marglin's labour exploitation thesis adequately 
explain why factories were necessary, for organizational 
changes in engineering did not lead to de-skilling of the 
labour force and consequent savings in labour costs. The 
subcontracting system was not an entrenched one in need of 
reform. The move to factories actually brought new problems 
of organization to entrepreneurs, who had then personally to 
handle issues of work discipline and skill shortages which 
had previously been the responsibility of their 
subcontractors. While it is likely that centralized 
supervision brought about a better quality product, the 
volume of business had to increase to make the investment in 
factories worthwhile. It was an expansion of the market for 
textile machinery, and the economies of scale which that 
made possible, which triggered the investment in factories. 
The growth of a mass market in machinery gave small firms 
confidence to invest as they had not done before. With a 
maturing of products and of the market, energies could be 
directed into productivity improvements. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CUSTOMERS AND MARKETS 
Your opinion is, that in England we shall always keep the 
superiorify, from our ingenuity and arrangements? -I hope 
we shall. 
A tone of complacency evident in 1824 may reflect nothing 
more than the success which those appearing before the 
Select Committee were then enjoying. Textile engineers were 
so inundated with orders that they did not bother to send 
the parliamentarians a collective view on lifting the 
2 machine export embargo. An explanation for the apparent 
smugness of machine-makers could be that their 'ingenuity' 
had created its own market, with local textile manufacturers 
forced to replace plant frequently in order to remain 
competitive. In that situation, engineers could continue to 
trade in a pre-existing market, with no need to look further 
for work or fight hard for business. The threat to such a 
position would come only when the bubble burst, as the great 
waves of innovation subsided. 
The suggestion of complacency may not be fair. For while 
there is some correlation between the industry's expansion 
and technological innovation, by the mid-century Yorkshire 
textile machinery was being sold far beyond the local 
region. This move to distant markets could have been an 
attempt to fill a gap left by the slowing of innovation, a 
recognition that most textile processes had been mechanized 
and that the pace of innovation must slow, leaving the local 
textile industry amply supplied with machinery which no 
longer had inbuilt obsolescence. On the other hand, markets 
extended beyond the immediately local area long before 1850, 
and a direct and consistent connection between innovation 
and the growth of the industry remains unproven. But the 
idea that technical progress stimulated a local market 
adequate to sustain the industry, and that serious efforts 
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to build extra-regional markets came only after the stream 
of innovation began to dry, can serve as an outline 
hypothesis. 
If there were a correlation between changes in the volume 
and location of the market over time, and the availability 
of new technology, then that may provide at least 
circumstantial evidence to support the theory. Of particular 
relevance is the size of the local market in relation to 
total sales. This local market requires definition, for the 
early textile industry spread into distant rural outposts. 
It could be that a 'local' market for machines was more 
widespread in the early period than later, when textiles 
concentrated upon major centres. There are other 
complications in trying to link sales and innovation. What 
was the effect of trade cycles? When at its most innovative, 
was textile engineering dynamic enough to override economic 
cycles and continue expanding in defiance of the general 
state of trade? If so, that may provide firmer evidence to 
support the hypothesis, especially if it can be shown that 
external markets were unimportant before the 1840s. When the 
export embargo was lifted in 1843, further complexities 
arise, and there is a need to clarify cause and effect in 
relationships between a declining home market, a 
decelerating pace of innovation, and the relaxation of the 
law. 
Before turning to the historical evidence, there is a 
theoretical point to consider on the nature of the 
connection between technology and the market. Did demand 
stimulate technical development, or did new technology 
stimulate the market? In short, which is the major factor 
accounting for the industry's dynamism? Gilfillan has shown 
that demand, whether in the form of changing prices or other 
3 imperatives, is quite capable of stimulating innovation. On 
the other hand, Musson is clear in believing that a product 
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4 
must precede its market. Capital goods suppliersq though, 
are differently placed from promoters of consumer goods who 
have to convince the general public of their need for a new 
product. It is quite possible for the market to demand what 
does not exist, when the market consists of well-informed 
purchasers looking to mechanize existing processes, or to 
improve machinery. However it is equally feasible that 
engineers could create a market by vigorous promotion in the 
5 way that Boulton and Watt seem to have done. As so little 
is known about the motives of innovators or the strategies 
of engineers in the nineteenth century, answers to this 
question are necessarily speculative. It is also a 
possibility that the process worked both ways, in that 
demand and new technology fed off each other. 
Musson would not accept such an idea, for he believes that 
to credit the market with a role in generating technological 
innovation is to accept that inventions are 'inevitable', a 
sociological theory which he dismisses as 'naive and 
unhelpfull. 
6 It is certainly easy to be wise after the 
invention, with what Musson calls 'easy historical 
hindsight'. He cites achievements which the modern public 
glibly assumes to be assured: travel to other planets and 
stars, and a cure for cancer. But with easy historical 
hindsight, we can see that considerable progress has been 
made in both these fields in the twenty years since Musson 
wrote. The progress is incremental, rather than cataclysmic, 
which is nonetheless what Musson might have anticipated in 
1972. He thought that 'easy modern assumptions ... are of 
little help to the scientists or engineers who are faced 
with the detailed problems of finding out precisely how to 
achieve such goals'. 
7 But on the contrary, the expectation 
that a solution can be found sets innovators on the road 
towards solving the problem. As engineers grappled with 
mechanizing textile processes and improving machinery, the 
strength of a prevailing conviction that solutions could be 
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achieved must not be underestimated. It hardly matters 
whether this Zeitgeist preceded the first successes, or 
whether confidence grew out of technological breakthroughs 
in the mid-eighteenth century, for what was important was a 
belief that solutions could be found by the application of 
knowledge and skills. This belief carried the textile and 
engineering industries on the, crest of a wave of mechanical 
improvements from the 1780s through to the last great 
challenge of designing a woolcombing machine in the 1840s, 
though by that time the wave had lost much of its momentum. 
As proof of the success of self-belief, a succession of 
innovations-to-order may be cited, from Cartwright's 
powerloom, an original idea which needed substantial 
modification before it would work, to Roberts's self-acting 
mule, technically successful though not entirely original. 
There are also thousands of innovations which cannot be 
referred to, as they were small and unrecorded, but 
nevertheless were improvements, in response to the express or 
unstated requirements of an informed and discerning market. 
So perhaps the idea that innovation stimulated demand is not 
an alternative to the idea that demand stimulated 
innovation, for there is no obvious reason to rule out 
either theory. If the importance of a local network of 
engineers and their customers is recognised, these views of 
how the market related to new technology may be 
complementary. The challenge then is to show more subtle 
mechanisms within local communities to explain how the 
market functioned. 
Demand need not take a form as explicit as the request made 
to Roberts to design a self-actor. In a close-knit community 
of machine-users and their suppliers, certain needs would be 
obvious to all. Was there, though, a point at which 
engineers had progressed beyond those clear requirements and 
were forcing the pace of technology? In the same way that 
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textile manufacturers encouraged the public to take new 
products, were engineers also thrusting new machines upon 
manufacturers? Or did the creative instincts of machine- 
makers instead turn inwards to refine their own tools and 
production processes? If the local market for machinery was 
becoming more difficult as possibilities for innovation 
diminished, engineers are likely to have looked for new ways 
forward, including increasing their own efficiency, and 
seeking out new markets. 
The comparative experience of Lancashire may be instructive. 
In a concise but convincing account of machine-making in 
Lancashire, Farnie emphasises the complementary roles of 
engineers and spinners in the growth of the cotton industry, 
though competition retains a central role in his argument, 
with engineers 'too jealous of their compeers ever to 
consider united action, least of all in the maintenance of 
8 prices'. Farnie stresses the importance of a vast local 
market for machinery, though the durable nature of the 
Lancashire engineers' products limited their own sales 
possibilities. The response to this difficulty included 
constant improvement and refinement of machinery, attempts 
to convince machine-users that technology was 'a progressive 
rather than a static instrument of production', and other 
less abstract incentives to spinners to upgrade their 
plant. 9 Thens from the late 1820sl Lancashire engineers 
increasingly turned to the export market. It might be 
expected that developments in Yorkshire would follow a 
similar pattern, though perhaps lagging behind the 
Lancashire engineers whose interests lay overwhelmingly in 
the more technically advanced cotton industry. 
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1850 
Spindles 
Looms 
25,638,716 
301,445 
1856 
33,503,580 
3699205 
NOTE: Figures for the woollen mills of Lancashire appear 
to have been excluded from the 1850 totals, which should 
therefore show a further 223,778 spindles and 4,839 
powerlooms (Jenkins 1978, p. 60). 
SOURCE: PP (HC) 1857 (Sess. 1) III, p. 572 
TABLE 6.1 
Spindles and Looms working in the U. K. Textile Industry 
1836 1841 1843 
2,768(l) 11,458 16,870 
1845 
19,121 
1850 
30,856 
1856 
35,298 
NOTE: (1) A figure of 2,856 is given in PP (HC) 1836 (24) 
XLV, pp. 150-1. 
SOURCES: PP (HC) 1845 (639) XXV, p. 477; PP (HC) 1857 (1) 
III, p. 633 
TABLE 6.2 
Worsted Powerlooms working in the West Riding 
THE SIZE AND VALUE OF THE MARKET 
There is no accurate way to estimate the size of the market, 
or the size of the textile engineering industry, in this 
'pre-statistical period'. 10 Even after 1850, Floud found 
considerable difficulty in producing such figures for 
machine tool manufacture. 11 That contemporary authorities 
had no idea of textile engineering's overall scale is 
demonstrated in the way that the 1841 Select Committee 
carefully recorded Peter Fairbairn's estimates of firms, 
workers and capital employed in machine-making in the 
biggest engineering centres in Yorkshire. 12 There was no 
attempt to make their own wider survey, or to collect 
information on the value of the market in machinery, though 
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POWERLOOMS 
England: 
wool 
worsted 
silk 
flax 
cotton 
1835 1836 1850 1856 
2,045 2,150 9,439 (1) 14,453 
3,082ý 29969 320617 38,956 
1,714 1,714 6,092 9,260 
309 209 3,670/1,141 (2) 7,689 
108,632 108,751 249,627 298,847 
West Riding (3): 
wool 175 (4) 
worsted 2953 
silk 
flax 
cotton 
272 
2,856 
nil 
nil 
3,114 
SPINDLES 
England: wool 
worsted 
cotton 
West"Riding: 
worsted 
c. 1833 
9,333,000 
30p856 
1850 
864,874 
746,281 
35,298 
1856 
1,298,326 
10212,587 
NOTES: 
1. The figures for the woollen industry in 1850 should 
include a further 4,839 powerlooms (Jenkins 1978, p. 60). 
2. Contradictory figures for the flax industry are iven in 
PP (HC) 1851 (1304) XXIII, p. 232, and PP (HC) 1857 
Mss. 
l) 
III, p. 574, though those for other branches of textiles are 
identical. The total used in Table 6.1 is based upon the 
figure of 3,670. 
3. The information for 1836 relates to only part of the West 
Riding, though apparently including the major woollen and 
worsted areas (PP (HC) 1836 (24) XLV, pp. 150-1). 
4. This figure is clearly incomplete. There are also 226 
looms said to have been used for both wool and worsted 
fibres (Jenkins 1975, pp. 126-7). 
SOURCES: PP (HC) 1836 (24) XLV 145; PP (HC) 1851 (1304) 
XXIII9 p. 217; PP (HC) 1857 (Ses'sp. 
i) III, p. 559; Baines 1835, 
p. 431; Ure 1836, p. lxii; James 1857, p. 536; Baines 1873, 
p. 636. 
TABLE 6.3 
Powerlooms and Spindles working in England and the West 
Riding 
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this would have been pertinent to the committee's 
investigations. 
To take a different approach and build an aggregate picture 
from local detail is equally problematic. The trade 
directories which Floud could use are incomplete for the 
earlier period, nowhere near universal in their coverage and 
not specific about firms' activities. Sales records of 
engineers, and purchase books of their customers, do not 
survive in sufficient numbers or suitable form to use as a 
basis for extrapolation. The difficulty is exacerbated by 
the way in which machine production was organized, 
particularly the supply of components to engineers who made 
complete machines. For example, the cost of rollers and 
spindles made up about one fifth the value of a machine. 13 
and most of these were produced for machine-makers by 
specialist subcontractors, who also sold replacement parts 
direct to textile factories. So while concrete evidence is 
in very short supply, there is also a danger that sales 
could be counted twice. 
Tables 6.1,6.2 and 6.3 have been compiled from a series of 
parliamentary reports, which are in part self-contradictory. 
Particularly unreliable are the spindle figures for the 
1830s, which the factory inspector, Baker, described as 'not 
in the least trustworthy'. 14 Even for the 1850s, figures for 
spindles are much more approximate than those for looms. 
Calculating the numbers of spindles working in the cotton 
industry in 1850 according to a formula provided by the 
Factory Inspectors, by multiplying 1,932 factories by 
14,000, the average spindleage per factory, produces a total 
of more than 27 million spindles, while we are told 
elsewhere in the same report that the number of spindles 
working in all branches of the country's textile industry 
was 25.6 million. 15 By the same formula, the woollen and 
worsted industries would have had 4.4 million spindles in 
1850, a figure which is inconsistent with apparently 
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authoritative information used elsewhere. 16 Jenkins has 
shown-that billy spindles, doubling spindles and spinning 
spindles were not separately listed, so that it is 
impossible to be certain about spinning capacity. 17 That may 
help explain the discrepancy between the various 
parliamentary figures, but it does not assist in valuing the 
size of the machinery market as the price per spindle of 
preparing and spinning machinery differed (see Table 6.5). 
Figures for cotton appear altogether more numerous and 
reliable, and illustrate the vast size of that industry 
compared with other branches of textiles. A significant 
proportion of the cotton industry was in Yorkshire. Of 1,000 
mechanically driven cotton factories in England in 1835,126 
were in the West Riding. 18 But how much of their machinery 
was locally produced remains unknown. It is likely that most 
nineteenth century cotton machinery was imported from 
specialist centres in Lancashire. 
So there are two major problems in using textile statistics 
to calculate the size of the textile engineering industry in 
Yorkshire. First, the figures are approximate, and perhaps 
inaccurate. Secondly they cannot account for the way in 
which the supply of machinery was organized, notably any 
inter-regional trade, nor how long machines were kept in 
service, nor how much discarded machinery was brought back 
into use. These points will be further discussed below. 
The two parliamentary reports do contain other indications 
of the machine-making industry's size. Working at full 
capacity in 1824, the total value of cotton machinery 
produced, presumably in England alone, was said not to 
exceed 9400,000, with a comparable figure for Scotland of 
not more than E40,000.19 No values were given for other 
branches of textiles, whereas evidence presented to the 1841 
Select Committee was in the form of a total for only the 
larger towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire and which did not 
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distinguish between branches of the industry. Eleven towns 
in Lancashire were said to accommodate 115 'mechanical 
establishments', with a total of 1,811 horse power and a 
maximum capacity of 17,382 employees. This works out to an 
investment averaging 987.16 per employee, though ranging 
from about 970 a head in Blackburn and Manchester to E146 in 
Burnley. 20 Fairbairn's figures for machine-making in Leeds 
suggest that 18 firms employed 255 horse power, 2950 workers 
and E305,000 capital. 
21 Furthermores he estimated that 
Bradford, Bingley and Keighley had nearly 1,000 hands and 
over 960,000 invested. These figures do not exactly coincide 
with evidence from Lancashire engineers who thought that the 
four Yorkshire towns together amounted to 442 horse power 
22 and 5,000 hands. 
The average firm in Leeds in Fairbairn's list had 164 
employees with E103.39 invested per capita. These numbers of 
firms and engineers are roughly what could be expected, as 
the engineering workforce in Leeds recorded in the 1841 
census has been calculated at 3,741, which includes a 
growing number engaged in machine tools, locomotive building 
and branches other than textiles. 23 The average Leeds firm 
is similar to the Lancashire sample, which ranged from 40 or 
50 workers per firm in the smaller towns, to 209 in 
Manchester, 280 in Salford and 321 in Bolton, averaging 151 
over the eleven towns. 24 Averages conceal a wide variation, 
as in the Leeds industry where Fairbairn employed 550, and 
Lawson, Maclea and March, and Taylor and Wordsworth, each 
had several hundred employees. 25 
Fairbairn's evidence to the Select Committee seemed to 
suggest that an annual turnover roughly in line with the 
amount of capital employed could be expected. In Fairbairn's 
case, he had invested 950,000 to E60,000 and claimed annual 
sales of E60,000, or a gross income to the firm of over 9100 
26 
per employee. Fairbairn was noted for his modern and 
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highly organized premises, but his level of investment 
appears to have been on a par with that of others in the 
industry. 27 The industry in general was working far below 
capacity; as a Lancashire witness to the Select Committee 
said, 'we could produce double the quantity that we have 
produced in the last twelve months, if it was requiredi. 28 
But Fairbairns specializing in flax machinery, was thriving, 
and a figure of E100 gross income and XIOO fixed capital per 
worker, for a firm which kept busy and was equipped to a 
modern standard, may serve as a useful benchmark. By this 
measure, the Leeds industry, employing 2,950, may have had 
an annual turnover in the order of 9295,000, and 1,000 
workers in the Keighley/ Bradford/ Bingley industry could 
have produced machinery with a finished value of X100,000. 
The equivalent figure for eleven leading Lancashire towns 
would have been over fl. 5 million per annum. 
It is possible to suggest tentative figures for the value of 
machinery produced in the years before 1850. Whatever the 
service lives of machines in general, powerlooms were in 
such demand from their first introduction that it is 
unlikely that any had been scrapped by 1850. The total 
number of powerlooms given in 1850, if an accurate estimate, 
is therefore likely to represent the total produced to date 
(Table 6.3). The probability is that most of the worsted, 
woollen and flax powerlooms at work in England, a total of 
50,565, were made in the West Riding. If these were sold at 
E14 each, a very approximate figure, then the total value of 
powerloom sales in Yorkshire before 1850, excluding exportsq 
would have amounted to 9707,910. These sales would have 
fallen in the fifteen years before 1850, with the majority 
in the 1840s, so that the value of the market in powerlooms 
during that decade would have been at least X50,000 a year. 
Estimates for spinning and preparing machinery are even more 
problematic. There was an early survey of spindles used in 
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the cottonýindustry, made by Crompton in 1811, though as he 
himself put it, 'this but a partial account of the cotton 
spinning - the extent of the Mule in the woollen trade is 
not mentioned, thol extensivel. 
29 The spindle figures do not 
show how many machines had been constructed, for mules could 
have between 50 and 500 spindles, water frames 48 to 160 and 
jennies 48 to 208.30 If Crompton's figures are accurate for 
the section of the textile industry which they attempt to 
cover, it appears that a minimum of 290,000 spindles were 
then operating in Yorkshire. 
31 As spinning frames then sold 
for around El a spindle, and most of those running in 1811 
would have been recently produced, perhaps in the previous 
20 years, the annual market in Yorkshire was upwards of 
E14,500. But there are serious omissions from this figure, 
such as the whole of flax-spinning in Leeds. 
Similarly, at the end of the period a rough calculation 
indicates the size of the engineering market. Table 6.3 
shows that 864,874 worsted spindles were working in England 
in 1850. As Keighley was approaching a monopoly on making 
worsted spinning machinery, most or all of those frames 
would have been produced in the town. 32 A tentative price of 
15 shillings a spindle sets the total value of this 
machinery at E648,655. If its service life were as long as 
25 years - and some of it would have been replaced much 
faster - then the annual value in the 1840s of the worsted 
machinery marketq most of which concentrated upon Keighley, 
could have been in the region of X26,000. A similar exercise 
for 1856 when there were 1,298,326 spindles gives a value of 
X973,744, averaging 938,949 over the previous 25 years. 
However if the increase in spindleage between 1850 and 1856 
is valued using the same method, ignoring any replacement of 
machinery during this period, the 433,452 additional worsted 
spindles installed amount to E325,089, or C54,181 per annum 
over six years. These figures, rough as they are, give an 
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impression of massive expansion in sales by the local 
machinery industry, particularly at the end of the period. 
Mule Water/Throstle Jenny 
Todmorden and district 69094 11984 
Halifax and district (1) 122640 69866 6300 
Miscellaneous districts: 
Dobcross 1080 
Marsden 1080 240 
Todmorden 3888 
Warley 5184 
TOTALS: 202966 82090 6300 
NOTE: (1) Included in the figures for Halifax and district 
are factories in Leeds, Huddersfield, the Spen Valley and 
outlying rural areas. There are also 17 factories in 
Keighley, where a total of 3312 mule spindles and 14560 
water frame or throstle spindles were counted. 
SOURCE: Bolton Library, Crompton Mss. ZCR/16a. 
TABLE 6.4 
Cotton Spindles vorking in Yorkshire in 1811 
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TEXTILE ENGINEERING AND TRADE CYCLES 
Kirk, who studied five large textile engineering firms in 
late nineteenth century Lancashire, suggests that the 
textile engineering industry lagged about a year behind 
other trade cycles, with machine-makers responding to 
increases in demand by deferring deliveries. If an increase 
in sales were sustained, production could be expanded by 
recruiting more labour and working overtime, and only if the 
trend continued would capacity be increased. 33 But Kirk was 
examining long-established companies in a mature industry. 
The earlier industry, characterized by small production 
units, flexibility and rapidly changing technology, was so 
responsive to the needs of customers that at times it could 
take a lead and instigate development rather than trail 
behind overall economic trends. No neat synchronization 
existed between machine sales and general trade cycles. 
Though precise information is missing, it is still possible 
to identify periods of growth and depression in the textile 
trade, and to relate the state of machine-making to those 
cycles. For example, the periods when textiles underwent 
massive expansion include a cotton mill-building boom of 
1789-1802 in Keighley and elsewhere, a great expansion of 
the worsted industry in Bradford from 1818 until 1825, a 
wave of new mills during 1832-36, all of which coincided 
with a high demand for machinery. 34 Much of the evidence is 
anecdotal. The Select Committee was told in 1824 of 70 
factories in the Manchester area, and eight or nine in 
Scotland, standing empty for want of cotton machinery. 35 
Evidence given to the later enquiry, in 1841, concentrated 
upon the slump which then preoccupied engineers. The 'long, 
dreary depression' following a bank rate increase in 
September 1836, and which lasted until 1842-3, hit machine- 
makers hard. 36 One cotton spinner, Thomas Ashton, of Hyde, 
Cheshire, was moved to recant on the views he had expressed 
in 1824: 
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There were many mills standing empty for want, of machinery 
... there is now more machinery than we can employ ... a 
very great increase [in magýine-making] took place in 
consequence of the demand. 
William Jenkinson, who made cotton, waste silk and flax- 
spinning machinery in Salford, confirmed that trade had been 
'in a very depressed state indeed' for the previous three or 
four years. 38 The cotton industry suffered severe downturns 
in 1825-6,1836-42 and 1847-8 39 which seem to have had 
immediate effects upon the engineering industry. But through 
the late 1830s and 1840s worsted machine-makers were 
enjoying a boom, based on the widespread introduction of the 
powerloom to the industry, 
40 
which may explain why they did 
not send representations to the 1841 parliamentary enquiry. 
They were still busy in 1843, when the Factory Inspector 
reported: 
The most extraordinary extension of any trade within a 
limited period is, perhaps, that which has occurred in the 
Bradford market ... The machine-makers have been for some time, and continue to be, fully occupied in the 41 manufacture of both spinning frames and powerlooms ... 
Besides the possibility of new technology bringing 
prosperity to one branch of textile engineering against the 
general run of economic trendss there were other ways in 
which engineers could keep busy at apparently inauspicious 
times. An example is the period around 1810 when many 
Yorkshire cotton mills underwent conversion to worsted, and 
when new or adapted machinery would have been needed. 
42 An 
engineer could also find bread and butter work - repair, 
replacement of parts, refurbishment - at any point in a 
trade cycle. As indication of the generally steady state of 
the machine-making business, the price of rollers, a ready 
measure of the buoyancy of the market, had fallen between 
1810 and 1812, but rose steadily thereafter. 
43 
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The most important means by which, engineers could break out 
of the textile trade cycle had been to devise new machines 
and new techniques. Innovations which saved labour or 
improved quality were attractive to manufacturers even when 
trade was bad, as increased efficiency might bring a larger 
share of a small market. The level of complaint raised to 
the 1841 Select Committee by machine-makers organised as 
never before, indicates that technological dynamism was 
diminishing, especially in the cotton industry. They then 
recognized the need for overseas markets to be opened. 
Previously, textile engineers had achieved a contracyclical 
effect that was entirely positive. When textiles did well, 
so did the machine-makers. They bucked the trend only when 
the textile industry was in the doldrums. 
Peter Fairbairn's success proves the point that technical 
flair could triumph over adverse trading conditions. His 
business had grown without remission, from a back room in 
Lady Lane in 1828, when a mechanic and labourer were 
employed, to the Wellington Foundry and 550 workers thirteen 
years later. 44 This startling growth continuedt with 850 
workers in 1851, over 1000 in 1858, and doubling again by 
1867.45 The downturn from 1838 which had dire consequences 
for much of the textile trade had not affected Fairbairn's 
growth, and he attributed his success before 1841 squarely 
to recent developments in flax-spinning technology: 
The improvements that have taken place in flax machinery 
have been very peat, and I think the extent to which the 
trade has gon 4 Lsince 18281 has arisen chiefly from these 
improvements. 
A major engineering achievement could itself spark off a 
revival in the textile trade. When James described the 
'extraordinary epoch' of 1818 in the worsted industry he 
suggested that innovations in preparation and spinning had 
come from worsted spinners in response to market conditions. 
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In particular, the price of wool had risen rapidly and the 
market for fine quality goods expanded. Improved spinning 
techniques were demanded to increase the output and quality 
of yarn. 47 James does not make clear whether the spinners 
had commissioned improvements in machinery from their 
engineering suppliers, but the new machinery quickly 
stimulated demand: 
With the production of this improved class of yarno which, 
however, could only be spun by those who possessed the 
new4ot and best machinery, an extensive demand sprung 
up. 
The appearance of new machinery could have been part of the 
cause, rather than an effect, of the ending of recession. 
Thomas Ashton recognised that upturns in trade could result 
directly from innovations, describing, the mechanists of Hyde 
in 1818 and 1819 as 'very fully employed, for the power 
looms were being introduced, and that kept them in full 
employment during that time'. 
49 Textile engineers were 
immediate beneficiaries ofýsucceeding waves of innovation 
which ran through the different textile processes and 
branches of that industry. A desire to stay on the 
innovatory bandwagon may account for some machine-makers' 
dabbling in different branches of textiles, for once an 
innovation had been successfully introduced to the cotton 
industry, then it could be adapted to the more technically 
demanding worsted, woollen and other fibres. 
Others less innovative than Fairbairn were able to weather 
adverse market conditions. Richard Hattersley's success was 
relatively modest, and rested upon technical competence and 
adaptability. In fact he did not start to build machines 
until 1827, and not until the 1840s had his firm become 
primarily loom-makers rather than component manufacturers. 
The Hattersleys experimented and kept abreast of 
developments9 but they were not risk-takers. In times of 
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depression, they always had a core of replacement and 
maintenance work upon which to fall back. Berry Smith took a 
very different course, though also one characterized by 
versatility and an apparently intuitive response to market 
conditions. From a small start in 1800, Smith built a large 
business within seven or eight years. 50 Though not known as 
an innovator, he worked at the forefront of technology, 
moving from repairing cotton machinery in 1800, to building 
throstles the following year, producing his own spindles and 
flyers by 1805, and from 1809 manufacturing 'the modern 
worsted spinning frame' which he shipped far beyond the 
local region. In 1810 he started commission worsted 
spinning, and after a time gave up engineering altogetheri 
Hodgson found that Smith was still repairing cotton spinning 
frames in 1809, the kind of routine work which ensured a 
regular income if the market for new technology slowed. 51 
Even Murray and Wood, already skilled textile engineers by 
1796 when their new foundry was advertised, offered a range 
of two or three dozen products, many of which had no 
connection with textiles or steam engines, as insurance in 
case orders for their main business failed. 52 
In general, though, the market for new technology held up. I 
Farnie's observations on the cotton industry suggest that 
machinery was disposed of as it became obsolete, long before 
it wore out. 53 Writing to Joseph Bramah in 18029 Benjamin 
Gott summarized the pressures upon a manufacturer to stay in 
touch with the latest technology: 
Those who have tried any machines and found a realized 
advantage from the use of them will speedily consult their 
own interest by generally applying such productive power & 
the rivalshi 340 f their neighbours will bring them into 
general use. 
In a recession, the service life of machinery could be 
prolonged if necessary. Slumps were, howeverp short, and 
manufacturers knew that they could not afford to be left 
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behind. A detailed study'of service lives of machinery for a 
sample of New England companies concluded that machinery 
installed during the 1830s averaged about 35 years' life, 
with spinning frames and opening machinery replaced rather 
more quickly than looms and carding machines. 
55 Less is 
known of earlier replacement rates, though McGouldrick 
believes there was 'very rapid replacement of much machinery 
installed before 18301.56 William Jenkinson thought that 
machine-users, if they wished to stay abreast of technical 
developments, usually needed new machinery. 
There are very few cases in which you can apply anything 
very new to an old machine... With regard to the self- 
acting mule, if the machine be good, we generally put the 
self-acting part on to it; but if the machine be an old 
one, the extra expense in attaching the new part to it is 
often considered as a waste of 39 ney, and parties prefer 
having new machines altogether. 
Cost savings and increased efficiency offered by new 
machinery would have made replacement worthwhile. 
58 The 
Leeds flax-spinner James G. Marshall, after telling the 
Select Committee that 'a considerable portion' of old 
machinery still operated in England, and that flax 
machinery, while requiring 'frequent renewals' was of great 
durability, was forced by his questioner to be more 
specific. 
What would you say was the date of the oldest machines 
which to any extent are now in use; 20 years? -I should 
think there are-not any to that extent. 
Then probably most of the improvements that have been 
introduced in the last 20 years are in general use? - Most 
of them, and that has led to the displacement of a 
considerable proportion 59f old machinery with great 
rapidity of late years. 
In 1832 Babbage had estimated that for textile machinery to 
be profitable, manufacturers would reckon to recover their 
outlay in five years, and scrap a machine in ten. 
60 In the 
flax industry, Rimmer thought that by selling cheap 
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machinery outside the immediate-locality, Leeds machine- 
makers had enabled spinners elsewhere to compete with Leeds, 
in turn forcing Leeds flax-spinners to stay absolutely up- 
to-date. 61 Flax-spinning technology was at this time 
progressing rapidly - 'a considerable improvement each 
year', as Marshall put it. In the worsted trade, where the 
pace of change did not match that of flax, there are 
nevertheless indications that machinery continued to be 
replaced frequently. Robert Clough of Keighley was 
constantly re-equipping, though information in the firm's 
records does not enable precise calculation of the service 
lives of machines. Some spinning frames were replaced after 
perhaps fifteen years. By 1842 Cloughs had almost 100 
powerlooms, bought from a number of Keighley suppliers over 
the previous six years, and they subsequently acquired large 
numbers of looms in 1843,1847,1852,1853 (84 looms) and 
1856. But in 1865 the firm owned only 98 looms in total, 
indicating that there had been a high turnover. 62 Clough's 
accounts show that many of the looms and spinning frames 
which they bought were part-exchanged against old models, 
though some old_machinery was sold to other textile firms. 63 
What the machine-makers did with part-exchange machines is 
not known, whether re-sold, exported, refurbished or 
scrapped. The part-exchange system may have been a way of 
removing second-hand machinery from circulation so that more 
machine-users were obliged to buy new equipment. For while 
some firms, like Cloughs, followed a policy of frequently 
updating machinery, others were reluctant to spend more than 
necessary on machines. Marriners, another Keighley firm of 
worsted spinners, while buying extensively from William 
Smith and Taylor and Wordsworth, 'were never averse to a 
second-hand bargain if it was available' and seem to have 
adapted machinery in their own workshops. 64 By judicious 
selection, it would have been possible to buy the latest 
technology and still find serviceable items second-hand, 
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perhaps for processes where technology had ceased to evolve 
so rapidly. 
There are other problems in trying to estimate normal 
service lives of machines. If machinery were in high demand 
and delivery dates deferred, probably at times when textile 
manufacturers were also busy, then one would expect old 
machinery to have been retained, at least temporarily, so 
that orders could be met. There were sometimes technical 
reasons for keeping old machinery, which may have been 
preferred for specialist work in the way that the mule was 
considered better than ring-spinning for certain grades of 
cotton later in the century. 
65 Zachariah Allen described how 
old and new methods in cloth finishing continued alongside 
each other in a Kirkstall woollen mill in 1825: 
One of the shearers informed me that the old fashioned 
blades were used to make the first cut, and the last sort 
of kntyes [a new kind of spiral blade] to finish the 
face. 00 
In this way the best possible finish could be achieved. 
Handlooms continued to be used for speciality and sample 
work into the twentieth century, particularly in the 
Huddersfield fancy trade. 67 In the late 1830sq when worsted 
powerlooms were being extensively introduced, many firms 
continued to use hundreds of handloom weavers alongside the 
new technology. 
68 This could have been a way of hedging 
bets, in case unforeseen problems arose with the powerloom, 
though as the technology had already been well-tried in the 
cotton industry, it is more likely than the hand method had 
to continue for a time while engineers worked to fulfil 
orders for powerlooms. 
The pace of technology moulded the machinery market until 
innovation slowed and there was no longer reason for 
serviceable machinery to be scrapped quickly. When this 
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happened machine-makers, no longer able to override trade 
cycles, were forced to confront slumps in home trade. How 
this was dealt with, by extending the market, is the subject 
of the remainder of this chapter. 
THE LOCAL MARKET 
The definition of a local market in machinery changed over 
time, but rather than grow outwards it contracted to match 
the growing concentration of its customer industry. The 
disadvantages of transporting machines over long distances 
provide an obvious explanation for the decline in such 
trade. Those outposts of the textile industry in the 
Yorkshire Dales and northern counties had little option but 
to buy from West Yorkshire engineers, despite the 
difficulties, and can be considered part of the local 
market, though a part which was declining. It quickly became 
apparent that machine-makers preferred to serve an 
immediately local trade, and that the reasons for this were 
technical as well as practical. 
The first demands for textile machinery in Yorkshire were in 
fact answered from Lancashire. Robert Heaton in 1790 looked 
to machine suppliers in Bolton, Manchester, Burnley and 
Blackburn, and rollers from Ashton under Lyne, the first 
machinery at Pildacre Mill came from Manchester in 1792, 
Benjamin Gott in 1793 brought carding engines and jennies 
from Salford and Manchester, as well as items from 
Halifax. 69 A Preston agent was advertising worsted spinning 
frames for sale in the Leeds newspapers in 1789.70 Much 
later, in 1834, some of the first powerlooms into Keighley 
were imported from Halifax. 
71 It seems that in the early 
period of mechanization, textile manufacturers intent on 
having the latest machinery would go as far as they had to 
to obtain it, generally in a westerly direction to 
Lancashire or perhaps Halifax, if necessary adapting cotton 
machinery to process woollen fibres. 
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Longstanding trade routes in textiles would have facilitated 
these transactions. Halifax was an established worsted 
market centre where the stuff-makers of Keighley and Haworth 
'principally exposed their goods for sale' in the late 
eighteenth century. 
72 Outwork from the Bradford worsted 
industry extended into north-east Lancashire and the 
northern dales. 
73 But although such trading routes existed, 
transporting bulky and heavy products such as textile 
machinery beyond the immediate area added difficulty and 
expense. Keighley, Bingley and Leeds, and hence the North 
Sea and all navigable points beyond, had been connected by 
canal in 1777,74 but the waterway was of limited use when so 
many customers for machinery were not on its route. Even 
textile manufacturers in Leeds experienced inconvenience and 
expense when ordering machines from outside the town. When 
Ard Walker brought spinning frames and other machinery from 
Halifax to his new cotton factory in 1802, the cost of 9168 
was inflated by freight charges of E22 15s Od, plus 15s Od 
to bring the goods from the boat. 
75 Gott paid E12 15s 8d to 
transport 95 cwt. of machinery from Manchester in 1793.76 
Purchasers of machinery therefore had good reason to prefer 
a more local source, and for suppliers there were also 
advantages in serving a concentrated local market. 
In the way that Hunslet businesses traded wherever possible 
77 
with neighbouring suppliers and customers, so in Keighley 
everything possible was bought locally. Hattersley was 
supplied by founders, braziers and tinsmiths working nearby, 
and many of the Keighley machine-makers and textile 
manufacturers bought spindles, flyers and rollers 
exclusively from Hattersley. 
78 Many early sales of machines 
which Hodgson recorded were to local factories by local 
engineers. 
79 As the worsted trade mechanized and 
concentrated heavily in Yorkshire, Keighley and Bradford 
machine-makers gained an immense local market. In 1850 the 
West Riding had 30,856 of the 32,617 powerlooms in the U. K., 
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or nearly 95 per cent. The comparable figures for 1856 are 
35,298 out of 38,956 (90.6 per cent), and 445 of the 
country's 525 worsted factories were situated in the 
county. 80 Keighley itself, of which in 1879 it was said that 
it 'nearly monopolises the trade of making worsted spinning 
machinery and is also engaged in making looms' had on its 
doorstep a tenth of the mills, an eighth of the spindles and 
a twelfth of the looms of the United Kingdom worsted 
trade. 81 It seems incontrovertible that the engineers' main 
market was concentrated locally, and that the engineering 
industry grew up in proximity to major textile centres in 
order to serve the textile industry. But machine-makers may 
have been much less passive in determining the course of 
trade than such bland generalizations suggest. With their 
preference for local business, engineers had reason for a 
strongly pro-active role in satisfying, then further 
stimulating, a local market, rather than venture into 
uncharted waters of sales to other regions or abroad. 
A certain antipathy towards selling outside the local region 
is detectable. Some of the resistance was ostensibly for 
practical reasons, though in expressing the problems Thomas 
Cheek Hewes indicated a lack of enthusiasm for solving them. 
When we send out a machine, it is taken to pieces like a 
bedstead, and there is no great care in packing it up; and 
it is sent to a mill, and set up the very afternoon it is 
taken out; but if it goes abroad, or even to Aberdeen, we 
are obliged to make it in a different sort of way, so that 
it will detach itself in a way that we can pack it, and we 
find it a very cumbersome thing, and the freight comes to 
a great deal, in comparison with yarn, and when it gets 
into the country, it is not portable; and if we do not 
know the kind of conveyagEe they have in the country, we 
may err in that respect. 
Hewes had recently declined an order from a former customer 
in Aberdeen, as he did not want the trouble of sending 
complete machines, nor would he supply components. 
83 The 
local trade was booming at the time so Hewes had no need of 
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the Aberdeen order. Henry Houldsworth, a cotton-spinner and 
machine-maker in Glasgow, confirmed the trouble and expense 
of transporting machinery over long distances, but had found 
ways to bring essential parts from Manchester, then three or 
four years ahead in cotton-spinning technology. He produced 
the bulkier components in Glasgow, and fabricated machinery 
by combining these home-produced parts with finer items from 
Manchester. 84 
There were other, positive, reasons for proximity between 
engineer and customer. 
... wherever you can get the most profitable and extensive 
market there a man would naturally settle ... [machine- 
makersi establish themselves in those localities where 
they are most required, provided they have 8 ýhe same facilities for carrying on their business. 
There is plenty of evidence that engineering entrepreneurs 
moved to the town, or even the part of town, where the 
market was: Murray, Lawson and Fairbairn are obvious Leeds 
examples. 86 and members of the Hattersley family set up 
separate firms close to customers, Samuel in Bradford, and 
Jonathan, after trying Burnley and Bradford, in Leeds. James 
Greenwood of Keighley moved to Leeds in the 1790s only to 
disappear without trace. 87 Benjamin Berry of Leeds was more 
successful as a machine-maker in the newly booming town of 
Bradford. 88 Once textile engineers had found their market, a 
clear preference for home customers emerged, 89 as Peter 
Fairbairn explained when setting out the concrete advantages 
of a local trade. 
oeo the contiguity of machine-makers to large spinning 
establishments is of the greatest importance to the 
extension of that particular branch of manufactures, by 
the reciprocal feelings which thereby exist between the 
parties, by being able to come into connexion with each 
other, and so canvass different improvements, the one 
trying and suggesting, and the obber executing the 
different mechanical operationso 
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Hence important innovations were in production in Leeds 
months before the flax-spinners of Ireland, who depended 
upon Leeds for their machinery, had even heard of the 
improvement. 91 Established machine-making centres were in an 
insuperable position, said Fairbairn, with such a 
technological lead and no effective competition, for 'a 
person wanting machinery prefers taking all his machinery of 
one machine-maker, if he can get it, because the machines 
are nearly alike, and may be changed from one to another'. 
92 
Such were the advantages of an early lead, added Fairbairn, 
that Belfast could not establish itself as an engineering 
centre, flax machine-making 'having first taken root in 
Yorkshire'. 93 
Keighley and Leeds were exceptional in their concentrations 
of machine-makers. The worsted boom in Bradford around 1820 
was not matched by any corresponding increase in machine- 
making there, though there were a few powerloom factories in 
the town later. 94 It was already difficult for newcomers to 
break into engineeringi Richard Hattersley responded to the 
mushrooming Bradford trade by building a new machine shop 
there in 1818.95 His judgement had been sound, and the 
Bradford business thrived for more than half a century under 
his son Samuel. But few textile engineers followed them into 
Bradford, and few newcomers succeeded in competing with 
established machine-makers in other towns. 
If a town such as Bradford were forced to import much of its 
machinery, so too were outlying villages. When Kellett, 
Brown and Co. of Calverley equipped a new woollen factory 
during the 1830s and 1840s they were able to obtain some 
machinery locallyv but much was transported from woollen 
machinery specialists in the Spen Valley. 
96 Their card 
clothing also came from long established manufacturers 
concentrated in the villages around Cleckheaton. Those 
textile businesses in the Dales and other northern outposts, 
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though still patronizing West Yorkshire engineers, were 
rapidly losing significance in relation to the total market. 
The local industry which provided machine-makers with the 
bulk of their work was very local indeed. 
Specialization was proving to be a means of producing 
components and machines efficiently and quickly. Responding 
to an unprecedented demand which had led prices to rise by 
20 per cent in less than a year, 97 the narrow field of 
spindle-making sub-divided into minor branches. 
99o there are two or three classes of spindle makers, 
separate and distinct tradesq masters and men soo since 
the demand has increased so much, [the master] confines 
his work to one kind of spindles only; each man confines 
his work to a smaller variety of spindles, and by that 
means produces them better adapted 48 the purpose, and 
cheaper than others could do before, 
The local demand for rollers remained high, resulting in a 
30 per cent price increase over twelve years. 99 In sectors 
where improved methods of manufacture had been introduced, 
prices of machines remained steady. Thomas Cheek Hewes cited 
carding engines as an example. 100 Profitable opportunities 
for specialization in shortage components were generally 
short-lived, as manufacturing processes themselves became 
mechanized. A breakthrough in spindle production came in 
1840 with Ryder's forging machine. 101 Some specialist 
spindle-makers, rather than seek to expand their 
geographical market as a result of the technological 
changes, instead chose to rethink sales strategies. 
Hattersleys, perhaps anticipating changes in the components 
market, had made experimental forays into powerloom 
manufacture in 1827 and by the late 1840s were 
overwhelmingly loom-makers. By this means they entered a new 
and booming trade, avoided head-on competition with other 
Keighley machine-makers, and ensured that much of their 
custom remained local. 
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In a sense engineers were beaten at their own games forced 
by process innovation within their own industry to 
reconsider product ranges and sales strategies. If 
comfortable local arrangements had existed between textile 
manufacturers and engineers when machine-makers occupied a 
commanding position in the application of technology, this 
changed as textile innovation slowed and engineering itself 
became mechanized during the 1820s and 1830si The intimacy 
of previous relationships may have been a phenomenon limited 
to Yorkshire. Hewes in 1824 claimed that not only did no 
formal combinations of master engineers exist in Manchester, 
but 'so little do we know of each other, that I do not know 
more than two in my line, as townsmen, I do not know them 
personally'. 102 But if this were true for Lancashire, it was 
certainly not the case in the close-knit community of 
Keighley, nor in Leeds. Only when it was recognized that 
technical successes had brought a limit to the size of the 
local market, and that general trade depressions were 
beginning to affect textile engineering as never before, did 
machine-makers need to look outside Yorkshire for new 
markets. 
REGIONAL MARKETS 
There is little to indicate that Yorkshire machine-makers 
sought work in other textile regions before 1850. ý If local 
orders had been shortg necessity might have dictated 
pursuing potential customers in Norfolk, the West of 
England, or the Scottish Bordersq but such activity seems to 
have been very limited, perhaps because any potential market 
was so small. 
Hodgson records instances of early Keighley machinery 
reaching outposts of the local market, and also into 
neighbouring regions: Edward Carr sold throstles to Chester 
and Whitehaven, Berry Smith equipped a factory in Stockton 
with spinning frames, both examples from perhaps the 
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1810s. 103 What little machinery was running in Norwich by 
1824 had come mainly from Yorkshire, 
104 In the way that 
Yorkshire manufacturers had gone to Lancashire before a 
local industry could supply their requirements, similarly 
textile manufacturers from other counties would order from 
Yorkshire if there were no indigenous engineering industry 
to which they could turn. 
Richard Hattersley, though his customers were overwhelmingly 
local, retained strong links with suppliers in the South 
Yorkshire metal trades. He bought steel from Walker and 
Booth of Rotherham, and files from his native village of 
Ecclesfield, during the forty years he lived in Keighley. 105 
After his death in 1829, his sons maintained friendly 
connections with these suppliers, one of whom actively 
helped protect the young men's interests while an assignee 
in their bankruptcy. This support was rewarded by many 
orders over the following years. 
106 Whatever the motives 
involved, it illustrates the possibility of enduring and 
close links between businesses in different regions. 
As South Yorkshire's specialist components and metals found 
a natural market far beyond their own region, so West 
Yorkshire machine-makers found a niche for their products. 
When local markets became more difficult, and especially, 
during depressions in textilesl engineers were more active 
in trying to establish markets beyond their existing range 
of contacts. The textile communities of West Yorkshire 
traded extensively in distant markets, and trading links in 
the machine-making industry to an extent shadowed those of 
textiles, in the way that Matthew Boulton had used a 
marketing network built up in the toy trade to develop a 
market in steam engines. 
107 
First indications of a more ambitious approach to sales by 
Hattersley emerge from records of a journey taken by his 
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eldest son, Samuel, in 1821.108 This was partly intended to 
chase unpaid bills, but was also an exercise in drumming up 
new business. Visits were made to established customers in 
Wharfedale and Lancashire but Samuel was also calling on 
potential buyers and noting details of their existing 
suppliers, Hattersley's competitorsi The business trip was 
relatively unsuccessful, yielding only a handful of orders. 
It must have been judged worthwhile, however, for similar 
excursions followed. A younger brother, Levi, was despatched 
to Scotland in 1828, and a journey which he made to London 
in 1823 could have been intended to seek out business. 109 
Other distant orders came through local agents, as in 1834 
when flyers were sent to Dublin under an arrangement with 
Horsfall Brothers of Bradford. 110 A request for information 
on machine prices for the United States in 1847 shows that 
agents also handled export orderslll though by that time 
George's sons, particularly Richard who went to the 
continent every year, were travelling extensively as sales 
representatives. 112 For Hattersley's, though, developing a 
regional market was not a half-way step to an export market, 
for the regional attempts did not amount to much. They did, 
though, form part of an experimental stage in the life of 
the firm during the 1820s and early 1830s, before and after 
Richard's death and the bankruptcy. The period of 
experimentation also included powerloom trials in 1827, and 
spinning frame production as late as 1833.113 The decision 
to concentrate upon the new worsted powerlooms, fairly 
obvious business for a Keighley-based engineer, enabled 
Hattersley to break free from agents and main contractors, 
and stand alone as a machine-maker. The potential market was 
enormous, and so much of it was local that Hattersley no 
longer needed to bother with customers in other regions. 
In the industry as a whole, more formal sales techniques 
were adopted from the 1830s, perhaps indication of a 
geographically developing market. Printed price lists were 
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becoming common, though prices quoted were a mere starting 
point in negotiations: 
.. the printed list of prices of any machine-maker is not 
to be depended upon; it is well known to those who 
purchase machinery, that there is a great deal of 
difference between the printed list and the, V lling price 
... They sell much cheaper than they print. `Lý 
The use of the 'package', where men, tools and materials 
were sent to equip a factory with machines, was also an 
attempt to cater for customers' needs in the home market as 
well as for exports, which technically at least were still 
illegal. 
There is an impression that engineers were more conscious of 
chasing business in other regions from, perhaps, the 1820s, 
but the amount of trade which resulted does not seem to have 
been large. The regional specialization of machine-makers 
which was already well developed -a concentration of cotton 
machines around Manchester, flax centred in Leeds, for 
example - meant that the local market remained supreme, and 
there was a certain inevitability about the pattern of 
inter-regional trade. Fairbairn knew that Leeds, as 'the 
seat of the chief flax-machine establishments ... for the 
whole world' had an assured market in Scotland and Belfast, 
and that the waste silk machinery he made would sell in 
Macclesfield and other established centres of silk- 
spinning. 115 Any possible competition would come from 
engineers in those textile districts. London, which had been 
renowned as a superior engineering centre in the eighteenth 
century, was operating in entirely different specialisms by 
116 1824 and had no hope of competing with textile engineers. 
As far as other textile districts were concerned, the 
'spirit of improvement in Norwich' which John Harvey in 1824 
had predicted would 'produce, in a short time, a great deal 
more machinery than we have now in use'$ failed to manifest 
itself in concrete form. 117 The Borders woollen 
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manufacturers, lacking an indigenous machine-making 
industry, bought most of their equipment from Glasgow and 
little from Yorkshire. 118 In the West of England some 
textile engineers were active, and inventive, perhaps in 
sufficient numbers to satisfy local requirements, for 
nothing has been found which would confirm a trade in 
Yorkshire woollen machineýry until some time after the mid- 
century. 119 The only firm evidence of trade with the West 
Country comes from the other direction, for Benjamin Gott 
had bought fulling stocks and scribbling machines from the 
West in 1793.120 In all, inter-regional trade in textile 
machinery, other than flax machinery, appears to have been 
very limited, with the West Country self-sufficient and the 
requirements of other woollen regions so modest that their 
orders for Yorkshire machines amounted to little. 
SALES ABROAD 
When local and inter-regional markets failed to provide 
sufficient business to enable engineering to continue 
expanding at its accustomed rate, machine-makers were 
encouraged, or compelled, to cultivate overseas markets. 
Without exports, the industry faced relative or real 
decline. 
Considering that textile engineering had suffered serious 
reversals in 1825-6 and during the late 1830s and early 
1840s, why did it take until 1843 for the export ban to be 
formally lifted? Musson's account of various parliamentary 
deliberations, and of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce's 
attitude to the question, is* revealing. 121 The debate of 
1824, carried out in two or three months in response to a 
question asked in parliament on the principle of Free Trade, 
would probably have had a different outcome had it been 
delayed by a year and consequently taken place during a 
recession. once the discussion had concluded, and a limited 
concession made to Free Trade by lifting the ban on 
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artisans' emigration, then it became difficult to revive the 
issue. During the 1830s attempts to enforce the law 
gradually disintegrated, and the repeal of 1843 was an 
acceptance of the inevitable. 122 Musson cautions against 
seeing the Free Trade debate in simplistic terms, drawing 
attention to the philosophical and practical considerations 
which caused such apparently contradictory postures among 
machine-makers and textile manufacturers. 123 The problem of 
machinery exports serves to illustrate the complexity of the 
Free Trade question. While the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce claimed to represent engineering as well as textile 
interests in opposing change, some of its 'engineering' 
witnesses had closer links to textiles. For example, John 
Kennedy had been primarily a cotton spinner for more than 
twenty years, as MIConnel and Kennedy had made machinery 
only for their own use after 1800J24 He no longer shared 
the interests of small-scale textile engineers who produced 
for sale. 
Consequently it is not possible to know the views of the 
majority of machine-makers at this timei The textile 
engineering industry was not represented, except under a 
general industrialists' umbrella. Even in 1841, the machine- 
makers' committees, as might be expected, represented large 
and medium-sized firms in large towns. A significant sector 
of'the industry did not come together to express an opinion. 
Though machine-makers might have welcomed a lifting of the 
embargo, the state of trade in 1824 meant that they did not 
consider it worth sending a collective view. Had there been 
a slump, they certainly would have done. But as machine- 
makers were heavily involved in their own communities, with 
local markets so important to them, and many of them with 
interests overlapping into the textile trade, it is by no 
means certain that their view in 1824 would have differed 
from that of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. 
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The slump of 1825-6 was a watershed. It represented the 
first serious blow to the industry, a recognition that 
textile engineering could no longer ride out recession 
merely by innovation. Though still illegal, exporting was 
one way of countering a difficult market at home. The flaws 
in export controls had been publicly exposed. Apart from 
outright smuggling, which could take a number of forms - 
parts mixed with others to conceal their true nature, whole 
machines sent through ports where recognition was unlikely, 
plans and models hidden in hand luggage - British technology 
reached the continent and elsewhere through the migration of 
artisans and through a number of British firms which had 
established foreign branches, mainly in France and 
Belgium. 125 The later parliamentary report, of 1841, 
contained a similar list of enforcement problems and 
complaints about contradictions and impractical features of 
the existing laws. Final proof of the law's failure lay in 
the fact that, as Peter Fairbairn put it, 'they get all our 
inventions whether we will or not'. 
126 The Lancashire 
machine-makers suggested, without much subtlety, that if 
they did not win the day in 1841, plans were afoot to 
establish a joint stock company on the continent land secure 
to ourselves the advantages which the law now gives to 
127 foreigners'. 
Between 1825 and 1843 a Board of Trade committee was charged 
with the job of issuing export licences. Their terms of 
reference included discretion 'as may appear to them not 
likely to be prejudicial to the trade and manufactures of 
the United Kingdom'. 128 The inconsistencies complained of by 
witnesses to the 1841 enquiry are apparent from the 
committee's records. Certain classes of machinery could be 
sent to continental Europe, while others were banned. These 
prohibited items were exported in copious numbers to the 
Colonies, for example in 1825, when Alexander Galloway, 
acting as agent for an unnamed machine-maker, was granted 
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leave to send to Egypt 500 (presumably cotton) powerlooms 
and other machinery. Licences for machines normally banned 
were sometimes issued if the applicant was sufficiently 
illustrious, as in the case of the Turkish minister who took 
away 'ten models of machinery for the manufacture of cloth' 
in 1836.129 Sometimes stable doors were closed late, as in 
1835 when it was noted that applications for waste tow 
preparing and spinning machinery were in future to be 
refused. 130 The goalposts moved, exporters often re-applied 
in the hope that there would have been a favourable change 
in the rules or that some carelessness by the committee 
might mean their licence would be granted. 
How involved were West Yorkshire machine-makers in exploring 
this export market? They left no trace in early applications 
to the Board of Trade. Leeds textile engineers started to 
appear on the list only in the late 1830s, when Lawson, 
Maclea and March, and Taylor and Wordsworth, attempted, 
usually successfully, to gain licences. 131 That does not 
mean that they had not previously exported, as many of the 
committee's dealings involved London agents who were 
handling machinery made in the north of England. Much of 
thist though, was for the cotton industry and probably 
originated in Lancashire. It is also unlikely that the 
larger Yorkshire engineering firms would have first 
circumvented the export ban and then later start to use the 
official system, so they may not have exported at all before 
the 1830s. Smaller makers could have adopted a more casual 
approach towards export licences. Potential problems with 
officialdom were not mentioned by Zachariah Allen when he 
recorded prices and specifications of woollen machinery, 
clearly intended to be exported, in 1825.132 
But in 1825 Yorkshire engineers had not developed much 
interest in selling abroad. They did not set up temporary or 
permanent branches on the continent in the way that some of 
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the Lancashire cotton machine-makers had done, 133 though 
there are many examples of artisans working abroads in 
France, Russia, Sweden and Switzerland, for example. 134 The 
fear of losing highly skilled employees to foreign companies 
may have been a further deterrent to firms' working abroad. 
In the way that machine-tool manufacturers found that 'a 
good tool sells itself1#135 for a time many textile 
engineers relied upon a similar maxim. Sales efforts were 
characterized by a lack of activity outside the immediate 
area, though a few machine-makers did try. Matthew Murray, 
who had built links with northern Europe through selling 
steam engines there, was able to export flax machinery to 
Russia at an early date, around 1800.136 But generally 
exporting was difficult, sometimes illegal, and involved 
extra expense and effort. To an extent British machines did 
sell themselves abroad. Technically they were in a league of 
their own, and they were also much cheaper than their 
inferior French and Belgian rivals, so they found their way 
abroad despite the lassitude of their makers on the export 
front. The northern engineers were not alone in a want of 
sales drive, for Babbage noted the preference of London 
machine makers for home orders, and the fact that premiums 
were added to prices quoted to foreign customers. 137 How 
many machines actually found their way abroad is impossible 
to say, as many were exported illegally and consequently 
unrecorded. The use of agents, which could have helped 
conceal the nature of the machine and avoid problems to the 
manufacturer of trading abroad, also serves to hide the 
volume of overseas trade. Table 6.6 shows the size of export 
business in machinery to four destinations on the continent 
during the early 1850s, but unfortunately there are no 
earlier figures, nor any breakdown to show the proportion of 
textile machinery included. 
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Some evidence of how, and when, an export market was 
developed by an individual firm comes from Hattersley's 
records though Hattersley was at least ten years behind the 
larger 
Leds 
firms in starting to export machineryi Levi 
Hattersley was sent to America in 1822-3, but there are no 
indications that any business resulted from this 
expedition. 138 It was in 1846 that a routine of sales trips 
and exports of looms to the continent began to be 
established, although Hattersley's parts had doubtless gone 
abroad in Taylor and Wordsworth's machines before then. 139 
In 1847, Hattersley began to circumvent Taylor and 
Wordsworth, who had long been his biggest customer for 
components and latterly for complete machines, and started 
to sell direct to the continent in competition with themJ40 
Summer trips by Richard L. Hattersley in search of orders and 
information in the Low Countries, Germany, and later further 
afields became an annual ritual. When in 1860 Hattersley 
recorded the sale of 100 looms in two months, a third were 
to foreign customers. Of 829 looms sold during 1861,298 
were exported. 141 
1851 1852 1853 1854 
France E71,016 E100,608 E168,856 E101,652 
Belgium Z27,058 935,517 L63,643 C57,959 
Hanse towns E1289611 E117,848 Z197,409 E125,157 
Holland E25,604 E38,616 E689455 977,058 
NOTE: The figures include all machinery exPorts other than 
steam engines. 
SOURCE: PP (HC) 1856 XVIII, p, 284i 
TABLE 6.6 
MACHINERY EXPORTED TO FOUR CONTINENTAL DESTINATIONS 
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A different view of the development of export markets in 
machinery is shown in Bruland's study of Norwegian purchases 
from Britain. The first significant imports of British 
textile machines were in the mid-1840s, 142 from which it is 
tempting to conclude that this was a result of the embargo 
lifting in 1843. But as the ban had been widely evaded, the 
importance of liberalizing the law can be overemphasised. It 
was a slowing of technological change, and decline in the 
home market as a result, which changed the law, and fired 
the sales effort into foreign marketsi 
PROFITS AND COMPETITION 
If it were possible to prove that profits were falling and 
competition among machine-makers intensifying during the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century, then that may 
support the idea that engineers were being forced into 
export markets. If the industry was becoming more 
competitive, it was not because more firms were working, for 
there were no more in the 1840s than had existed earlier143 
and with the growth of integrated factories entry to 
machine-making had become progressively more difficult. 
Also, as demonstrated by Hattersley's changing products, 
firms chose to avoid competition where there was a less 
confrontational option. So if competitiveness were on the 
increase, the cause was not a change in conditions on the 
supply side of the industry, but was more likely to be 
related to a falling home market. 
There is little concrete information about profit levels in 
engineering, though indications were given to the 1841 
Select Committee of profits enjoyed by some Lancashire 
machine-makers, when work was supposedly very short. Thomas 
Marsden of Salford, nearing the end of a three year, E30,000 
contract for flax machinery built in France, estimated that 
C6000 went on tools and materials, and over E16,000 had been 
paid out in wages. 144 The remaining E8000, while it had to 
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cover fixed costs, left a healthy margin for profit. William 
Jenkinson described a Mexican order for cotton-spinning 
machinery and millwork, lost to Belgium because of the 
export ban. The gross value was Z70,000 to E80,000, and the 
work would have employed 1,000 hands for six months. Eighty 
per cent of the amount would have gone to pay wages and 
profits, though Jenkinson did not distinguish further 
between the two. 145 Marsden had paid his workers on the 
French contract, who included local unskilled labour and 
apprentices, an average of not more than E50 per annum. 
Using the same formula, the Mexican order would have cost 
E25,000 in wages and yielded as much in profit. Matthew 
Curtis, a machine- and card-maker from Manchester, broke 
down the costs of a E27,000 order for spinning machines 9 
146 
With E3000 for bought-in spindles and rollers, L11,000 on 
wages, fixed costs of Z1,400 and E800 covering consumables 
such as tools and files, the total of Z16,200 left Z10,800 
for materials, profits and depreciation. All these figures 
are approximate, and deliberately imprecise about profits, 
but it seems that a generous level of surplus was built into 
the pricing structure even at a time when the industry was 
short of work. Rather than compete for existing home 
business, which would have meant cutting margins, these 
machine-makers hoped to broaden the market by having the 
export embargo lifted. 
Though this evidence covers only a limited section of the 
industry and consequently is not wholly satisfactory, it 
does suggest that profits remained high. If the Lancashire 
industry were still able to turn in a profit, then the 
Position in Yorkshire remained healthier still. If it is 
true that the industry was still very profitable, that is 
not fatal to the argument that machine-makers were forced to 
seek markets abroad because home sales were declining. It 
would have been possible to anticipate changes in the home 
market and move into the export trade so that profit margins 
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were protected. Engineers had had prior warning that they 
were no longer immune to market fluctuations, through their 
experiences from the mid-1820s, and by planning ahead could 
avoid sacrificing profits. ý The Yorkshire industry was better 
situated than Lancashire for this, for they had longer 
notice. They could see what was happening in the more 
technically advanced branch of cotton machine-making, where 
mechanization had run its course, and may have realized that 
they too would need to cultivate export markets to 
compensate for loss of home sales once machinery had been 
supplied to convert the last woollen processes* 
CONCLUSION 
To say that Yorkshire machine-makers had become complacent 
as a result of their early success Is to understate the 
dynamism which still motivated the industry to innovate and 
to seek new markets. Rather they were keen to protect their 
interests and those high returns they had come to expect. 
The eventual solution was to develop an export market. 
Through most of the period a local market had been of 
paramount importance. The textile industry determined the 
location of the engineering industry, and the presence of 
machine-makers subsequently helped centralize textiles in 
certain places, which in turn concentrated a local market 
for machinery. Because textile manufacturers were willing to 
replace plant as soon as it became obsolete, they were 
enthusiastic and immediate customers for any innovation. 
More than that, they contributed to technical progress by 
working closely with machine-makers and making known their 
requirements and ideas. The local market could stimulate 
innovation, just as innovation stimulated the local market. 
Under these conditions it was entirely rational that 
engineers should prefer local customers. 
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Inter-regional markets were insignificantq partly because of 
transportation difficulties. It is also likely that the West 
of England textile industry found it more satisfactory to 
have machinery appropriate to its own needs designed and 
built locally. Where machinery was sent from Yorkshire to 
other regions, it was to markets such as the Macclesfield 
silk and the Norfolk worsted industries, where an indigenous 
machine-making industry had not been able to establish 
itself. By the 1820s existing centres of textile engineering 
were so firmly established and had built such commercial 
advantages that not even such a huge new textile trade as 
worsteds in Bradford could generate much of an indigenous 
engineering industry. 
The opening of export marketsv which occurred rapidly during 
the 1840s, marks a real turning point. Yorkshire machine- 
makers, still busy equipping the local trade with powerlooms 
at that time, had benefited by witnessing the problems of 
their Lancashire counterparts at the end of the cotton 
technology boom, and acted quickly to develop an export 
trade lest advantages should slip away. The export ban was 
lifted in recognition of these changing home circumstances, 
and within a very few years exports had assumed an 
overwhelming importance to Yorkshire textile engineers. 
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CONCLUSION 
The picture of early textile engineering which emerges from 
this study is one of an industry growing from an artisan 
base, acquiring its own distinct identity during the early 
years of the nineteenth century, and developing into 
something more modern and large-scale only after about 1830. 
The changes were accompanied, predictably, by a growing 
expertise among entrepreneurs, a new professionalism in the 
workforce, and modernized forms of industrial organization. 
Significantly, the changing attitude towards competitors 
shown by the adoption of new methods of innovation and by a 
growing tendency to restrict the free circulation of 
technology illustrates just how important had been a non- 
competitive form of productive association during the 
industry's formative years. 
Those pre-established eighteenth century industries and 
professions - iron-foundingo clockmaking, millwrighting, and 
middle-class engineering in a broad sense - which appear at 
first glance to have had similarities with mechanical 
engineering, were in fact unable or unwilling to involve 
themselves in machine-making. Consequently the new industry 
did not follow any middle-class or 'yeoman' tradition, 
instead developing an identity which, while it was founded 
upon solving immediate local problems with a degree of 
originality, built upon artisanal foundations and depended 
especially upon conventional metal-working skills. From 
these origins emerges the paradox at the heart of early 
textile engineering, that it was a 'high tech' industry at 
the leading edge of the economy, yet its antecedents lay in 
simple artisan skills, rather than having developed from 
what might be considered the most sophisticated engineering 
of the eighteenth century. The newest technology was 
produced by handicraft methods. 
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It is hard to imagine how machine-making could have 
developed in any environment which was not closely in touch 
with the community of textile manufacturers. That is why 
many of the first textile machines were produced by users, 
for they knew exactly what was required. They did not, 
however, find the mechanics of machine-making easy, which is 
why it was convenient to pass over to local smiths and other 
artisan-engineers who had a more appropriate background to 
execute the work. Such craft skills, along with an immersion 
in the local textile community, were pre-requisites for 
early success as a machine-making entrepreneur. Capital 
mattered less, though as the industry grew and concentrated, 
by the middle of the nineteenth century it had become much 
more difficult for a talented young engineer to set up as a 
full-scale machine-maker. Entrepreneurial abilities, the 
capacity to manage and plan, were also essential 
requirements by that time. 
The development of the workforce mirrored the changes in 
management of the industry. Though there came to be less 
scope for mobility into entrepreneurship or even into self- 
employment, consistently high levels of skill and status and 
relatively good wages proved attractive to new generations 
of young men, who followed a formal apprenticeship path into 
the trade. 
Fundamental to the success of machine-making throughout the 
period was the industry's ability to work on ways of 
mechanizing those textile processes still carried out by 
hand, to improve existing machines and to develop solutions 
to technological problems. Textile engineers' grasp of 
technology was not informed by formal education or science. 
For a time, it was adequate to have handicraft skills in 
metal-working, though the knowledge element, the design 
details of machines, became an increasingly important part 
of the trade. As opportunities to innovate became more 
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limited by the growing complexity of skills and knowledge 
required, then technology became viewed less as the property 
of a wide community and more as a scarce asset to be 
protected. This development coincided with a move from 
'community'-centredness to a 'firm'-oriented perspective, a 
change datable to the 1830s when the availability of new 
process machinery in engineering and a growing preference 
for vertical integration within factories meant that capital 
requirements greatly increased. As a result of such large 
investments, the maintenance of a firm became the over- 
riding concern of its members, with forward planning a new 
and pressing issue. 
The market for machinery, which had occupied an influential 
place in the early development of textile engineering, 
continued to exert its force. When some in the industry 
sensed that innovation was slowing, and consequently that 
local demand would diminish as machines were kept longer in 
service, they actively sought export markets so that 
turnover and profits could be maintained at accustomed 
levels. 
Basic craft skills, open minds and a fairly free flow in 
technological information were the guiding lights of the 
industry during its earliest phases, for they were the 
optimum means through which mechanization could rapidly 
develop. After 1805 there is a sense of inevitability about 
the path which textile engineering would take. It was an 
increasingly exclusive club which was to become even more 
prohibitive to potential members, first because of the 
growing skills and knowledge content of the trade, and later 
when high entry costs barred most artisans from 
entrepreneurship in mainstream machine-making. Early success 
in the industry, or sponsorship by one who had been 
successful, were the best means of achieving success during 
the later phases. 
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By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the general 
prosperity of the industry had also come to seem assured. 
The need for both customers and producers to remain in touch 
with developments ensured that accomplishment was a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. Self-belief brought achievement, which 
reinforced self-belief. The beginning of this spiral of 
improvement cannot be precisely dated, for it was probably a 
gradual result of accelerating innovation in textile 
processes during the first half of the eighteenth century. 
The end of it, and the accompanying changes in the textile 
engineering industry, came when the first clamour for 
powerlooms was dying away and further opportunities for 
profitable innovation were diminishing. 
Inevitably the relationship between engineering and textiles 
altered-at this time. Textile engineering had never been 
subordinated to its customer industry, but the two had 
operated in marked contrast before 1830, for whereas levels 
of productivity and investment were low in engineering, 
through the products of engineering the textile industry had 
been able to achieve high productivity. In theory, skilled 
labour shortages should have stimulated process 
mechanization in engineering. In practice, machine-makers 
coped with the inadequacy of machine-tools by attempting to 
refine hand processes, for example by an increasingly fine 
division of labour designed to achieve higher degrees of 
precision. For a while that was adequate, though perhaps the 
stream of quality complaints received by Hattersley during 
the 1820s signals that the time was then ripe for change. 
The market for machinery had become much larger and more 
consistent, between 1808/9 when Hattersley still could not 
carry a regular workforce of any size, and about 1820 when 
those complaints intensified. Process mechanization 
eventually became imperative, and the market large enough to 
justify investing in new techniques, though change had been 
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long deferred while the industry's dynamism was directed 
towards product innovation. 
Any discussion of the process of technological change is 
inevitably bound up with consideration of the nature of 
competition. In the industry's early phasest innovation took 
place because the community's needs were fairly obvious to 
those involved. Technological developments were aimed at 
-improving the quality of products and the practicability of 
processes, rather than being motivated by explicit economic 
considerations. Most machine-makers did not possess any 
extraordinary talents of inventiveness, for flexibility was 
more the key to success in this, as in other industries. ' 
To be clear about the role of-demand in the progress of 
textile engineering is not easy, for in a capital goods 
industry demand may be at one remove from the supplier. If 
the consumer market demanded a new type of textile product, 
requiring a new kind of machine, then the need for 
innovation would be filtered through to a machine-maker via 
his direct customer, the textile manufacturer, for textile 
manufacturers themselves rarely designed and produced 
machinery after the initial stages of mechanization had 
passed. But when a free-standing textile engineering 
industry existed, demand could have been direct and 
explicit, from manufacturers who understood their own 
markets and could see potential economies in mechanizing or 
re-organizing parts of their production. Such informed 
demand could provoke innovation. In an atmosphere of self- 
belief., given that the problem was an immediate and relevant 
one to the concerns of the industry, solutions could be 
found. On the other hand, having seen the commercial 
possibilities of new technology, engineers would recognise 
potential benefits which perpetual innovation might bring to 
them. Perhaps it is possible to discern over the period a 
shift from demand-led innovation, to the use of innovation 
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as a means of stimulating sales. This would go hand-in-hand 
with an increasing professionalism and expertise and the 
growth of vested interests in machine-making. If it is 
correct that a self-sustained growth in technology existed 
2 from the 1760s, that phenomenon matches early, 
experimental, amateurish excursions into machine-making, 
whereas a full-blown 'Age of Inventions' blossoming in the 
1790s 3 coincides with the beginnings of a specialist 
machine-making industry. Additionally a new type of 
analytical approach to knowledge which appeared in about 
1800 4 may have been influentiall possibly infusing and 
enthusing a wider society than educated science could reach. 
Innovation was stimulated, then, in a number of ways, 
directly and indirectly, and encompassing wider cultural 
movements as well as demand and supply-side factors. As for 
the role of competition in the process, it does appear that 
a more competitive spirit was abroad in this industry by the 
mid-nineteenth century than had existed earlier, and that 
this new ethos had a role in determining new directions in 
technological innovation. 
None of these questions, about the relative importance of 
demand and supply mechanisms, or about the role of 
competition, can be adequately addressed outside the 
framework of the industry's very local community context. 
The nature of textile engineering differed entirely from 
those heavy industries, like coal and iron, which were 
connected to landed interests and large-scale capital and 
which were consequently divorced from community 
considerations. In fact, some of the features of machine- 
making were those which might have been expected of 
consumer, rather than capital, goods manufacture - constant 
product and process innovation, small firms, batch 
production of components and flexible work organization. 
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If interest groups and value systems can produce a negative 
effect, leading to 'technological inertialf 5 then the 
opposite must also be a possibility, that community energies 
can be harnessed towards a process of technological 
dynamism. In this case, innovation really does seem to have 
been the property of a wide community, at least for a time. 
The evidence of trading, training and social networks 
strongly suggests that this was the case, especially when 
these networks of entrepreneurs overlapped into the lives of 
a small key workforce which shared the same artisan 
background. The result is likely to have been an 'inventive 
6 workforce and a progressive technological stance'. In fact, 
resistance to change is striking by its absence. One 
suspects that some of the oft-repeated stories of antagonism 
towards new machines may amount to less than meets the eye, 
especially if viewed in the context of the scale of whole 
communities. This is an issue which requires further 
research. 
If constant change were the very essence of engineering, 
then the management of that change was crucial to success. 
The idea of managing change goes beyond the issue of 
planning a firm's succession. Some of the businesses which 
failed to survive the industry's gradual transition to new 
ways of working had been unable or unwilling to shed 
obsolete ideas, and their objectives lost touch with those 
of the mainstream industry. The significant period for this 
dislocation, a split between the flexible and the relatively 
inflexible, came during the 1820s and 1830s when the leading 
firms acquired a new status, leaving behind the craftsman's 
workshop and modus operandi to become an entity which 
possessed (perhaps) premises, a power source, machine-tools, 
and specialist human and technological capital. From this 
time change needed conscious management in order to sustain 
the firm and ensure its future by forward planning on a new 
scale. This was a significant breakthrough, a new frame of 
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mind amounting to much more than an artisan's conventional 
ambition of merely passing his business intact to his sons. 
Some within the industry were well capable of managing the 
new situation, ensuring their longer-term continuation and 
survival by consciously planning to become more technical, 
to adopt new working methods, managerial control and 
workplace organization, and eventually, when it became 
necessary, by developing overseas markets. The survivors 
showed a combination of technical, managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills, though still generally contained 
within the family firm. So although some firms perished, and 
it was actually only a few which thrived, the industry as a 
whole responded efficiently to achieve what was required of 
it before 1850. 
NOTES: 
1. Griffiths et al 1992, p. 898. 
2. Griffiths -e-t-aT 1992, p. 893. 
3. Griffiths et aT 1992, p. 901. 
4. Pickstone =. 
5. Mokyr 1992. 
6. Maxine Berg, 'Technological and organizational change 
during the industrial revolution: new questions', paper 
given at the Annual Conference of the Economic History 
Society, April 1994. 
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